Buckskin Props., Inc. v. Valley Cnty.

• Decision Date: 29 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 38830.,38830.
• Citation: 154 Idaho 486,300 P.3d 18
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho corporation; Timberline Development, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Plaintiffs–Appellants–Cross Respondents, v. VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant–Respondent–Cross Appellant.

154 Idaho 486

300 P.3d 18

BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC., an Idaho corporation; Timberline Development, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Plaintiffs–Appellants–Cross Respondents,

v.VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant–Respondent–Cross Appellant.

No. 38830.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2013 Term.

March 29, 2013.

Rehearing Denied May 16, 2013.

Evans Keane, LLP, Boise, for appellants. Victor S. Villegas argued.

Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for respondent. Christopher H. Meyer argued.

J. JONES, Justice.

Subdivision developers, Buckskin Properties, Inc. and Timberline Development, LLC (collectively "Buckskin"), brought suit against Valley County seeking recovery of monies paid to the County for road development and declaratory relief from payment of any further monies. The district court granted summary judgment to the County and Buckskin timely appealed. We affirm.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about April 1, 2004, Buckskin submitted a land use application to Valley County, seeking to develop The Meadows, a multi-phase development project consisting of six phases. The application was for approval of a Planned Unit Development (PUD), a Conditional Use Permit (CUP) and preliminary and final plats for Phase 1 of the development. Buckskin included as part of its application a proposed "capital contribution agreement" in which it agreed to provide mitigation for the traffic impact of its development. Among other things, Buckskin proposed to pay a road impact fee of $1,870 "per equivalent single-family residential unit." Buckskin's project engineer stated that the proposed agreement was included in the application because it was required by the County. Buckskin subsequently submitted a revised application providing that the PUD would consist of 221 single-family units, 160 multi-family units, and approximately 55,000 square feet of commercial amenities to be constructed in six discrete phases.

The CUP for The Meadows was approved by the County's planning and zoning commission on July 14, 2004. The approved use under the CUP was for "221 single-family residential lots, 17 common lots, 2 commercial lots totaling 11.2 acres, and 160 multi-family units." The CUP contained seventeen conditions of approval, including that the "Capital Contribution Agreement must receive approval from the Board of County Commissioners." On July 14, Buckskin signed a revised Capital Contribution Agreement (CCA), which had been prepared by the County, and the County Board approved and signed the CCA on July 26.

The CCA pertained specifically to Phase 1 of The Meadows, reciting that "[Buckskin] has agreed to participate in the cost of mitigating [impacts on public services and infrastructure reasonably attributable to The Meadows] by contributing its proportionate fair share of the cost of the needed improvements identified in [the CCA]." The CCA provided that Buckskin shall "contribute capital to road impact mitigation as established by Valley County at the time the final plat of each phase of [The Meadows] is recorded." The CCA required Buckskin to pay road improvement costs for future phases of the development and required the County to segregate Buckskin's contributions and apply them only to road improvement projects agreed upon by the parties. The mitigation cost for Phase 1 totaled $79,292. Buckskin conveyed a right-of-way to the County on October 25, 2004, in order to satisfy the Phase 1 mitigation costs. The right-of-way was valued at $91,142, which exceeded the amount due for Phase 1 by $11,850, for which Buckskin was given credit.

On September 26, 2005, Buckskin and the County executed a Road Development Agreement (RDA)¹ that governed the mitigation costs for Phases 2 and 3 of The Meadows.² Buckskin agreed to mitigate the impacts of the development by "contributing its proportionate fair share of the cost of the needed improvements identified in the [RDA]." Again, the County was required to segregate the funds and apply them only to the project costs of road improvement projects agreed upon by the parties. Under the Phase 2 and 3 RDA, the mitigation cost totaled $247,096. After applying several credits, Buckskin's balance was $232,160, which it paid.

In the summer of 2007 Buckskin began to move toward final plat approval for Phases 4–6. During preliminary discussions, Buckskin learned that the per-lot mitigation fee for Phases 4–6 would be $3,968, more than twice the $1,844 per-lot fee for Phases 13. No portion of the mitigation costs for Phases 4–6 of The Meadows was ever paid by Buckskin.

Buckskin filed its Complaint on December 1, 2009, seeking a declaratory ruling that the County's practice of requiring developers to enter into RDAs constituted an illegal impact fee and also seeking recovery of the money it had paid for Phases 2 and 3 on an inverse condemnation theory. The County moved for summary judgment on a number of grounds, including that Buckskin's lawsuit was barred by the four-year limitations period in I.C. § 5–224. On January 7, 2011, the district court issued its initial decision, holding that the four-year statute of limitations began to run, at the very latest, on October 25, 2004, when Buckskin conveyed the right-of-way to the County to satisfy the Phase 1 mitigation costs, and that Buckskin had waited too long to sue.

Buckskin requested reconsideration and also moved for summary judgment on its claim for declaratory relief, arguing among other things, that each phase of the project should be considered individually and that the court's ruling on the statute of limitations did not apply to the uncompleted Phases 46. In response, the County argued that the statute of limitations commenced to run at the same time for all phases of the development because it was governed by a single CUP and, alternately, that Buckskin's request for declaratory relief with regard to Phases 46 was mooted by the County's adoption of Resolution 11–6 on March 7, 2011.³ On April 11, 2011, the district court entered a further decision upholding its ruling on the statute of limitations with regard to all phases of the project and finding that Buckskin's claims with regard to Phases 46 had been mooted by Resolution 11–6. The court denied the County's request for attorney fees. Buckskin appealed the district court's dismissal of its claims and the County cross-appealed the denial of its fee request.

II.ISSUES ON REVIEW

1. May a governing board lawfully make an agreement with a land developer for the funding and construction of new infrastructure?

2. Did Buckskin fail to exhaust its administrative remedies?

3. Did the district court err in dismissing Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim?

4. Did Resolution 11–6 moot Buckskin's claim for declaratory relief as to Phases 4–6?

5. Did the district court err in denying the County's request for attorney fees?

6. Is either party entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

III.DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review.

In "reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard as used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." Cnty. of Boise v. ICRMP, Underwriters, 151 Idaho 901, 904, 265 P.3d 514, 517 (2011). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Additionally, this Court exercises free review over questions of law. Cnty. of Boise, 151 Idaho at 904, 265 P.3d at 517. This Court reviews the district court's denial of attorney fees predicated on I.C. § 12–117 for an abuse of discretion. City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 908, 277 P.3d 353, 355 (2012).

B. A governing board may lawfully make a voluntary agreement with a land developer for the funding and construction of new infrastructure.

Interwoven among the issues presented on appeal is whether a governing board may lawfully make an agreement with a developer to fund the construction of new infrastructure as part of the development approval process. Buckskin contends that it was required against its will to pay for road improvements in the vicinity of its proposed development as a condition of gaining the County's approval of its plans. It contends this was a condition unlawfully imposed upon it and that the payment requirement constituted an unlawful development impact fee. Buckskin bases its inverse condemnation claim to recover the Phases 23 payment, as well as the claim for declaratory relief with respect to any fee for Phases 46, upon grounds of illegality. On the other hand, the County asserts that a governing body and developer may lawfully enter into such an agreement so long as it is voluntary on the part of both parties, citing KMST, LLC v. Cnty. of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003) and I.C. § 67–6512(d)(6).⁴

Because this issue is central to the determination of this case, we address it first. Both the CCA and the RDA characterized the payment required by Buckskin as a "capital contribution." The characterization of the charge is not, however, as important as the true nature of the charge. As Buckskin notes in its brief, the charge originated from a Capital Improvement Program (CIP) instituted by the County to identify "different areas throughout the county to determine the level of road improvements necessary for the roads in that area to handle the increases in traffic as a result of the development." Buckskin observes that the County's Master Transportation Plan describes the CIP as a plan "to require new developments to pay a fee to mitigate the impacts of their developments on the roads and bridges" in the County. According to the CIP, "[d]evelopers are, in effect, required to pay for the roadway capacity their developments use." Buckskin states that "the CIP is not part of the [County's Land Use Development Ordinance (LUDO) ] and is not an ordinance...