Buckman-Peirson v. Brannon, Appeal No. CA 20320 (OH 11/5/2004)
| Decision Date | 05 November 2004 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. CA 20320. |
| Parties | Ashley Buckman-Peirson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dwight D. Brannon, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Myers & Frayne Co., LPA, Jacob A. Myers, and Frederick B. Hatton, for Appellant.
Bieser, Greer & Landis LLP, David C. Greer, and Jennifer L. Hill, for Appellee.
DECISION.
{¶1} Two questions are presented here: (1) what court has jurisdiction to hear a legal malpractice claim arising from a wrongful-death case, and (2) in Ohio what evidence of emotional damage is required to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress? We hold that the answer to the first question is the common pleas court. The answer to the second is that the plaintiff must present some evidence, not necessarily expert, in addition to her own testimony.
{¶2} Ashley Buckman-Peirson sued her attorney, Dwight D. Brannon, for legal malpractice, breach of contract, replevin, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
{¶3} Brannon had represented Peirson in several legal actions, including Peirson's deceased husband's wrongful-death settlement. The trial court, a common pleas court, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Brannon on Peirson's malpractice and contract claims, holding that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction over the issues.
{¶4} The trial court then granted partial summary judgment in favor of Brannon on Peirson's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, ruling that there were no genuine issues of material fact.
{¶5} We reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the malpractice and contract claims but affirm the grant of summary judgment on Peirson's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
{¶6} Peirson first hired Brannon to represent her in 1996. Brannon filed suit on Peirson's behalf against Prudential and others, alleging the mishandling of her investments. In 2000, Peirson hired Brannon to represent her in her husband's wrongful-death claim against the Huber Heights Police Department. Brannon negotiated a settlement, which the probate court approved.
{¶7} In her complaint filed in November 2002, Peirson alleged that Brannon had committed legal malpractice when he (1) neglected to inform her that she had a right to bring a survival claim; (2) did not inform her that, as the decedent's spouse, she had a legal right to more of the estate's assets than her husband's children; (3) failed to inform her that, as the surviving spouse, she was entitled to an allowance and to have the estate pay her husband's funeral expenses; (4) simultaneously represented her and her stepchildren, which was a conflict of interest; and (5) incorrectly informed her that her interest in the insurance proceeds available to settle the claims was identical to the interests of the stepchildren. These are, of course, only allegations, but in the procedural posture of this case, we are constrained to assume that they are true.
{¶8} In her breach-of-contract claim, Peirson alleged that, before Brannon's settlement of her husband's wrongful-death case, Brannon had told her that he would charge her a fee of thirty-three percent of whatever she received from the suit. But Peirson claimed that the agreement she signed did not state a percentage of money for attorney fees. Peirson alleged that, after she signed the agreement, Brannon inserted a term of forty percent. In her complaint, she sought a refund of a portion of the forty-percent fee retained by Brannon.
{¶9} In her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Peirson alleged that Brannon had verbally and sexually harassed her continuously from 1996 until the time she fired him in 2002. Specifically, Peirson alleged that Brannon had made unwanted and offensive sexual advances, propositions, and comments, and that he had used abusive and foul language towards her. Peirson claimed that, due to the severe emotional distress caused by Brannon's sexual harassment and abuse, she had sought help from her family doctor and then from a psychiatrist. As a result of her problems, Peirson stated, her doctor had doubled her prescription for medicine to treat her nerves and sleeplessness.
{¶10} In her first assignment of error, Peirson argues that the common pleas court erred when it determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over her malpractice and breach-of-contract claims. Peirson argues that the common pleas court, and not the probate court, has exclusive jurisdiction over malpractice and breach-of-contract claims. She is correct.
{¶11} The probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction. As such, its jurisdiction is limited to only those matters conferred by statute and by the Ohio Constitution.1
{¶12} The General Assembly, in R.C. 2101.24, has specifically stated the probate court's jurisdiction. Neither legal malpractice nor breach-of-contract claims are listed in that section.
{¶13} But Brannon argues, and the trial court agreed, that, under R.C. 2125.03(A) and this court's decision in Comer v. Bench,2 the probate court had jurisdiction over Peirson's claims. He contends that the probate court had jurisdiction because the claims were related to Peirson's wrongful-death claim, and the probate court had jurisdiction over the settlement of the wrongful-death claim.
{¶14} In Comer, a wrongful-death claim by a four-year-old girl was settled and the settlement was approved by the probate court, with the girl's mother allegedly signing the settlement agreement.3 Years later, after reaching the age of majority, the girl sued in common pleas court for a declaratory judgment.4 The girl claimed that her mother's signature had been forged and requested that the court declare the agreement void.5
{¶15} After the trial court found that the mother's signature had been forged and voided the agreement for fraud, this court reversed, holding that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction. This court stated, "By enacting R.C. 2125.03(A), the General Assembly conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the probate division of the court of common pleas to approve settlements in actions for wrongful death and to order distribution of the settlement proceeds."6 (Emphasis added.) We held that where there was a special statutory method for determining a particular type of case, it could not be bypassed by a declaratory-judgment action in a different court.7 We further held that any relief from the probate court's order of approval and distribution had to be sought in the probate court.8
{¶16} We believe that Comer was correctly decided, but that it is irrelevant to the present case. The issue in Comer was whether the settlement was valid and whether it should have been changed because of a fraud committed at the time the settlement was made. The claimed fraud was in the approval of the settlement—a matter solely within the probate court's jurisdiction. The suit in Comer was not for legal malpractice or for breach of contract, but instead sought to reopen and undo the settlement of the wrongful-death suit.
{¶17} In this case, in contrast, Peirson did not seek to reopen or undo the settlement agreement approved by the probate court for her wrongful-death suit. She sued her attorney for what she claimed was substandard representation and breach of a contract. These claims developed out of the wrongful-death suit, but were distinct claims that involved separate legal issues. And the wrongful-death suit itself was in common pleas court, not in probate court.
{¶18} The malpractice and breach-of-contract claims did not directly implicate the approval and distribution of the wrongful-death settlement. In fact, Peirson could not, through the common pleas court, have reopened the wrongfuldeath settlement or the administration of her husband's estate. But what she could do was sue her attorney in common pleas court for the losses she claimed that she had sustained due to her attorney's alleged incompetence.
{¶19} Therefore, Comer is not applicable, and the trial court erred in relying on it to support its ruling that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction over Peirson's malpractice and breach-of-contract claims.
{¶20} Our conclusion is bolstered by the Sixth Appellate District's holding in Elden v. Sylvania Savings Bank.9 In Elden, a surviving spouse and heirs-at-law sued the executor of an estate and the estate's trustees in common pleas court, alleging that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to the estate and had failed to exercise the ordinary legal knowledge and skill of an attorney.
{¶21} The common pleas court ruled that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction over the suit. But the appellate court reversed, holding that the suit alleged malpractice, which was a matter not within the jurisdiction of the probate court under R.C. 2101.24. While the initial legal matter was one appropriate for a probate court—the handling of an estate—the claim of legal malpractice involved separate issues and was properly within the jurisdiction of the common pleas court.10
{¶22} Brannon argues that Elden is not applicable to the facts of this case because the original legal action in Elden involved the administration of an estate, while Peirson's suit was for wrongful death. We fail to see why this distinction makes a difference. The original cause of action is not important....
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