Buffalow v. Buffalow

Decision Date30 June 1839
Citation22 N.C. 241,2 Dev. 241
PartiesJACOB BUFFALOW v. JOHN BUFFALOW et. al.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

The principle upon which Courts of Equity interfere, in cases of unequal agreements between attorney and client, extends equally to agreements between a party to a suit before a single magistrate before whom attorneys do not appear, and his friend and confidential adviser in such suit. Hence, an absolute conveyance of all his property, worth at least $1,000, upon the consideration of supporting him during his life, obtained by a nephew from his uncle, a weak and very infirm old man, upwards of sixty years of age, while the nephew was acting as the pretended friend, adviser, and agent of the uncle, in a suit brought by warrant before a single magistrate, to recover from him the penalty for trading with slaves, about which the uncle was under much anxiety and alarm, and obtained too without the old man's having an opportunity to consult his friends or advise with counsel, will be set aside, and a reconveyance decreed upon the payment to the nephew of what had been advanced by him.

An agreement entered into, with a weak old man, by which he makes an absolute assignment of his whole estate upon the consideration of the assignee's personal covenant to maintain him for life, out of the profits of the estate, is, of itself. without reference to any confidential relation between the parties, or to any state of anxiety and alarm in which the assignor may be, liable to much animadversion, and without explanation, imports undue advantage.

A donee claiming under a voluntary conveyance from one who obtained his title by fraud and surprise, will be affected by the same equity which may be enforced against the donor.

The bill was filed in August, 1833, by Jacob Buffalow, the administrator and heir at law of Steele Buffalow deceased, for the purpose of having certain deeds made by him to John Buffalow, declared void, as having been fraudulently procured, or that they should stand only as a scurity for what might be found to be justly due to John Buffalow, upon the transaction between the parties.

The bill stated, that the plaintiff's late father was seized in fee of a tract of land, containing fifty acres, on which he resided, in Wake county, and was also the owner of four negroes and some other personal estate, such as furniture and stock. That he had never more than a very ordinary understanding, when his habits of life were regular and good; and that in the latter part of his life, he became much addicted to drinking, and that, about the period of the transactions complained of, his habits of intemperance were confirmed and inveterate, and his health impaired from those causes, and old age, he being then about the age of seventy; and that he was thereby rendered utterly unable to manage his business with discretion, and but little, if at all, removed from strict legal incapacity of mind. That, while in that state, the defendant Hutchins, and one Utley, commenced suits, by way of warrants, against him, for an alledged trading with slaves, and also preferred indictments therefor.--That the other defendant, John Buffalow, was the relation of Steele Buffalow, and affected to be his friend; that he was a man of much acuteness and speculating turn, and succeeded by professions of regard and other artifices, in insinuating himself into the good opinion and entire confidence of the other, as a friend and agent, capable of serving, and willing to serve him, in the management of the said business, for which Steele had no skill himself. That John Buffalow, finding Steele greatly agitated and alarmed, represented that the prosecutions would be successfully carried on, and impressed upon his mind, that they would result in his ruin, and leave him without the means of support, in his old age. That, availing himself of terrors thus produced by him, or perceived to exist, John offered himself as his friend, and proffered to secure him against all the suits, and to provide him a suitable maintenance for the residue of his life, if Steele would convey to him his land and slaves, and other property. That Steele, with alarms thus excited by artful suggestions operating on his weak and decayed mind, embraced the insidious offer, and, on the 7th day of October, 1831, conveyed his whole property to the defendant, John Buffalow, who, soon after, took possession thereof, and conveyed the land to the other defendant Hutchins; between whom and John Buffalow the suits were in some way settled.

The bill then stated, that in the belief of the plaintiff, the warrants and prosecutions were instituted in consequence of some understanding between the two defendants, to speculate upon the alarms of Steele Buffalow, and divide the spoils; or, if mistaken therein, that the negotiation of John Buffalow was commenced and carried on in concert with the other defendant, upon an agreement implied or expressed, that Hutchins should take the land as his share, and the other defendant keep the residue of the property.

The bill then charged that, at all events, and if the two defendants did not unite in the active perpetration of the fraud as alleged, yet, from the relations between the parties as kinsmen and friends, and as principal and agent, professing to interpose from affectionate consideration of the other's afflictions, incapacities and distresses, and from the surprise and undue advantage in procuring the conveyances from one in the condition of said Steele, they ought not to stand in this court. The bill further charged that Hutchins did not pay any valuable consideration for the land, and also had notice of all the matters affecting the transaction between Steele and John Buffalow.

The bill further stated, that Steele Buffalow died intestate, about six months after the deeds were procured from him, and left the plaintiff his only child and heir at law; to whom also letters of administration on the personal estate had been granted.

The answer of John Buffalow admitted the conveyances at the time charged in the bill, and that Steele Buffalow, who was his uncle, was then between 60 and 70 years of age: that he was not a man of any remarkable powers of mind, or discretion, but was a man of ordinary capacity in his youth, and, at times, addicted to intemperance, but denied that he was legally incompetent to transact business.

The answer then stated that this defendant resided in Raleigh, and Steel Buffalow a few miles off; that on the 6th day of October, 1831, the uncle came to the defendant's house and told him that judgment had just been rendered against him for $100, as a penalty for trading with a negro: Immediately afterwards, a constable came to the house, and served two other warrants on him for the like penalties, at the suit of one Utley, who was also the plaintiff in that which had just been tried; and “the said Steele invited this defendant to go with him before the magistrate, as he might require some surety to prevent him from being put in jail; and the defendant went, and the magistrate continued the cases for the absence of a witness.” At that time, also, the defendant Hutchins, as prosecutor, preferred three bills of indictment for the same offences in the Superior Court, which were found by the grand jury. The answer of Buffalow positively denied any agency, directly or indirectly on his part, in causing the warrants or indictments to be instituted. It stated that the first he, John, knew of them, was from Steele himself; and “that, on the 7th of October, 1831, of his own head, he proposed to this defendant that he would convey to him, as his absolute property, the land and four negroes, if this defendant would bind himself to pay all the just debts of the said Steele, and support him during his life. This defendant at first refused to do so; but, after being persuaded, he consented, and the deeds were drawn”--which were exhibited with the answer. One of them was a deed of bargain and sale for the land, expressed to be made in consideration of $100; and was drawn by a gentleman of the city, not a professional person. A second was a bill of sale for the four slaves, expressed to be in consideration “of an agreement this day sealed and delivered by John Buffalow to Steele Buffalow, by which the said John hath agreed to support and maintain the said Steel during his natural life, and to pay all the debts justly owing by the said Steele; and in the further consideration of one dollar.” A third was in these words:

“Know all men by these presents, that for and in consideration of the conveyance of four slaves to John Buffalow, by Steele Buffalow, the said John, for himself and his heirs, doth covenant and agree with said Steele as follows, to wit:--that the said John will pay off and discharge all debts now justly owing, or that may become due hereafter on contracts now existing, if such there be, so that the creditors of said Steele shall in no manner harrass the said Steele--the said Steele, however, consenting that the said John may, at his own expense, resist all demands which he may consider unjust, and be allowed the benefit of all legal or equitable set offs, with any of the creditors of said Steele: Further also, that he, the said John, will comfortably maintain and support the said Steele, as a boarder at the house of said John, during the life of said Steele, and decently clothe him, provide for him all necessary medical aid and attendance during sickness; and, if the said John die before the said Steele, then he will provide for his maintenance, support and comfort, as above stated, in the family of the said John Buffalow:”

which was signed and sealed by the defendant, John. The three deeds were attested by the same witness; and the answer stated that the two latter were drawn by counsel, according to the proposition of said Steele; and that the covenant from John to Steele Buffalow, was...

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  • Sutton v. Sutton
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • 1 december 1919
  • Helms v. Helms
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 26 april 1904
    ...is also said that courts of equity will freely rescind conveyances by parents to sons upon breach of the agreement to support. Buffalow v. Buffalow, 22 N. C. 241; Jones on Conveyances, 640. The last clause in the deed from Elmira to plaintiff, we think, shows that the parties understood tha......
  • Helms v. Helms
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 26 april 1904
    ...is also said that courts of equity will freely rescind conveyances by parents to sons upon breach of the agreement to support. Buffalow v. Buffalow, 22 N.C. 241; on Conveyances, 646. The last clause in the deed from Elmira to plaintiff, we think, shows that the parties understood that her s......
  • Dixon v. Green
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 1 oktober 1919
    ... ... 256, 65 S.E. 963; Braddy v ... Elliott, 146 N.C. 578, 60 S.E. 507, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) ... 1121, 125 Am. St. Rep. 523; Buffalow v. Buffalow, 22 ... N.C. 241, Futrill v. Futrill, 58 N.C. 61; Id., 59 ... N.C. 337. The last case, while slightly different in its ... facts, and ... ...
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