Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
Decision Date | 19 February 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 80-1162,80-1162 |
Citation | 644 F.2d 690 |
Parties | Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 97,879 G. A. BUDER, III; Christy L. Buder; G. A. Buder, IV; M. Leslie Buder and G. A. Buder, III; as next friend for his minor child, Douglas L. Buder, Appellants, v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INCORPORATED, and Ray Dusek, Jr., Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Lashly, Caruthers, Thies, Rava & Hamel, A Professional Corp., Charles E. Valier, Judson W. Calkins, St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiffs-appellants.
John J. Cole, Armstrong, Teasdale, Kramer & Vaughan, St. Louis, Mo., for defendants-appellees.
Before HEANEY, ADAMS, * and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.
G. A. Buder, III, and four of his children, commenced this action on June 13, 1977, alleging that Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and Ray Dusek, one of its brokers, committed various federal securities acts' violations. The primary securities provisions on which plaintiffs rely are section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979)). 1 The substance of the Buders' complaint is that Dusek, acting on behalf of Merrill Lynch, failed to disclose the risk attendant to purchase by the plaintiffs of real estate investment trust securities ("REITs"). The plaintiffs seek over $800,000 in damages, representing the purchase price of the REITs and various interest costs.
The parties have engaged in extensive discovery, through depositions, interrogatories and production of documents. The case has been set for trial seven times. While this action was pending, our Court ruled in Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 600 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1979), that section 10(b) securities claims commenced in Missouri federal courts were subject to the two-year statute of limitations of that state's blue sky law 2 rather than the five-year period for common law fraud claims. Soon after the Morris decision was filed, the defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that Buders' action was time barred.
Argument was heard on the summary judgment motion on October 19, 1979, and the case was taken under submission by Judge Regan. 3 Four days later, the plaintiffs sought leave to file an amended complaint, alleging a separate count for common law fraud. Jurisdiction for that claim was based on diversity of citizenship.
On February 1, 1980, the district court sustained the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied leave to file the amended complaint. The plaintiffs challenge both of these rulings on appeal. We affirm the district court's grant of the summary judgment motion on the 10b-5 claim, but hold that the court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiffs leave to amend.
The appellants contend that the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The standard to be applied in reviewing the grant of this motion is whether it has been shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., supra, 600 F.2d at 140. We conclude that the defendants in this action have met their burden of establishing, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs' 10b-5 claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
We note preliminarily that a motion for summary judgment is an appropriate method for raising a statute of limitations' defense. Morris v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., supra, 600 F.2d at 140. The Court will refuse to grant summary judgment for the defendants if there is an issue of fact as to when the limitations period began. See 10 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2734, n.31 at 651; Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 (10th Cir. 1974). However, where it is clear that the plaintiffs cannot, as a matter of law, refute the defendants' plea of limitations, summary judgment may be granted. See In re Alodex Corp. Securities Litigation, 533 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1976); Turner v. Lundquist, 377 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1967).
The two-year limitations period for plaintiffs' 10b-5 claim runs from the date of the discovery of the fraud or from the date the fraud upon reasonable inquiry should have been discovered. Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852, 91 S.Ct. 47, 27 L.Ed.2d 90 (1970). Thus, it is not only the subjective judgment of the defrauded party that is relevant. Commencement of the period is also tested by an objective standard of reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff in discovering the fraud. Cf. Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976).
The district court held that G. A. Buder, III, knew or should have known about the defendants' alleged fraudulent acts more than two years before the case was filed on June 13, 1977. The plaintiffs last purchase of REITs was made in December, 1973. The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that prior to this purchase, and all their other REITs purchases, the defendants represented that these were sound securities, promising high yields and growth possibilities with little attendant risk. The district court relied on Buder's deposition testimony and various documents furnished to him after the purchases to conclude that the falsity of these alleged representations should have been apparent to him before June 13, 1975. The court was not persuaded by Buder's testimony that he does "not recall" reading the reports furnished him, or that Dusek, his broker, told him not to pay attention to the adverse information contained in them. The court stated that
Buder may not deliberately close his eyes to the information available to him which would demonstrate to any reasonable person (and to Buder in particular as a sophisticated investor) that the alleged representations of Dusek as to the soundness and lack of risk of REITs for investment purposes could not have been true.
We have carefully reviewed the record and find that there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether G. A. Buder, III, had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged fraud prior to June 13, 1975. Buder was in possession of a great deal of information about the sorry state of his REIT investments prior to this date. He received a number of research reports from Merrill Lynch describing problems in the REIT-industry generally. One of these, dated March 20, 1974, stated:
The shares of REITs have been out of favor for more than a year due to the severe problems which the industry has been facing. Earnings have been restricted due to high interest rates, increasing building costs and problem loans. Many of the industrys (sic) problems seem likely to persist during 1974 and into 1975. Thus, we are tempering our opinion on a number of trusts. In general, we believe new investments in the industry should be avoided, as the risks are very high and the outlook is not at all clear * * *.
Another research report, dated April 22, 1974, stated that "(t)he REIT industry is beset by a number of very serious problems," and detailed the effect that serious financing and liquidity problems were having on the REITs' earnings and profitability. On July 3, 1974, Merrill Lynch released a report headlined "changes in opinion," which stated the firm's belief that "the continued high cost of money will severely limit the recover potential of many trusts." It went on to say that although some trusts may be attractive in the long term,
Buder also received adverse financial and market information regarding the specific REITs he had invested in. Annual and quarterly reports from the companies, Merrill Lynch research reports addressed to individual REITs and communications from Dusek, revealed sharp declines in the market prices, book values, earnings, and dividends paid by the REITs in the Buders' portfolios. 4 G. A. Buder, III, admitted that by April, 1975, he was aware of substantial losses and deficits incurred by one of his major REIT investments, Independence Mortgage Company.
The totality of the information received by Buder prior to June 13, 1975, was clearly sufficient to have put him on notice of the alleged fraud. See Turner v. Lundquist, supra, 377 F.2d at 48. The facts were such as to "excite inquiry" in Buder; the statutory period "need not await his 'leisurely discovery of the full details' regarding his claim." In re Alodex Corp. Securities Litigation, 392 F.Supp. 672, 684 (S.D.Iowa 1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1976); Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1970).
Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires"; this mandate is to be heeded * * *. If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claims on the merits.
The standard of review by the Court of Appeals is whether the district court abused its discretion in granting or denying leave to amend. Norbeck v. Davenport Community School Dist., 545 F.2d 63, 70 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917, 97 S.Ct. 2179, 53 L.Ed.2d 227 (1977). We...
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