Alia D. v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 27 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-366 (MJD/LIB) |
| Parties | Alia D.,[1] Plaintiff, v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Alia D. (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), seeks judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”) denying her application for disability benefits. This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment, [Docket Nos. 26, 29], and the Court took the matter under advisement on the written submissions pursuant to the Local Rules for this District governing motions filed in Social Security cases.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, [Docket No. 26] be DENIED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, [Docket No. 29], be GRANTED.
On June 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability benefits, as well as, a Title XVI application for supplemental security income. (Tr. 22).[2] Plaintiff alleged that her disability began on December 18, 2013. (Tr. 22). The Commissioner initially denied Plaintiff's present claims on October 3, 2017, and again, upon reconsideration, on November 16, 2017. (Tr. 22). On January 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (Tr. 22).
Administrative Law Judge Erin Schmidt (hereinafter “ALJ”) conducted a hearing on May 29, 2019. (Tr. 22). At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff was represented by a “non-attorney representative.” (Tr. 22). Plaintiff and an independent vocational expert, Kenneth E. Ogren, (“IVE Ogren”) testified at the hearing. (Tr. 22).
On June 18, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's request for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. (Tr. 19-40). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 40).
Plaintiff thereafter sought review of the decision by the Appeals Council. (Tr. 8-16). Subsequently, on February 7, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 9). Accordingly, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
On February 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present action. (Compl. [Docket No. 1]). Thereafter, both parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment, [Docket Nos. 26, 29], and the Court took the matter under advisement on the written submissions pursuant to the Local Rules for this District governing motions filed in Social Security cases.
If a claimant's initial application for disability benefits is denied, she may request reconsideration of the decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907-404.909. A claimant who is dissatisfied with the reconsidered decision may then obtain administrative review by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.929.
To determine the existence and extent of a claimant's disability, the ALJ must follow a five-step sequential analysis. This analysis requires the ALJ to make a series of factual findings regarding the claimant's impairments, residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. See, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); see also, Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit has described this five-step process as follows:
The Commissioner of Social Security must evaluate: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
If the claimant is dissatisfied with the ALJ's decision, she may request review by the Appeals Council, although the Appeals Council need not grant that request for review. See, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-404.982. The decision of the Appeals Council (or, if the request for review is denied by the Appeals Council, then the decision of the ALJ) is final and binding upon the claimant, unless the matter is appealed to federal court within sixty days after notice of the Appeals Council's action. See, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. In this case, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled, (Tr. 8-16), thus making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
Judicial review of the administrative decision generally proceeds by considering the decision of the ALJ at each of the five steps. Judicial review of the decision to deny disability benefits, however, is constrained to a determination of whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008); Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2005); Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000) (). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion.” Buckner, 213 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000)); Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007).
In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute its own judgment or findings of fact for that of the ALJ. Hilkemeyer v. Barnhart, 380 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2004). The possibility that the Court could draw two inconsistent conclusions from the same record does not prevent a particular finding from being supported by substantial evidence. Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). The Court should not reverse the Commissioner's finding merely because evidence may exist in the administrative record to support the opposite conclusion. Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2015); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).
After balancing the evidence, if it is possible to reach two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner's decision through the ALJ, the Court must affirm the decision. Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992). Thus, the Court will not reverse the ALJ's “denial of benefits so long as the ALJ's decision falls within the ‘available zone of choice.'” Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008). The decision of the ALJ “is not outside the ‘zone of choice' simply because [the Court] might have reached a different conclusion had [it] been the initial finder of fact.” Id. “If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ's findings, the court must affirm the ALJ's decision.” Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 813 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
The claimant bears the burden under the Social Security Act of proving that she is disabled. See, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); Whitman v. Colvin, 762 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2014). Once the claimant has demonstrated she cannot perform prior work due to a disability, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant retains the residual functional capacity (hereinafter “RFC”) to engage in some other substantial, gainful activity. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005).
Before beginning the five-step disability evaluation process in the present case, the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirement of Social Security Act through December 31, 2018. (Tr. 24). This finding is not in dispute.
Thereafter, the ALJ made the following determinations during the five-step disability evaluation process.
At step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engage in substantial gainful activity since December 18, 2013, Plaintiff's alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 24). This finding is not in dispute. The Court will refer to the period of time between that date Plaintiff last engaged in substantial gainful activity and the date through which Plaintiff meets the insured status requirement of the Social Security Act as “the adjudicated period.”
At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had “the following severe impairment: borderline personality disorder; major depressive disorder; and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.” (Tr. 25). Plaintiff does not challenge this finding made by the ALJ at step two.
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have a presumptively disabling impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,...
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