Buffelen Woodworking Co. v. Cook, 4068-II

• Citation: 28 Wn.App. 501,625 P.2d 703
• Decision Date: 27 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 4068-II,4068-II
• Parties: BUFFELEN WOODWORKING COMPANY, Respondent, v. Henry W. COOK, Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 501

28 Wn.App. 501

625 P.2d 703

BUFFELEN WOODWORKING COMPANY, Respondent, v. Henry W. COOK, Appellant.

No. 4068-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Feb. 27, 1981.

Edwin J. Wheeler, Tacoma, for appellant.

Darrel B. Addington, Tacoma, for respondent.

PETRIE, Judge.

In this case we are asked to declare that jury review of workers' compensation claims, as authorized by the workers' compensation act, RCW title 51, denies procedural due process afforded by the state and federal constitutions. For the reasons stated below, we hold that such jury review does not deny due process.

In 1977, Henry W. Cook filed a claim for medical aid and compensation benefits under the workers' compensation act for injuries he allegedly sustained in the course of his employment with Buffelen Woodworking Company. Following allowance of the claim by the Department of Labor & Industries as an "industrial injury," Buffelen, a self-insurer under the act, filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. At issue throughout the proceedings and the ensuing appeals was whether the worker sustained his back injury at the job site, or elsewhere. After hearing Mr. Cook's testimony and that of five other witnesses, the hearing examiner found the worker was injured in the course of his employment. Buffelen's petition to the Board for review of the examiner's proposed decision and order was denied.

As authorized by RCW 51.52.110, Buffelen appealed the order to superior court and demanded a six-person jury. Mr. Cook moved for summary judgment, requesting that the court take the issue of occurrence of the injury from the jury. The motion was denied. Pursuant to RCW 51.52.115 the jury conducted a de novo review of facts as found in the Board record. Specifically, the jury was asked, "Did Henry W. Cook slip on some steps and fall on February 28, 1977?" The jury responded negatively. Accordingly, the court entered a judgment denying Mr. Cook's claim. He appeals to this court, contending that jury review of allowance of an industrial insurance claim, based on the Board record, when the crucial issue is the credibility of witnesses, violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution.

RCW 51.52.115 provides in pertinent part:

The hearing in the superior court shall be de novo, but the court shall not receive evidence or testimony other than, or in addition to, that offered before the board or included in the record filed by the board in the superior court as provided in RCW 51.52.110: ... The proceedings in every such appeal shall be informal and summary, but full opportunity to be heard shall be had before judgment is pronounced. In all court proceedings under or pursuant to this title the findings and decision of the board shall be prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same. ... In appeals to the superior court hereunder, either party shall be entitled to a trial by jury upon demand, and the jury's verdict shall have the same force and effect as in actions at law. Where the court submits a case to the jury, the court shall by instruction advise the jury of the exact findings of the board on each material issue before the court.

In practice the jury's de novo review is not a silent reading of the verbatim report of proceedings. Instead, counsel for the litigants adopt unique "role playing" capacities and "read" their respective parts to the jury, in the same manner as they would when reading a witness' deposition. The jury is then informed that the Board's decision is presumed correct and the burden is on the appealing party to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is incorrect. Allison v. Department of Labor & Indus., 66 Wash.2d 263, 401 P.2d 982 (1965). After deliberation, the jury is requested to return a special verdict form evaluating the correctness of the disputed board findings. See WPI 155.13, 6 Wash.Prac. 469 (2d ed. 1980).

In assessing the worker's due process claim we begin with a familiar premise. Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging constitutionality of a specific statute has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional. In re Harbert, 85 Wash.2d 719, 538 P.2d 1212 (1975); Toulou v. Department of Social & Health Services, 27 Wash.App. 137, 616 P.2d 678 (1980). We are reminded by the employer that various provisions of the workers' compensation act, including those relating to jury review of claims, have survived constitutional attack. State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101 (1911); Floyd v. Department of Labor & Indus., 44 Wash.2d 560, 269 P.2d 563 (1954). But our courts have not addressed the specific question: Is this jury review process a constitutionally defective form of claim determination?

The federal and state constitutions protect against state government deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law. Fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution; article 1, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution. It seems apparent that two issues must be resolved. First, what is the nature of the property interest the worker seeks to protect? Second, what process is due the worker on appeal?

Property interests "protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money." (Footnote omitted.) Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705-06, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). To have a protected property interest the party must have more than a need or unilateral expectation. He must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Roth at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. Property interests

are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.

Id. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d at 561. The procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be limited to presently enjoyed interests, but should be afforded when the law confers some benefit, provided certain criteria are met. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 10-9 at 518-19 (1978).

We perceive a worker's interest in potential benefits as substantial because of the statutory abrogation of his common law right to sue his employer for work-related injuries in exchange for his exclusive remedy under the workers' compensation act. See RCW 51.04.010. We hold that an applicant for workers' compensation benefits whose claim is not finally adjudicated has a property interest of sufficient magnitude to trigger the application of procedural due process requirements. Davis v. United States, 415 F.Supp....