Golden v. State, 11

• Decision Date: 02 November 1964
• Docket Number: No. 11,11
• Parties: Milford GOLDEN and Beatrice M. Golden, his wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE of Michigan and Billie S. Farnum, Auditor General, Defendants and Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 55

131 N.W.2d 55

373 Mich. 664

Milford GOLDEN and Beatrice M. Golden, his wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STATE of Michigan and Billie S. Farnum, Auditor General,

Defendants and Appellee.

No. 11.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 2, 1964.

Brucker & Brucker, by Wilber M. Brucker, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Nicholas V. Olds and Warren R. Synder, Asst. Attys. Gen., Lansing, for defendants-appellees.

Before the Entire Bench, except SMITH, J.

DETHMERS, Justice.

This is an action to set aside a decree for tax sale for 1958 delinquent taxes, insofar as it affected plaintiffs' land, and a tax deed given thereunder by the auditor general to the State. From judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

In 1959 plaintiffs had received a sheriff's deed to the land in question and certain adjacent premises upon their foreclosure of a second mortgage thereon held by them. In 1960 Michigan State University foreclosed its first mortgage covering said adjacent premises and received a commissioner's deed. Because of previous common ownership, the 2 properties had been assessed together as one piece for 1958 taxes. In 1961 the university requested and obtained from the township assessor, under the provisions of the general property tax law, being P.A.1893, No. 206, as amended (C.L.1948, § 211.1 et seq. [Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 7.1 et seq.]), and more particularly section 53 thereof (C.L.1948, § 211.53 [Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 7.97]), a statement of the valuation of its part and of the entire description. Equipped with this statement it applied to the county treasurer for permission to pay its proportionate share of the assessment against the entire description properly attributable to its portion thereof and paid the same accordingly.

Thereafter, in 1961, the auditor general filed a petition in circuit court for sale of lands on which the 1958 taxes were delinquent. In the petition and in the subsequent publications thereof and of the court's order of hearing thereon, the whole description was set forth as one, with a statement of the amount of taxes due on the entirety without severance thereof into 2 parts. On April 14, 1961, a decree, as provided by statute, entered thereon.

After the decree but before the date in May, 1961, set for sale, someone in the county treasurer's office, without knowledge or authority of the court, changed the tax record to show a severance of the 2 parcels, apportionment of the entire tax between the 2, and payment of the amount on the university's portion. At the sale the county treasurer sold plaintiffs' parcel for the amount due on it, but the remainder of the description, on which the university had paid the tax, was withheld from sale.

Plaintiffs urge that they are entitled to the relief sought because, under the statute, severance of the whole description, apportionment of the entire tax between the 2 parcels, and change of the record accordingly, should have been accomplished by order of the circuit court in the hearing on the auditor general's petition and that he or his agents should have brought the dual ownership of the description to the attention of the court. On that premise plaintiffs say that it was error for the court below in this suit to hold that accomplishment of the severance, apportionment, and change of the tax record by the method here employed was not a matter or error of substance nor prejudicial to plaintiffs' rights. Section 66 of the act (C.L.1948, § 211.66 [Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 7.111]) provides in part:

'If the lands of 2 or more persons have been assessed together, the court may, if practicable, separate the same and apportion to each parcel its just proportion of the taxes, interest and charges.'

It will be noted that the provision is permissive, not mandatory, although it manifestly was the legislative intent that the court should do so when informed of requisite facts as to multiple ownership. See Auditor General v. Brown, 243 Mich. 192, 219 N.W. 670. No duty is imposed on anyone, by the statute, to call such fact to the court's attention. Manifestly, plaintiffs did not so apprise the court nor petition it for severance and apportionment as it appears by the Brown Case they might have done. Neither did plaintiffs avail themselves of the provisions of section 53 of the act for that purpose as did the university. Whether or not the latter course would have been irregular seems to us, as it did to the trial judge, a matter of no particular substance and scarcely prejudicial to the rights of the other party owning a portion of the entire description. No complaint is made of the fairness of the apportionment as made. Whichever of the 2 methods of accomplishment might have been employed, the results would have been the same. No prejudice to plaintiffs is shown to have occurred in this connection by reason of the court's failure to sever and apportion as by section 66 of the act permitted, or to order the change or correction in the tax record.

Filing of the auditor general's petition and the publications as provided by statute, complied with here, conferred jurisdiction on the court over the entire description. Auditor General v. Ober, 304 Mich. 193, 7 N.W.2d 268. It thereupon became competent for the court to decree sale of the whole description. Payment of the tax on a portion thereof and withdrawal of if from the sale could not operate to destroy, the court's jurisdiction over the remaining parcel or to invalidate its decree of sale with respect thereto. McQuade v. State Land Office Board, 321 Mich. 235, 32 N.W.2d 510, cited by plaintiffs in this connection for the proposition that the county treasurer had no power to offer the land in question, which was a part of one owner's description, except in strict compliance with the statute and the decree, has no application here, because in the instant case there was multiple ownership as to which the statute permitted a severance of the description, while in McQuade the entire description was owned by one person so that there was no statutory basis for a severance. Furthermore, the decree provided, as section 67 of the act ¹ directed, for the sale of such parcels or interests therein as might be necessary to satisfy the amount decreed against the same, 'unless said amount be paid prior to said sale.' In the case at bar the proportionate amount due on the university's property had been paid; that on plaintiffs' had not. The offering for sale by the county treasurer was, therefore, in compliance both with the statute and the decree. The fact that less of the entire description, as advertised, was sold than might have been had the university made no payment, can hardly be said to be and it was not shown to have been prejudicial to plaintiffs' rights, nor to have violated either statute or decree. Every requisite of the statute having a semblance of benefit for plaintiffs was complied with. The statute gave the university the right to pay the rightful amount of tax on its parcel and, thereupon, to have it withheld from the sale. The statute gave plaintiffs no right to fail to pay the taxes on their parcel nor to have the entire description sold because of their default with respect to their own parcel, much less to have none of it sold.

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality, under the due process clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions, of the statute's provision for notice of the proceedings on the auditor general's petition by publication and...