Buckner v. City of Highland Park
| Decision Date | 22 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 86-71300. |
| Citation | 681 F. Supp. 1256 |
| Parties | Ray C. BUCKNER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, Highland Park Police Department, Robert Blackwell, Chief of Police, Terry Ford, and Lieutenant John Holloway, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Gary A. Benjamin, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.
Richard L. Hurford, Detroit, Mich., for defendants.
This case is before the court on the parties' renewed cross motions for summary judgment, filed pursuant to an order of this court, on plaintiff's claim that he was deprived of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, when he was discharged from the police force of the City of Highland Park, Michigan, on November 15, 1984. Plaintiff's claim, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is that his discharge was made without adequate notice and opportunity to respond to the allegations which formed the basis for his dismissal.
Plaintiff Ray C. Buckner was employed by the Highland Park Police Department for two decades. The terms and conditions of his employment were defined by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the city and his union, the Highland Park Police Officers Association.
On November 6, 1984, then-Detective Buckner went to the home of Ms. Letite Riley in order to take her statement regarding an incident in which an individual had fired a gun at her. Buckner had failed to bring the proper witness form, so he informed Ms. Riley that he would return the following day for her written statement.
Buckner returned to Riley's apartment on the evening of November 7. In a complaint filed by Riley that same night, it was alleged that at that time Buckner made sexual advances toward her, touching her breast and attempting to kiss her, and that he refused to leave despite her repeated requests. Riley's boyfriend, Lawrence Bohler, who telephoned her while Buckner was at the apartment, corroborated Riley's story, stating that he could hear Buckner and Riley arguing as she repeatedly asked Buckner to leave. Both Riley and Bohler gave written statements to Highland Park Police Chief Terry Ford.
On November 8, at about 2:00 p.m., after learning that a complaint had been lodged against him, Buckner admitted himself to the psychiatric ward of Henry Ford Hospital for the purpose of obtaining treatment for alcoholism. That same evening, at about 6:30 p.m., Lt. John Holloway and plaintiff's union representative, Officer Hubert Yopp, visited upon Buckner in the hospital ward.
Defense affidavits state that Detective Buckner was then informed of the charges against him by Ms. Riley, and that he was the subject of a criminal investigation; that he was advised of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)); and that he was asked but refused to give a statement, at which point he was suspended by Lt. Holloway.
Defendants further state that Chief Ford, at some later date, sent plaintiff's union president, Officer Charles Brookman, to obtain Buckner's account of the incident, and that plaintiff refused to give a statement to Officer Brookman as well.
Plaintiff has sworn that he refused to make a statement to Lt. Holloway on November 8 upon the advice of his union representative, Officer Yopp, who accompanied the lieutenant. Plaintiff further avers that Officer Brookman's subsequent visit occurred approximately ten days after plaintiff's initial hospitalization and after he had already been terminated from the force.
Plaintiff was fired on November 15, 1984, when Highland Park Mayor Robert Blackwell approved a letter of recommendation by Chief Ford of that same date. Plaintiff's termination became effective the following day.
On November 26, 1984, plaintiff filed a grievance pursuant to the provisions of the CBA between his union and the city. Due to multiple adjournments, arbitration of the dispute still had not been conducted at the time of hearing on these motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed a two-count complaint on March 10, 1986 in Wayne County Circuit Court (Buckner v. City of Highland Park, et al., No. 86-606-587-CZ) alleging his discharge was in violation of his due process rights because no hearing was held prior to his termination, and further that the discharge violated the Michigan Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq. (Handicappers Act) because plaintiff is an alcoholic and was discharged because of that condition. The cause was removed to this court by defendants on March 31, 1986.
Following cross motions for summary judgment and a hearing, this court issued an Order on May 26, 1987, granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Handicappers Act claim, and denying both parties' summary judgment motions on the claim of deprivation of due process.
One month later, on June 26, 1987, this court ordered the parties to rebrief and reargue their summary judgment motions on the due process claim "in light of the Sixth Circuit's recent opinion in Duchesne v. Williams, et al., slip opinion # 86 1017 (June 16, 1987)." In its Order, the court further directed the parties to "specifically address the unresolved issue of the source of plaintiff's alleged property right in his employment which would implicate the due process requirements of Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985)." The first motions had not touched upon the source of plaintiff's claim of property in his job.
This memorandum constitutes the court's finding of fact and conclusions of law on the matter.
In order to state a claim for deprivation of due process of law in a discharge context, plaintiff must first demonstrate a property interest in his employment. See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, supra, at 538, 105 S.Ct. at 1491. If plaintiff demonstrates such a right, the state may not deprive him of this property without the due process of law. Id. at 538, 105 S.Ct. at 1491, citing Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1561-62, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) (other citation omitted).
Defendants here have stated that, "for purposes of this motion," they do not dispute plaintiff's claim of a property interest in the position of detective, Highland Park Police Department. Nonetheless, a review here of the undisputed sources of plaintiff's property right is appropriate.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the Supreme Court stated:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
In Loudermill, supra, the Supreme Court specifically affirmed that a security guard and a school bus mechanic had property interests in their jobs by virtue of an Ohio statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 124.11 (1984), defining them as "`classified civil service employees' ... entitled to retain their positions `during good behavior and efficient service,' who could not be dismissed `except ... for ... misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance in office,' § 124.34." Id., 470 U.S. at 538-39, 105 S.Ct. at 1491. As the Loudermill Court put it: "The statute plainly supports the conclusion, reached by both lower courts, that respondents possessed property rights in continued employment." Id., at 539, 105 S.Ct. at 1491-92.
In the instant case, plaintiff has established beyond doubt that he has a similar property interest in continued employment with the Highland Park Police Department.
The collective bargaining agreement governing employees of the Highland Park Police Department provides that employees may not be disciplined or discharged without just cause, providing a five-step grievance procedure culminating in arbitration.
Moreover, as in Loudermill, plaintiff's property interest is further grounded in state law, pursuant to the Charter of the City of Highland Park and the Michigan Civil Service statute governing police officers.
Section 7-9 of the City Charter governs the police department and states at 7-9(4):
The plan of Civil Service for policemen and firemen as established by Act # 78 of the Public Acts of 1935, as amended, (MCL 38.501 et seq.), which was in effect in the City on the effective date of this Charter, is hereby continued under this Charter and incorporated therein by reference with all future amendments, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth therein, and nothing is hereby added to or deleted from such Act by such incorporation.
The Michigan Civil Service act governing police and fire personnel, M.C.L. § 38.501 et seq., commonly known as the Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Service Act, provides in § 13 (M.C.L. § 38.513):
In all cases of ... suspension of an employee or subordinate, whether appointed for a definite term or otherwise the appointing authority shall furnish such employees or subordinate with a copy of reasons for ... suspension and his reasons for the same, and give such employee or subordinate a reasonable time in which to make and file an explanation ... Provided, however, that the employee or subordinate shall be entitled to a hearing before the commission as provided in § 14.
This provision permits a suspension for up to 30 days, and contemplates that the hearing to which the employee is entitled be held during that 30 day period.
§ 14 of the Act (M.C.L. § 38.514) provides in relevant part:
... However, no member of any fire or police department within the terms of the Act shall be removed, discharged, reduced in rank or pay, suspended or otherwise punished except for cause, and in no event until he shall have been...
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Buckner v. City of Highland Park
...process claims. On March 22, 1988, after considering the briefs and arguments, the district court awarded summary judgment to Buckner. 681 F.Supp. 1256. The district court found that Buckner had a property interest in his continued employment and that, despite the opportunities for Buckner ......