Buckner v. Apfel

• Decision Date: 12 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-3856,99-3856
• Citation: 213 F.3d 1006
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2000) TANYA BUCKNER, APPELLANT, v. KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, APPELLEE. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1006

213 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2000)

TANYA BUCKNER, APPELLANT, v. KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, APPELLEE.

No. 99-3856

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: April 12, 2000

Filed: May 22, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Wollman, Chief Judge, Magill, Circuit Judge, and Frank, ¹ District Judge.

Wollman, Chief Judge.

Tanya Buckner appeals from the district court's order to remand for further administrative proceedings her application for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 1381-1383f. We reverse and remand.

I.

Buckner was born on January 21, 1970, and has a high school education, although most of her classes were special education courses. Her work experience includes that of a maid, janitor, and caretaker in a daycare facility. Buckner filed the current application for supplemental security income benefits on August 24, 1994, alleging as an onset disability date the date of her birth. In her application, Buckner stated that she was "not certain" of the basis of her disability. She did, however, indicate that she had received childhood disability benefits and, in a subsequent submission, reported that her impairments included depression, anxiety, and the "need [for] IQ testing."

The Social Security Administration denied Buckner's application initially and again on reconsideration. Buckner then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ evaluated Buckner's claim according to the five-step sequential analysis prescribed by the social security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)-(f); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (describing five-step analysis). At steps one and two, the ALJ determined that Buckner had not engaged in substantial gainful activity at any time relevant to the decision and that she suffered from a severe impairment, mild mental retardation. At step three, the ALJ found that her impairment was not listed in or medically equal to those listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, and thus did not give rise to a conclusive presumption of disability. At step four, the ALJ determined that Buckner possessed the residual functional capacity to perform work as a janitor or maid, which the ALJ deemed to be past relevant work. The ALJ therefore concluded that Buckner was not disabled and found it unnecessary to determine whether she could perform other work within the national economy, as is considered at step five.

The Appeals Council denied Buckner's request for further review, thus making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Buckner then sought review in the district court, asking the court to reverse the Commissioner's denial of benefits. The Commissioner answered Buckner's complaint and shortly thereafter filed a motion to remand her claim pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g) for further administrative action. The Commissioner stated that remand was necessary to further evaluate Buckner's ability to perform past relevant work. In her response, Buckner likewise urged the court to order a "sentence four" remand, but additionally requested that the court in its remand order make a finding of disability and remand for calculation of benefits only or, alternatively, that the order direct the Commissioner to reconsider several findings made by the ALJ, not only whether Buckner could perform past relevant work.

The district court issued an order to remand for further consideration of Buckner's ability to perform past relevant work, but stated that such remand was pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. 405(g) rather than sentence four. Buckner appeals, contending that the court erred in issuing a sentence six remand and also in failing either to make a disability finding or to expand the scope of the remand. The Commissioner joins Buckner in arguing that the district court improperly based its remand order on sentence six, but supports the court's findings regarding the substantive scope of the remand.

II.

We consider first whether the district court erred in granting a sentence six, rather than a sentence four, remand. Section 405(g), which governs judicial review of final decisions made by the Commissioner, authorizes only two types of remand orders: (1) those made pursuant to sentence four, and (2) those made pursuant to sentence six. See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1991); Hafner v. Sullivan, 972 F.2d 249, 250-51 (8th Cir. 1992). Sentence four, by its terms, authorizes a court to enter "a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. 405(g). A sentence four remand is therefore proper whenever the district court makes a substantive ruling regarding the correctness of a decision of the Commissioner and remands the case in accordance with such a ruling. See Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98.

Sentence six, in contrast, authorizes a remand in only two limited situations: (1) where the Commissioner requests a remand before answering the complaint of a claimant seeking reversal of an administrative ruling, or (2) where new and material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented during the administrative proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. 405(g); Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297 n.2 (1993); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir. 1993). The first of these situations distinguishes a sentence six remand from a sentence four remand based on timing, while the second situation does so based on substance. See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626 (1990) (noting that sentence six authorizes an "entirely different kind of remand" than sentence four). This substantive distinction insures that a remand pursuant to the second part of sentence six concerns only new and material evidence and "does not rule in any way as to the correctness of the administrative proceeding," as does a sentence four remand. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98; see Finkelstein, 496 U.S. at 626.

Viewing the district court's remand order in light of the various attributes of sentence four and sentence six remands, we conclude that the court erred by basing its remand on sentence six. As an initial matter, neither of the conditions under which a sentence six remand is appropriate is present in this case. The Commissioner did not file the motion to remand until after filing his answer, and neither the district court in its remand order nor the parties in their submissions have pointed to any newly discovered evidence that is material to Buckner's claim. See Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 297 n.2. Rather, the apparent purpose of the remand was to prompt additional factfinding and further evaluation of existing facts, neither of which is an action that supports a sentence six remand. See Finkelstein, 496 U.S. at 626.

Conversely, we believe that the district court's remand order meets the substantive requirements of sentence four. Although the district court stated in its order that it was "not making any ruling based on the correctness of the Commissioner's decision" and thus was not issuing a sentence four remand, the substance of its order-- the reconsideration of Buckner's ability to perform past relevant work--demonstrates that it was, in essence, evaluating the propriety of the Commissioner's denial of benefits. The court's order effectively called into question a substantive aspect of the Commissioner's decision and ordered the Commissioner to give further consideration to this issue. Such an order sufficiently implicates the merits of the Commissioner's decision to bring it within sentence four. See Welter v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 674, 675 (8th Cir. 1991).

Finally, our case law supports the conclusion that the district court's remand order was more properly governed by sentence four than sentence six. In Welter, we suggested that remand orders that do not expressly affirm, modify, or reverse a decision of the Commissioner but rather direct him to cure some specific defect in the administrative proceeding, such as the ALJ's failure to develop the record or to properly evaluate the evidence, are nonetheless sentence four remands. See 941 F.2d at 675; see also Hafner, 972 F.2d at 251 (reaffirming Welter). The remand order in this case is indistinguishable from those in Welter. See 941 F.2d at 675. Accordingly, the district court should have remanded the case pursuant to sentence four, rather than sentence six, of 42 U.S.C. 405(g).

III.

We next must determine the proper scope of the sentence four remand. Buckner urges us to find that she is disabled and to remand merely for purposes of calculating her disability award or, alternatively, to order the Commissioner to reconsider on remand several findings made by the ALJ. The Commissioner, on the other hand, argues that a finding of disability at this time would be improper and that all of the Commissioner's findings, except that regarding Buckner's ability to return to past relevant work, are supported by substantial evidence and thus should not be revisited on remand.

A.

We consider first whether a finding of disability would be proper at this time. Ordinarily, when a claimant appeals from the Commissioner's denial of benefits and we find that such a denial was improper, we, out of "our abundant deference to the ALJ," remand the case for further administrative proceedings. Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1210 (8th Cir. 1998). Consistent with this rule, we may enter an immediate finding of disability only if the record "overwhelmingly supports" such a finding. Thompson v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 1992); see Fowler v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 249, 253 (8th Cir. 1989); Talbott v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 511, 514 (8th Cir. 1987).

Buckner asserts various reasons why she believes...