Buffinton v. Chase

• Decision Date: 08 December 1890
• Citation: 25 N.E. 977,152 Mass. 534
• Parties: BUFFINTON et al. v. CHASE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

152 Mass. 534

25 N.E. 977

BUFFINTON et al.

v.CHASE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Dec. 8, 1890.

Report from supreme judicial court, Bristol county; C. ALLEN, Judge.

Jennings & Brayton, for plaintiffs.

Braley & Swift, for defendant.

DEVENS, J.

The question which the case presents is, whether the receipt of certain notes, which the plaintiffs credited on the account of the defendant, is to be treated as a part payment made by him on that date, from which a promise to pay the balance of the debt due may be implied, or whether the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant, on November 1, 1881, owed the plaintiffs a balance on account, which, with interest, amounted to $1,810, and gave the plaintiffs an order on one Howland for this sum, or any less sum, due to him from Howland, then in Howland's hands. Howland was notified of the order, and promised to pay the same, when he could ascertain the amount due from him to the defendant. After repeated and unavailing efforts to collect the amount from Howland, the plaintiffs, on August 8, 1883, accepted from Howland his notes on time for the sum of $1,125.30, and gave the defendant credit for the same on account. The defendant requested a ruling that the claim against him was barred by the statute; that the application of the $1,125.30 must be made on the account as of the date of the acceptance of the order by the plaintiffs; that no part payment had ever been made by defendant, or on his behalf, under such circumstances as to give rise to the inference that defendant renewed his promise to pay, and that the plaintiffs could not therefore recover. The court refused so to rule, and found as facts that the order was taken with the understanding that whatever might be received upon it should be applied to the indebtedness of the defendant, and that it was not understood that the plaintiffs should acceptit in full payment, or in accord and satisfaction. The court further ruled that in this state of things, when the plaintiffs settled with Howland by taking his notes, it amounted to a part payment then made by defendant, and found for the plaintiffs. While the evidence was conflicting as to whether the order was given in accord and satisfaction of the debt due the plaintiffs, these findings of fact are justified by the evidence. In order that part payment of a debt shall lead to the inference that it is at that time an acknowledgment of the debt which revives the original promise of payment, it is not necessary that such payment should be made by the debtor personally. It is sufficient that it be made by his direction and authority, and it takes effect from the time when it is thus made. Where a debtor deposits, with his creditor, notes, accounts, etc., against third persons, not in satisfaction of his debt, but as collateral security therefor, to be applied in payment of the debt as the same may be collected, if the creditor acts in good faith, and with reasonable expedition, when he realizes thereon, his collections are to be regarded as payments by the principal, as of the date and at the time when they are received. Porter v. Blood, 5 Pick. 54;Whipple v. Blackington, 97 Mass. 476;Butler v. Price, 115 Mass. 578;Brown v. Tyler, 8 Gray, 135;Hancock v. Franklin Ins. Co, 114 Mass. 155, Haven v. Hathaway, 20 Me. 345.

The fact that this claim was not received in full payment, or accord and...