Buckley v. Cnty. of Suffolk

Decision Date09 January 2013
Docket NumberNo 10-CV-1110 (JFB) (AKT),10-CV-1110 (JFB) (AKT)
PartiesTERRENCE BUCKLEY AND JOHN STANTON, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Defendant, COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Third Party Plaintiff, v. 1000 ISLAND AIRBOATS, INC., Third Party Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiff Terrence Buckley ("Buckley") and Plaintiff John Stanton ("Stanton") (collectively, "plaintiffs") bring this action pursuant to general maritime law and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, seeking damages for injuries suffered on account of defendant County of Suffolk's ("defendant" or "Suffolk") alleged negligence as a maritime employer, and the alleged unseaworthiness of defendant's vessel, 1000 Island Airboat ("1000 Island Airboat" or "vessel"). Plaintiffs now move, unopposed, for partial summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure56(a), solely on the issue of Suffolk's liability under general maritime law for failing to provide a seaworthy vessel.1

Generally, where a non-moving party fails to oppose a moving party's motion for summary judgment, "the district court may not grant the motion without first examining the moving party's submission to determine if it has met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains for trial." Vt. Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Young v. Nassau Univ. Med. Center, No. 10-cv-00649, 2011 WL 6748500, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2011). Here, defendant not only fails to oppose plaintiffs' respective partial summary judgment motions; rather, defendant expressly concedes liability on the unseaworthiness claim by noting "that plaintiffs' unseaworthiness count has been satisfied as stated in [their] moving papers . . . ." (See Def.'s Letter of Nov. 30, 2012, at 1.) Because defendant has conceded that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiffs' unseaworthiness claim, nor does the undisputed evidence show to the contrary, the Court grants plaintiffs' respective motions.2

I. BACKGROUND

The Court derives the facts below from plaintiffs' affidavits and exhibits, and from plaintiffs' Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts. A court considering a motion for summary judgment shall construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Capobianco v. City of N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 50 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).

A. The Facts

On January 18, 2009, plaintiffs Buckley and Stanton were working as members of the Marine Bureau for Suffolk; each was assigned to work as a crew member aboard the 1000 Island Airboat, of which Suffolk was both the charterer and owner pro hac vice.3 (Pl. Buckley's Statement of Undisputed Facts ("Buckley's 56.1") at ¶¶ 2-4; Pl. Stanton's Statement of Undisputed Facts ("Stanton's 56.1") at ¶¶ 2-4.) On that day, the 1000 Island Airboat was out on navigable waters in the Great South Bay when it became involved in an accident. (Buckley's 56.1 ¶ 5; Stanton's 56.1 ¶ 5.) As a result of the accident, the front operator and passenger seats broke free from the deck of the vessel's cockpit. (Buckley's 56.1 ¶¶ 5-7; Stanton's 56.1 ¶¶ 5-7; Pl. Buckley's Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Ex. 1, Buckley Aff. ¶¶ 4-5; id. Ex. 6, Buckley Dep. 37-38; Stanton Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Ex. 1, Stanton Aff. ¶¶ 4-5.) Buckley, who was occupying one of the seats before it became dislodged, flew backwards with the seat, striking Stanton, who was seated in a rearsection of the boat. (Pl. Buckley's Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Ex. 1, Buckley Aff. ¶¶ 4-5; Stanton Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Ex. 1, Stanton Aff. ¶¶ 4-5; id. Ex. 17, Buckley Dep. 37-41.) Both Stanton and Buckley suffered injuries as a result. (Buckley's 56.1 ¶¶ 6-7; Stanton's 56.1 ¶¶ 6-7.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a court may only grant a motion for summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant "bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment." Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005). Generally, a movant may satisfy this burden by identifying those portions of "the materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" that it asserts establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The Court must view the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Where the non-movant, however, "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, . . . there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In such a case, the movant is entitled to summary judgment because the nonmovant has not made a sufficient showing as to an essential element of his case for which he bears the evidentiary burden. Id. at 323.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Unseaworthiness of the Vessel

1. Legal Standard

Where a seaman's injuries arise from equipment or crew on a vessel that is unsafe, plaintiff may assert a claim for unseaworthiness. Under general maritime law, an action for unseaworthiness may lie against the owner of the vessel. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); Turner v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 80, 82 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Both ship and shipowner are liable to seamen for injuries caused by unseaworthiness.")). Indeed, "the shipowner's obligation under maritime law to furnish a seaworthy vessel is absolute and nondelegable, 'a species of liability without fault.'" Doherty v. Federal Stevedoring Co., 198 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (quoting Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94 (1946)); id at 194 ("It is . . . abundantly clear from the cases that the obligation of seaworthiness is exclusively that of the shipowner."). Thus, a shipowner will be liable for injuries sustained by a seaman provided that there is a causal connection between the unseaworthy condition of the vessel and the plaintiff's injuries. See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 109 (1944) (stating "[a]n injury must be 'in consequence' of the unseaworthiness, - must be connected with and result from it"); see also Borges v.Seabulk In'tl, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 387, 392 (D. Conn. 2006) ("To prevail on an unseaworthiness claim, a plaintiff must establish that a vessel's unseaworthy condition was the proximate cause of his or her injuries.").

A seaworthy vessel is one consisting of adequate equipment and appliances that are reasonably capable of serving their intended purposes and performing the ship's functions, see, e.g., Mahnich, 321 U.S. at 103; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 121 n.2, 122 (1936), as well as officers and crew who are capable of performing requisite tasks in a safe manner, Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 724, 726-27 (1967); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) ("The standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather every conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service."); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 427 (1959) (noting that even where ship equipment is safe and sufficient, its misuse by the crew may create an unseaworthy vessel); see also Borges, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 392 (stating "[a] vessel is unseaworthy if the vessel, crew and appurtenances are not 'reasonably fit for their intended use.'" (quoting Mitchell, 362 U.S. at 550)).

Even if the vessel and/or its equipment is shown to be in full, proper working condition, unseaworthiness may still be established. For instance, if a particular part of the ship is not inherently defective, but is changed or altered in such a way as to make the equipment dangerous or unsafe, the vessel will be deemed unseaworthy. Crumady, 358 U.S. at 426-28. Similarly, unsafe work practices involving seemingly safe pieces of equipment on a vessel will render the vessel unseaworthy. See Rogers v. Eagle Offshore Drilling Serv., Inc., 764 F.2d 300, 303-04 (5th Cir. 1985). Notably, to establish a vessel's unseaworthiness, a plaintiff only need show that the particular part of the ship - whether its equipment, the ship itself, or a crewmember - contributing to his injury was unseaworthy. See Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1963); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 339-40 (1955) ("[There is] no reason to draw a line between the ship and the gear on the one hand and the ship's personnel on the other. A seaman with a proclivity for assaulting people may, indeed, be a more deadly risk than a rope with a weak strand or a hull with a latent defect.").

Generally, the contested seaworthiness of a vessel is "a question of fact to be determined by the jury." Savard v. Marine Contracting Inc., 471 F.2d 536, 543 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Cook v. Am. S.S. Co., 53 F.3d 733, 742 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that the question of unseaworthiness typically should not be resolved by the court as a matter of law). However, summary judgment may be appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the question of unseaworthiness. See, e.g., Johnson v. Donjon Marine Co., No. 05 CV 1543(JG), 2006 WL 3240730, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006) (granting summary judgment on issue of unseaworthiness where party only...

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