Buckmaster v. Dent, 2
| Decision Date | 26 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | CA-CIV,No. 2,2 |
| Citation | 707 P.2d 319,146 Ariz. 521 |
| Parties | Ed BUCKMASTER, an individual, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Larry B. DENT, an individual; Dwight W. Davis, an individual; LLC Investments, Inc., a California corporation; Mt. Vista Investments, Inc., a California corporation; Davis-Dent II, a California partnership, Defendants/Appellees. 5384. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Appellant Buckmaster filed suit for specific performance of a contract to purchase a mobile home park after a dispute arose as to an easement for ingress and egress and escrow failed to close. Appellees Davis and Dent counterclaimed, seeking damages for breach of the purchase contract and, in the alternative, for rescission. The trial court, in ruling on cross summary judgment motions, determined the contract was rescinded and awarded attorney's fees to Davis and Dent. Buckmaster has appealed, contending rescission was not a proper remedy and protesting the attorney fee award. We affirm the rescission and reverse the attorney fee award.
Davis and Dent were the owners of a 281-space mobile home park located off Mission Road in Tucson. 1 In the spring of 1983 Buckmaster offered to purchase the park. Davis and Dent rejected the offer and made a counter-offer which was also rejected. Nothing further occurred between the parties until that fall. Negotiations then resumed and several offers were made by both sides until a contract was entered into October 31, 1983. The contract was for the sale of the mobile home park, approximately ten acres of undeveloped land to the east of the park and a private street between the park and Mission Road known as Via Ingresso (referred to as the "entrance street" in the agreement). The street is the only access to the park. Escrow was opened and was to close in early January 1984. Pursuant to their interpretation of the contract, Davis and Dent submitted proposed warranty deeds to the escrow officer which contained an easement for ingress and egress over Via Ingresso for the benefit of property to the west of the park (referred to as the "front property") which is also owned by Davis and Dent.
The pertinent paragraph of the purchase contract reads as follows:
Similar language appears in four previous offers submitted during the course of negotiations. Dent, an attorney licensed to practice in California, drafted the language, and Buckmaster utilized it in submitting the two offers he made during the negotiation period. Dent continued to employ the singular of "easement" in his offers after the O'Leary easement was recorded.
The O'Leary easement is an easement for ingress and egress over Via Ingresso which was granted by Davis and Dent to the owners of property to the south of the park on August 1, 1983. It was recorded August 31 after the initial negotiations for sale of the property but before the purchase contract was entered into. Apparently Buckmaster was unaware of the existence of the O'Leary easement until after he entered into the purchase contract.
Buckmaster insists the contract provided for only one easement for ingress and egress which must be the O'Leary easement. Davis and Dent contend they always intended to reserve an easement for access for the benefit of the front property as evidenced by the fact that the language in question first appeared in the May 1983 offer long before the O'Leary easement was granted. They insist the O'Leary easement is provided for in the clause "and other exceptions that appear of record and do not impair the value of the Real Property," and thus two easements were reserved. The trial court found the contract was rescinded because there had been no meeting of the minds on the provision for easement for ingress and egress.
Buckmaster refused to accept the deeds with both easements because the city would not permit him to expand the mobile home park to include the undeveloped land since there was already a maximum amount of traffic using Via Ingresso.
Appellant contends the trial court should not have ordered the contract rescinded since both parties had urged the court to interpret paragraph 4, thereby finding either that only the O'Leary easement had been contemplated by the parties or that both retained easements had been contemplated. The interpretation of a contract is a question of law for a trial court. Dutch Inns of America, Inc. v. Horizon...
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Buckholtz v. Buckholtz
...facts could create ‘a latent ambiguity in otherwise clear and intelligible language.’ " Id. (quoting Buckmaster v. Dent , 146 Ariz. 521, 523, 707 P.2d 319, 321 (App. 1985) ). ¶12 In this case, the superior court found the Agreement was valid and binding. Finding Wife’s testimony about discu......
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...attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 in an action based on a contract that is unenforceable as a matter of law."); Buckmaster v. Dent, 146 Ariz. 521, 707 P.2d 319, 321 (1985) (holding that "there is no successful party within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 when a contract has been held to ......
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Kempton v. Kempton
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