Budlong v. Nadeau
| Decision Date | 24 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 10612,10612 |
| Citation | 619 A.2d 4,30 Conn.App. 61 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 4 NDLR P 84 C. Michael BUDLONG v. James H. NADEAU. |
James H. Nadeau, pro se, appellant (defendant).
Kathleen A. Murrett, with whom was Steven R. Dembo, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before LAVERY, FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN and SCHALLER, JJ.
The pro se defendant appeals from the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff following a jury trial on both the plaintiff's action for libel and the defendant's counterclaim for legal malpractice. The defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly allowed the jury to consider evidence that was not referred to in the complaint, (2) improperly instructed the jury regarding a number of issues, and (3) generally deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. In February, 1988, the defendant contacted the plaintiff to retain legal services in an action for dissolution of marriage. At the time the plaintiff began representing the defendant, a contempt motion against the defendant was pending due to an alimony arrearage owed by the defendant. The attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff and defendant began to deteriorate by the spring of 1988, when the defendant refused to follow the advice of the plaintiff regarding the contempt motion. The plaintiff notified the defendant that he would be withdrawing his appearance with regard to the contempt motion, and the defendant then filed a pro se appearance.
At a hearing on June 28, 1988, the defendant appeared pro se and agreed before the court to an arrangement whereby the attorney for the defendant's wife would be a court-appointed trustee over certain of the defendant's bank accounts to ensure the defendant's payment of alimony to his wife. After that hearing, the defendant contacted the plaintiff and asked him to remain as his attorney in the divorce action. The plaintiff agreed to this, but the defendant soon decided that he was dissatisfied with the representation provided by the plaintiff. On or about October 31, 1988, he began picketing outside the judicial district courthouse at 95 Washington Street, Hartford, wearing a sandwich board that said in large letters: "Christopher Storm [the defendant's wife's attorney] is a liar and a thief C. Michael Budlong is helping him." The plaintiff continued to picket the courthouse until jury selection began for this case in the trial court. The defendant's car, which he would often park in front of the courthouse during this period, had signs taped to it that said, "Christopher Storm is a liar and a thief C. Michael Budlong is helping him" and "Honest Lawyer wanted to sue Igor Sikorsky and C. Michael Budlong for unethical law practice Call Jim Nadeau 951-8966." 1 The defendant also posted signs the size of business cards in the courthouse bearing the "Honest Lawyer" message, and an eight and one-half by eleven inch sign bearing similar allegations against the plaintiff. 2
Subsequent to the defendant's commencing his picketing, the plaintiff filed and was granted a motion to withdraw his appearance for the defendant in the action for dissolution of marriage. The plaintiff then started an action against the defendant in libel, and the defendant filed a counterclaim for malpractice.
During the trial, the defendant failed to object at any time to the admission of evidence regarding the signs on his car, or to the admission of the business card signs. 3 In fact, the defendant himself admitted into evidence, over the objection of the plaintiff, a sign that contained a number of allegations regarding Budlong and Sikorsky, and the message that was printed on the business card signs.
"Our rules of practice make it clear that counsel must object to a ruling of evidence, state the grounds upon which objection is made, and take exception to the ruling to preserve the grounds for appeal." State v. Lizotte, 200 Conn. 734, 742A, 517 A.2d 610 (1986); Practice Book § 288. "Because the defendant failed to except to the trial court's ruling and because the defendant does not seek review under the bypass rule of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973), as reformulated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989); see Adolphson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 205 Conn. 703, 716, 535 A.2d 799 (1988); Hurtado v. Hurtado, 14 Conn.App. 296, 300, 541 A.2d 873 (1988) (); we decline to review this claim." 4 Capitol Restorations Corporation v. Construction Services of Bristol, Inc., 25 Conn.App. 681, 686-87, 596 A.2d 927 (1991).
As the defendant correctly points out, the business card signs and the car signs were not mentioned in the plaintiff's complaint. The complaint merely alleged that the defendant picketed the courthouse with a sign that said "Christopher Storm is a liar and a thief C. Michael Budlong is helping him" on October 31, 1988, and particular dates in November of that year. Since the defendant failed, however, to object to offers of evidence beyond the scope of the complaint, he cannot now allege that the trial court improperly allowed the proffered evidence to go before the jury. "The trial court has broad discretion to determine both the relevancy and remoteness of evidence, and its rulings on evidentiary matters will be set aside on appeal only upon a showing of clear abuse of discretion." Henry v. Klein, 15 Conn.App. 496, 500, 545 A.2d 575 (1988). We find no such abuse of discretion by the trial court in this case.
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury in several respects. Again, the defendant failed to preserve this issue properly for appeal. The defendant made no written request to charge, and took only a general exception to the jury instructions. 5 "In order to preserve full appellate review of a jury charge assigned as error, an appellant must not only move to set aside the verdict; Small v. South Norwalk Savings Bank, 205 Conn. 751, 758, 535 A.2d 1292 (1988); but must also set forth, either in the motion itself, in supporting briefs, or in oral argument at a hearing held on the motion, each claim of error with sufficient specificity to enable the trial court to consider the claimed errors." Cuartas v. Greenwich, 14 Conn.App. 370, 374, 540 A.2d 1071, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 803, 548 A.2d 436 (1988). Since the defendant did not preserve his claim that the trial court improperly charged the jury, we are limited in our review to whether the trial court committed "plain error." 6 Practice Book § 4185.
Plain error "is reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cuartas v. Greenwich, supra, at 375, 540 A.2d 1071. The trial court's charge to the jury was detailed, comprehensible to a reasonable juror, and correct in law. The charge was not only free of plain error, it contained no error.
The defendant's final claim is that the trial court did not conduct a "fair" trial. Specifically, the defendant claims that the court erred when it removed from the counsel table a person the defendant described as a hearing assistant. At the opening of the trial, the defendant requested that, because he has some difficulty hearing, he be allowed to have a friend repeat things said during the course of the trial, or write things down for him. The court, upon determining that the defendant had a hearing problem, allowed the assistant to sit with the defendant at the counsel table, provided that she follow strict guidelines. She was only permitted to repeat things to the defendant that were said in court, or write things down. On several occasions, the court admonished the defendant's friend for coaching the defendant when the court overheard comments that were not mere repetitions of what was said. Eventually, the court ordered the assistant to leave the counsel table when she refused to heed its warnings. The court did not allow another assistant, noting that the defendant had abused the privilege of being allowed one. 7
The actions taken by the court were clearly within its discretion. ...
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