Buckley v. Buckley, 65828
| Citation | 889 S.W.2d 175 |
| Decision Date | 20 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 65828,65828 |
| Parties | Joe Willie BUCKLEY, Petitioner/Respondent, v. Betty Jean BUCKLEY, Respondent/Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Irving L. Cooper, Clayton, for appellant.
Gary H. Lange, St. Louis, for respondent.
Mother appeals from the trial court's order terminating child support based on a finding that the child was emancipated. We reverse.
The marriage of Joe Willie Buckley ("Father") and Betty Jean Buckley ("Mother") was dissolved by a decree of dissolution on November 18, 1987. Custody of the one minor child born of the marriage, Jason Alexander Buckley ("Son"), was awarded to Mother. Pursuant to the terms of the decree, Father was ordered to pay $200 per month as child support for Son.
Subsequently, Mother filed a Motion to Modify seeking to increase the amount of monthly child support. On March 23, 1993, a hearing on the matter was held before Judge Samuel J. Hais. Mother testified regarding her income and expenses, as well as Son's current expenses and those anticipated as a result of his upcoming attendance at the Naval Academy Preparatory School ("NAPS").
The record reveals that NAPS is a ten-month preparatory program for admission into the Naval Academy. It is similar to a junior college in that basic college courses are taught, but it includes military indoctrination as well. It was established at the hearing that Son had already been accepted at NAPS and that both Mother and Father, as well as Son, anticipated his attendance there after his graduation from high school in June 1993, as well as his attendance at the Naval Academy upon successful completion of the program.
Father testified at the hearing that he had phoned the Naval Academy recruiter directly and spoke with him regarding Son's attendance at NAPS and his rights and responsibilities while there. Father testified that, as a condition of attending NAPS, Son would be enlisted in the military as a reservist for a three year obligation 1 and ordered to ten months active duty for attendance at NAPS. Upon successful completion of the NAPS program, Son would be guaranteed acceptance at the Naval Academy if he still desired to enroll there. Father also inquired about the salary Son would receive and costs involved with NAPS and testified to those at the hearing. Son also testified at the hearing regarding his attendance at NAPS and the procedures and consequences that followed from his enrollment therein.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Hais granted Mother's motion and entered an order requiring Father to pay the increased sum of $500 per month retroactive to December 18, 1992. The order provided, however, that during the time Son was attending college away from home, this amount would be reduced to $250 per month. Exhibit 1, attached to the modification order and incorporated by reference therein, provided that Mother and Father were each responsible for one-half of the cost each year for Son to attend a post-secondary college, university or vocational/technical school. It further expressly stated that this provision "shall apply to the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland and shall also apply to the Naval Academy Preparatory School, at Newport, Rhode Island." Neither party appealed from this order.
As anticipated, Son graduated from high school on June 6, 1993, and as required per his enrollment at NAPS, enlisted in the United States Naval Reserve. In July, 1993, Son was ordered to active military service for 36 months, but was ordered to report for duty at NAPS.
On August 10, 1993, Father filed a Motion for Emancipation of Child and Termination of Child Support Order. In this motion, Father alleged that a "continued and substantial change of circumstances" had occurred which warranted termination of child support. He alleged that Son was now emancipated due to his enlistment in the military. In her Amended Answer to the motion, Mother denied that any change of circumstances had occurred and further raised the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel, arguing that Son's attendance at NAPS and the subsequent consequences thereof had been previously litigated at the March 1993 modification hearing.
On January 4, 1994, a hearing on Father's motion was held before Judge Whittington. Mother again raised the defense of collateral estoppel. On February 8, 1994, Judge Whittington granted the motion terminating child support and found that Son was emancipated due to his attainment of age 18, his completion of high school, and his engagement in military service. This appeal followed.
Our review of an order modifying child support obligations is limited to determining whether the order is supported by substantial evidence, or is against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law. Sparks v. Trantham, 814 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Mo.App.1991).
The dispositive issue raised by Mother's appeal is whether Father's motion to terminate child support by reason of Son's alleged emancipation is barred by collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel, also referred to as issue preclusion, precludes the same parties from relitigating issues previously adjudicated. Vinson v. Vinson, 725 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Mo.App.1987). Collateral estoppel applies if four conditions are met: 1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the issue in the present action 2) the prior adjudication must have resulted in a judgment on the merits; 3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party or one in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and 4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity in the prior adjudication to litigate the issues. Vinson, 725 S.W.2d at 124; Oates v. Safeco Insurance Co., 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. banc 1979). All four requirements are met here.
Contrary to Father's contention on appeal, the transcript of the March 23, 1993 hearing establishes that the issue of whether Son's anticipated enlistment in the military for the purpose of attending NAPS and the Naval Academy would result in his emancipation was squarely before Judge Hais. As reflected in the following passages, Judge Hais expressly acknowledged Father's contention that child support should be terminated and that the issue was whether Son's attendance at NAPS and/or the Naval Academy...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fag Bearings Corp.
...offered all of the evidence it proposed to offer, but whether the party had an opportunity to do so.") (citing Buckley v. Buckley, 889 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Mo.Ct.App. 1994)). Liberty also notes that § 29 of the Restatement is applicable only to cases involving different parties, and that the re......
-
Ideker v. PPG Indus., Inc.
...inconsistent decisions,” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). Accord Buckley v. Buckley, 889 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Mo.Ct.App.1994). Under Missouri law, the district court's determination that the commission had exclusive statutory authority to hear......
-
Olsen v. Siddiqi
...that, inter alia, whether a prior judgment is legally correct is not at issue in applying collateral estoppel. See Buckley v. Buckley, 889 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994) ; Reynolds v. Tinsley, 612 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Mo. App. E.D. 1981) ; Ideker v. PPG Industries, Inc., 788 F.3d 849, 854......
-
Scarborough, In re
..."Whether a prior judgment is legally correct is not at issue in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel." Buckley v. Buckley, 889 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Mo.Ct.App.1994). See also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) ("[A] fact, question or right di......