Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 91 C 7635

• Decision Date: 20 August 1992
• Docket Number: 92 C 1889.,No. 91 C 7635,91 C 7635
• Citation: 801 F. Supp. 83
• Parties: The Hon. Robert C. BUCKLEY, and the Illinois Judges Association, intervenor, Plaintiffs, v. The ILLINOIS JUDICIAL INQUIRY BOARD, and its members, not individually, but in their capacity as members of the Board, namely, Tyrone C. Fahner, Joel D. Gingis, the Honorable Harold L. Jensen, Joyce E. Moran, Patrick F. Mudron, William A. O'Connor, Frances K. Zemans, Mary Sue Hub; and Ray F. Breen, not individually, but as Executive Director of the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board; and the Illinois Courts Commission, and William Madden, not individually, but in his capacity as Secretary of the Illinois Courts Commission, Defendants. Anthony L. YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. James Harold BANDY, John P. Clarke, Eldridge T. Freeman, Jr., David M. Hartigan, Watts C. Johnson, and Carole R. Nolan, in their official capacities as members of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission; Tyrone C. Fahner, Joel D. Gingis, the Honorable Harold L. Jensen, Joyce E. Moran, Patrick F. Mudron, William A. O'Connor, Frances K. Zemans, and Mary Sue Hub, in their official capacities as members of the Judicial Inquiry Board; and Ray F. Breen, in his official capacity as the Executive Director of the Judicial Inquiry Board, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

801 F. Supp. 83

The Hon. Robert C. BUCKLEY, and the Illinois Judges Association, intervenor, Plaintiffs, v. The ILLINOIS JUDICIAL INQUIRY BOARD, and its members, not individually, but in their capacity as members of the Board, namely, Tyrone C. Fahner, Joel D. Gingis, the Honorable Harold L. Jensen, Joyce E. Moran, Patrick F. Mudron, William A. O'Connor, Frances K. Zemans, Mary Sue Hub; and Ray F. Breen, not individually, but as Executive Director of the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board; and the Illinois Courts Commission, and William Madden, not individually, but in his capacity as Secretary of the Illinois Courts Commission, Defendants.

Anthony L. YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. James Harold BANDY, John P. Clarke, Eldridge T. Freeman, Jr., David M. Hartigan, Watts C. Johnson, and Carole R. Nolan, in their official capacities as members of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission; Tyrone C. Fahner, Joel D. Gingis, the Honorable Harold L. Jensen, Joyce E. Moran, Patrick F. Mudron, William A. O'Connor, Frances K. Zemans, and Mary Sue Hub, in their official capacities as members of the Judicial Inquiry Board; and Ray F. Breen, in his official capacity as the Executive Director of the Judicial Inquiry Board, Defendants.

Nos. 91 C 7635, 92 C 1889.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

August 20, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William J. Harte, David J. Walker, Stephen L. Garcia, William J. Harte, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff Robert C. Buckley.

Candace Jean Fabri, John H. Ehrlich, Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for defendant Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd.

Thomas A. Ioppolo, Ill. Atty. Gen. Office, Candace Jean Fabri, John H. Ehrlich, Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for defendant Ill. Courts Com'n.

Jane M. Whicher, Harvey Michael Grossman, Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff Anthony L. Young.

James John Grogan, James Scott Renfroe, Ill. Atty. Registration & Disciplinary Com'n, Chicago, Ill., for defendants James Harold Bandy, John P. Clarke, Eldridge T. Freeman, Jr., David M. Hartigan, Watts C. Johnson, and Carole R. Nolan.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ALESIA, District Judge.

These cases were filed by two candidates for judicial office in the State of Illinois. The cases were consolidated because both plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Rule 67(B)(1)(c) ("Rule 67(B)(1)(c)" or the "Rule") of the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct (the "Code"). ILL.REV.STAT. ch. 110A, ¶ 67(B)(1)(c).¹ Plaintiff Robert C. Buckley ("Justice Buckley") is a Justice of the Illinois Appellate Court. In 1990 Justice Buckley campaigned for election to the Illinois Supreme Court. The defendant Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board ("JIB") brought a complaint against Justice Buckley before the Illinois Courts Commission ("ICC") alleging that some of Justice Buckley's campaign statements violated Rule 67(B)(1)(c). Justice Buckley's defense was that Rule 67(B)(1)(c) is unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and Illinois Constitution. The ICC found Justice Buckley's statements a violation of Rule 67(B)(1)(c) but declined to impose sanctions.² Plaintiff Anthony L. Young ("Young") is an attorney and a member of the Illinois General Assembly. Young is currently a candidate for Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Young's complaint states that he wishes to make statements which presumably would violate Rule 67(B)(1)(c). Young asserts that he has refrained from making these campaign statements so as to avoid sanctions under Rule 67(B)(1)(c). Thus, Young believes his rights under the federal and state constitutions are being violated. Young has sued the JIB and the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC"). Both plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, which would in effect require a ruling by this court finding Rule 67(B)(1)(c) unconstitutional either on its face or in its application to plaintiffs, and an order enjoining defendants from enforcing the Rule. The Illinois Judges Association ("IJA") has moved to intervene on behalf of its members as plaintiff in the Justice Buckley case (No. 91 C 7635).³ The IJA also seeks a declaratory judgment that Rule 67(B)(1)(c) is unconstitutional.

Plaintiffs have filed motions for summary judgment.⁴ The motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Weisberg for a Report and Recommendation ("Report"). The Magistrate Judge has issued his Report. See Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, et al., Nos. 91 C 7635 & 92 C 1889, slip op. (April 23, 1992) (Weisberg, M.J.). The Magistrate Judge recommends denying plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and recommends this court sua sponte grant summary judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs have filed timely objections to the Report. FED.R.Civ.P. 72(b). For the reasons discussed below, the court adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, except that the court does not adopt the Report's conclusion regarding the court's jurisdiction over the IJA's intervening complaint. Accordingly, the court denies the plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and sua sponte grants defendants summary judgment.⁵

The facts and procedural history of these cases are discussed by Magistrate Judge Weisberg. See Report, at 2-9. As the Magistrate Judge correctly notes: "There are no disputed facts and the court has been asked to determine the constitutionality of Rule 67(B)(1)(c) as a matter of law." The parties do not object to this characterization. Therefore, we will not set forth the facts except as needed to support our analysis.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Standard on Review

A district court judge is required to make a de novo review of any portion of a magistrate judge's recommendation on a dispositive motion. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); FED. R.CIV.P. 72(b). Plaintiffs object to almost every legal conclusion made by the Magistrate Judge. Our review, then, is not limited to a single legal issue but extends to the entirety of plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir.1989). A genuine issue of material fact exists only where there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party to support a jury verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l. Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir.1989). If the evidence presented by the non-movant is merely colorable or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment is appropriate. Wolf v. Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir.1989). The parties submit that this case does not involve disputed issues of material fact. Hence, the court's focus will be on which party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

B. Rule 67(B)(1)(c) and its application to Plaintiffs — Standing and Case and Controversy.

Any discussion of these cases must begin with the regulation involved. Rule 67(B)(1)(c) states:

A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office filled by election or retention

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(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact; provided, however, that he may announce his views on measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, if, in doing so, he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before him.

Rule 67(B)(1)(c) is enforced by two public agencies depending upon the position of the candidate involved. Against a sitting judge, such as Justice Buckley, Rule 67(B)(1)(c) is enforced by the JIB. The JIB brings charges of misconduct before the ICC, which is empowered to discipline and remove judges from office. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(b)-(g). The ARDC enforces Rule 67(B)(1)(c) against a lawyer, such as Young, who is not a sitting judge running for judicial office.

Rule 67(B)(1)(c) may be divided into four sub-parts.⁶ The opening clause of the Rule prohibits a candidate from pledging or promising specific conduct if elected, except that the candidate may promise "faithful and impartial performance" of his duties. We will refer to this clause as the pledge or promise provision. The second clause of the Rule prohibits a candidate from announcing views on disputed legal or political issues; we will refer to this clause as the disputed issues provision. The third clause prohibits a candidate from misrepresenting his⁷ identity, qualifications or other facts. This provision will not be discussed as the plaintiffs have not raised any constitutional objections to this portion of the Rule. The last clause contains a proviso that a candidate may announce his views on measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice so long as the candidate does not, by his announcement, cast doubt on his capacity to be impartial on any issue which may be presented to him while in office. We will refer to this clause as the proviso. The Magistrate Judge considered the constitutionality of each provision separately, which is as it should be. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506-07, 105 S.Ct....