Buckley v. Director of Revenue

Citation4 S.W.3d 152
Parties(Mo.App. E.D. 1999) . Michael D. Buckley, Appellant, v. Director of Revenue, Respondent. Case Number: 75215 Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Handdown Date: 0
Decision Date21 September 1999
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

Appeal From: Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Hon. Robert Cohen

Counsel for Appellant: Frank A. Anzalone

Counsel for Respondent: Evan F. Buchheim

Opinion Summary: The driver appeals a judgment sustaining revocation of his driving privileges after he refused a breathalyzer test.

AFFIRMED.

Division Four holds: The Alcohol Influence Report was sufficient to support a finding that the police officer complied with notice requirements of section 577.041, called the implied consent law or implied warning law. Refusal was a "statutory refusal."

Opinion Author: Kent E. Karohl, Judge

Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. Crandall, Jr., P.J., and Hoff, J., concur.

Opinion:

Michael Buckley (Driver) appeals from the judgment sustaining the Director of Revenue's (Director) revocation of his driving privileges pursuant to section 577.041, RSMo Cum. Supp. 19971, after Driver refused a breathalyzer test. We affirm.

On December 21, 1997, Driver was operating his vehicle in St. Louis County when he was stopped by a St. John police officer for weaving. The officer arrested Driver for driving while intoxicated. Driver refused to submit to any field sobriety tests. Driver also refused to submit to a breathalyzer test to determine his blood alcohol content. Director revoked Driver's driving privileges.

After the revocation, Driver filed a petition for a trial de novo as allowed by section 302.535, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1998. The hearing on the petition was held on November 6, 1998. At that time, Director offered the Alcohol Influence Report (Form 2389) prepared by the arresting officer. The court admitted the report. Driver offered his testimony and disputed that the officer had ever given him the Implied Consent warnings. The court entered judgment in favor of Director, sustaining the revocation of Driver's driving privileges.

Driver now appeals, contending that the Director failed to offer substantial evidence that he refused the breathalyzer test because Driver testified the officer never gave him the required warnings under the Implied Consent Law, section 577.041. He contends his refusal was not a "statutory refusal."

Section 577.041.1 provides that an officer's request to submit to a breathalyzer test "shall include the reasons of the officer for requesting the person to submit to a test and also shall inform the person that evidence of his refusal to take the test may be used against him and that his license shall be immediately revoked upon his refusal to take the test." These warnings have been called the "Implied Consent Law" or "Implied Consent Warning." This warning is sufficient unless the words either: (1) failed to inform the driver of all the consequences of refusal; or (2) mislead the driver into believing the consequences of refusal are different than the law actually provides. Teson v. Director of Revenue, 937 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. banc 1996). A refusal is not a valid "statutory refusal" if the arresting officer omits statutorily necessary information. McMaster v. Lohman, 941 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997).

Here, Driver testified that the arresting officer never informed him of the Implied Consent Law. However, in the Alcohol Influence Report which was admitted into evidence, the arresting officer certified that he did inform Driver of the provisions of Implied Consent Law. The officer checked boxes on the Report, which will support findings of statutory compliance on the following:

1. You are under arrest for driving while intoxicated.

2. To determine the alcohol/drug content of your blood, I am requesting you submit to a chemical test of your Breath.

3. If you refuse to take the test(s), your...

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6 cases
  • Sheppard v. East
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 23, 2006
    ...evidence, not that there was evidence before the court that could have supported different findings of fact. Buckley v. Director of Revenue, 4 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Mo.App.1999). Further, although plaintiffs challenge the trial court's findings on the element of the falsity of the representation......
  • Kidd v. Wilson
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 29, 2001
    ...is afforded wide discretion even if there is evidence in the record which would support a different result." Buckley v. Dir. of Revenue, 4 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). "[A]ll fact issues are deemed to have been found in accordance with the result reached." Berry, 885 S.W.2d at 328.......
  • Litzsinger v. Director of Revenue
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 22, 2003
    ...A refusal is not a valid "statutory refusal" if the arresting officer omits statutorily necessary information. Buckley v. Director of Revenue, 4 S.W.3d 152, 153 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). Director contends that it made its prima facie case for revocation at the hearing which driver failed to rebut......
  • Fischbeck v. Director of Revenue
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 10, 2002
    ...or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Fredrickson v. Dir. of Revenue, 55 S.W.3d 460, 463 (Mo.App.2001); Buckley v. Dir. of Revenue, 4 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Mo.App.1999). To uphold the revocation of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a chemical test, the trial court must only de......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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