Buehler v. Oregon-Washington Plywood Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 July 1976
• Docket Number: S.F. 23375,OREGON-WASHINGTON
• Citation: 551 P.2d 1226,131 Cal.Rptr. 394,17 Cal.3d 520
• Parties: , 551 P.2d 1226 William Kenneth BUEHLER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.PLYWOOD CORPORATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 394

131 Cal.Rptr. 394

17 Cal.3d 520, 551 P.2d 1226

William Kenneth BUEHLER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. OREGON-WASHINGTON PLYWOOD CORPORATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

S.F. 23375.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

July 12, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 11, 1976.

Rawles, Hinkle, Finnegan, Carter & Petersen, Rawles, Hinkle, Finnegan, Carter & Petersen, Jared G. Carter and Patrick M. Finnegan, Ukiah, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Steinhart, Goldberg, Feigenbaum & Labar, Neil E. Falconer, Michael A. Kahn, Bailey Lang, William S. Boyd and Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.

BY THE COURT.

In this proceeding, involving the interpretation of an agreement creating an easement in real property, plaintiffs William and Jessie Buehler appeal from a summary judgment dismissing their complaint for declaratory relief and for trespass. After decision by the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reversing the judgment, we granted a hearing in this court for the purpose of giving further consideration to the issues raised. Having made a thorough examination of the cause, we have concluded that the opinion of the Court of Appeal prepared by Justice Christian and concurred in by Presiding Justice Caldecott and Justice Emerson (retired judge of the superior court sitting under appointment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council) correctly treats and disposes of the issues involved, and we adopt such opinion as and for the opinion of this court. Such opinion (with appropriate deletions and additions) is as follows: ^*

( ) Appellants' predecessors in interest, Joseph and Mary Campbell, once owned a ranch enclosed by a large land area known as the Garcia tract. In 1908, the Campbells conveyed to the L. E. White Lumber Company (hereinafter White Lumber) and its successors and assigns, all timber then standing on the ranch. White Lumber was also granted an easement across Campbell Ranch to haul the Campbell timber and any other timber which White Lumber might 'acquire upon adjoining land or lands in the vicinity of' the Campbell Ranch.

The easement granted to White Lumber was subsequently transferred to the S.C. Rudolph Lumber Corporation (hereinafter Rudolph Lumber). By 1954, Rudolph Lumber had also acquired property in the Garcia tract formerly owned by White Lumber, and granted an option to several persons, including W. M. Moores and W. H. A. Smith, to purchase the property in the Garcia tract. Shortly thereafter, Moores and Smith, as well as the Cloverdale Redwood Company, were granted licenses to use all timber rights and easements owned by Rudolph Lumber, including the right-of-way created by the Campbell grant. The licensees began removing timber from both the Campbell ranch and the Garcia tract.

Meanwhile, appellants had become the owners of the Campbell ranch. They brought suit in 1955, disputing the right of Moores and Smith, Cloverdale Redwood and Rudolph Lumber to cut and haul timber under the circumstances described above. Appellants then contended that the Campbell grant only permitted the easement holders to cut timber which had become merchantable by 1908; that the definition of 'merchantable' timber was to be determined by logging practices existing in 1908 or those followed by White Lumber; that whatever rights the easement holders might have acquired by the Campbell grant had been forfeited by lapse of time; that the ranch had been damaged by careless logging and road building; and that the easement holders were prohibited from using the Campbell easement to haul timber originating outside of the section in which the timber described in the Campbell grant was located.

The action was settled and dismissed, and a 'road agreement' was executed and recorded in 1956; it provided that Moores and Smith and Cloverdale Redwood were granted permanent easements in gross 'for any purposes reasonably related to the ownership, management and exploitation of timber and forest products which from time to time may be owned or controlled by the owner or owners of said easements . . ..' The easement was assignable only to a partnership or corporation which had acquired operating control of at least one-third of the timber situated in parts of the Garcia tract. Appellants received $10,000 in cash, grazing rights and other considerations. According to the affidavits of William Buehler and Judge Timothy O'Brien (who had been appellants' attorney), the easement holders had indicated to appellants during the contract negotiations that the easement could only be used to haul timber originating within the Garcia tract. Appellants believed that these understandings were incorporated in the road agreement.

In 1962, the Oregon-Washington Plywood Corporation (hereinafter Oregon-Washington) acquired the Campbell easement, as well as substantially all of the Garcia tract property, from Moores and Smith, Cloverdale Redwood and Rudolph Lumber. In 1965, Oregon-Washington sold virtually all of its Garcia tract property to Longview Fibre Company (hereinafter Longview) while reserving timber rights for itself until December 31, 1971. Appellants first learned in 1969 that Oregon-Washington was hauling timber originating from points outside the Garcia tract. This action was then brought against Rudolph Lumber, Cloverdale Redwood, Moores and Smith, Oregon-Washington, and Longview.

The real issue in this case is the scope of the easement conferred by the road agreement. ¹ Respondents make no claim of title to Campbell Ranch except for such rights as they may have under the easement. No trespass can be said to have occurred if Oregon-Washington's rights under the road agreement were as broad as Oregon-Washington has contended.

Oregon-Washington was merged into the Louisiana-Pacific Corporation (hereinafter Louisiana-Pacific) during the pendency of this action. Under the 1965 agreement, Longview had also obtained contract rights to secure, at a later date, a conveyance from Oregon-Washington of its easement rights under the road agreement. The transfer was actually made, between Louisiana-Pacific, as successor to Oregon-Washington, and Longview just prior to the granting of the summary judgment.

The trial court adopted respondents' interpretation of the road agreement, determining that the 'language (is) completely clear' and holding that the easement conferred thereunder 'may be used and enjoyed . . . regardless of the location of the lands from which such timber and forest products may be derived . . ..'

Summary judgment may only be granted if no material fact issue remains in the case. Where affidavits have been submitted by the opposing parties, any doubts as to whether summary judgment is proper should be resolved against the moving party. (Pettis v. General Tel. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 503, 505, 58 Cal.Rptr. 316, 426 P.2d 884.)

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in determining that the language of the road agreement was clear, and in disregarding extrinsic evidence which had been presented in opposition to summary judgment. In determining the scope of an easement, extrinsic evidence may be used as an aid to interpretation unless such evidence imparts a meaning to which the instrument is not reasonably susceptible. Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 521--523, 67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889.

Although the agreement (which is set forth in relevant part in the margin ²) does not specifically state that the easement holders are entitled to use the Campbell right-of-way for hauling timber originating from any source, respondents contend that no other interpretation is reasonable. They argue that a conveyance of an easement in gross, as here, cannot possibly be construed as being subject to territorial restrictions. It is true that the benefit of an appurtenant easement attaches only to the land of the easement holder (see Civ.Code, § 1104; Moots v. Kasten (1949) 90 Cal.App.2d 734, 736, 203 P.2d 537; Burby, Land Burdens in California--Easements (1930) 4 So.Cal.L.Rev. 115, 118), while an easement in gross runs in favor of the persons specified in the grant. (See Balestra v. Button (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 192, 197, 128 P.2d 816; 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law (8th ed. 1973) Real Property, § 341, (pp. 2041--2042.)) But territorial restrictions are not necessarily absent simply because the parties have limited the use and enjoyment of the easement to a number of specified persons. (Such restrictions, for example, may be directly relevant to the matter of the scope and extent of permitted use. (See generally 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (1971) §§ 715, 722.))

Respondents point to paragraph four of the agreement, which provided in part that the easements 'may be used and enjoyed for any purposes reasonably related to the ownership, management and exploitation of timber and forest products which from time to time may be owned or controlled by the owner or owners of said easements . . ..' But that language does not establish that the easement holders may use the Campbell right-of-way to haul timber from any source. Appellants had claimed in the 1955 lawsuit that the Campbell grant had only authorized removal of timber which was merchantable in 1908. Paragraph four of the road agreement may have been inserted for no other purpose than to resolve that controversy.

(Paragraph three, on the other hand, gives rise to some doubt on the matter of territorial limitation upon the source of timber which may be hauled over the subject road. After stating that the easements are to be in gross, it goes on to consider the question of who may benefit from them. The easements, it is provided, may be used and enjoyed by 'second parties'--i.e., Cloverdale Redwood Co. and Moores and Smith--their employees, agents, and contractors as well as any licensee in which second parties had at least a 50 percent interest. (Cloverdale Redwood Co. and...