Buford v. Laborers' Int'l Union Local 269

Decision Date14 January 2019
Docket Number16 C 10218
PartiesMAURICE BUFORD, Plaintiff, v. LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 269 and LABORERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 4, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Judge Gary Feinerman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Maurice Buford brings this pro se suit against his union, Laborers' International Union Local 269, and its alleged successor, Laborers' Local Union No. 4, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that Local 269 discriminated against him on the basis of race and color by failing to adequately represent him in connection with his termination by his former employer, I.W. & G., Inc. Doc. 7. (For the sake of convenience, and assuming without deciding that Local 4 assumed Local 269's liabilities, the court will refer to both Locals together as "Defendants.") With discovery concluded, Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that the record would not permit a reasonable juror to find that Local 269 discriminated against Buford. Doc. 160. The motion is granted.

Background
A. Buford's Noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)

Consistent with Local Rule 56.1, Defendants filed a Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of undisputed facts along with their summary judgment motion. Doc. 161. The factual assertions in the Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement cite evidentiary material in the record and are supported by the cited material. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(a) ("The statement referred to in (3) shall consist of short numbered paragraphs, including within each paragraph specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts set forth in that paragraph."). Also consistent with the local rules, Defendants served on Buford a Local Rule 56.2 notice, which explains what Local Rule 56.1 requires of a pro se litigant opposing summary judgment. Doc. 163. If Buford wished to oppose summary judgment, Local Rule 56.1(b) required him to file:

(1) any opposing affidavits and other materials referred to in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); (2) a supporting memorandum of law; and (3) a concise response to [Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3)] statement that shall contain: (A) numbered paragraphs, each corresponding to and stating a concise summary of the paragraph to which it is directed, and (B) a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon, and (C) a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.

N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b).

Buford filed a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response but not a Local Rule 56.1(b)(2) memorandum of law or a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement of additional facts. Doc. 166 at pp. 1-20. Buford's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response expressly declines to dispute ¶¶ 2, 4-5, 8, 10, 13-15, 24, 26, 30-31, and 47-48 of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement, id. at ¶¶ 2, 4-5, 8, 10, 13-15, 24, 26, 30-31, 47-48, so the factual assertions in those paragraphs are deemed admitted. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C) ("[A]ll material facts set forth in the [Local Rule 56.1(a)(3)] statement ... will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party."). Buford's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response denies or otherwise objects to the remaining paragraphs of the Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement, but those denials and objections violate Local Rule 56.1 in several respects.

First, Buford's response violates Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B)'s requirement that a non-movant denying a particular paragraph in the movant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement support the denial with "specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B). Paragraphs 9, 11, 18-20, 22-23, 28-29, and 33-44 of Buford's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response do not cite any record evidence to support his denial of or objection to the facts asserted in the corresponding paragraphs of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement. Doc. 166 at ¶¶ 9, 11, 18-20, 22-23, 28-29, 33-44. Accordingly, those paragraphs of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement are deemed admitted. See Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218-19 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The non-moving party's failure ... to cite to any admissible evidence to support facts presented in response by the non-moving party render the facts presented by the moving party as undisputed."); Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (same); Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2004) (same); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994) (same). In so holding, the court notes that some of Buford's denials rest on the submission that he misspoke during his deposition or does not recall the underlying facts, id. at ¶¶ 19, 22, 36-37, 43-44, or that the evidence supporting Defendants' assertions is fabricated or unverified, id. at ¶¶ 18, 28-29, but those submissions create, at most, only "metaphysical doubt" about Defendants' assertions and therefore are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. See Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1011-12 (7th Cir. 2018) ("When the moving party has carried [its] burden, the nonmoving party 'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.' Instead, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.") (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).

Almost three weeks after the deadline for his response to Defendants' summary judgment motion, Doc. 165, Buford filed a declaration purporting to provide additional evidence, Doc. 167. The tardiness of the declaration alone provides sufficient reason to disregard it. See Raven v. Madison Area Technical Coll., 443 F. App'x 210, 212 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Although we liberally construe pro se filings, we do not enlarge filing deadlines for them.") (citation omitted); Casimir v. Sunrise Fin., Inc., 299 F. App'x 591, 593 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[E]ven when the litigant is pro se, district courts are justified in enforcing deadlines, particularly in the context of summary judgment and Local Rule 56.1.") (collecting cases). In any event, Buford's declaration does him no good, as his Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response does not cite the declaration, and the declaration references neither his Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response nor Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement. Docs. 166-167. The court need not and will not attempt to map the factual assertions in Buford's declaration onto Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement or his Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response to determine whether he has adduced any genuine disputes of material fact; that is the purpose of a properly constructed and supported Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response. See Curtis, 807 F.3d at 219 ("The purpose of [Local] Rule 56.1 is to have the litigants present to the district court a clear, concise list of material facts that are central to the summary judgment determination. It is the litigants' duty to clearly identify material facts in dispute and provide the admissible evidence that tends to prove or disprove the proffered fact. A litigant who denies a material fact is required to provide the admissible evidence that supports his denial in a clear, concise, and obvious fashion, for quick reference of the court."); FTC v. Bay Area Bus. Council, 423 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We are hard-pressed to see how [the] affidavit could constitute compliance with [Local] Rule 56.1. ... [The] affidavit in no way constitutes a concise response to each numbered paragraph in the [Local Rule 56.1(a)(3)]statement.") (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); Koszola v. Bd. of Educ., 385 F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting its review to the content of the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements, excluding from consideration [the non-movant's] attached affidavits."), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, Buford cannot use his declaration to dispute what his Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response admits or to buttress his denials.

Second, ¶¶ 1, 3, 12, 17, and 27 of Buford's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response make factual assertions that go well beyond the facts asserted in the corresponding paragraphs of Defendants' Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement. Doc. 166 at ¶¶ 1, 3, 12, 17, 27. For example, ¶¶ 3 and 27, which deny Defendants' assertions that I.W. & G. offered certain reasons for Buford's termination, contain lengthy rebuttals to the reasons themselves rather than addressing whether I.W. & G. in fact offered them. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 27. Those extraneous facts will be disregarded because a non-movant seeking to assert facts that go beyond what is fairly responsive to the movant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) assertions must do so not in his Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response, but rather in a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) statement of additional facts. See Eason v. Nolan, 416 F. App'x 569, 570 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion when it disregarded the additional facts that [the non-movant] included in his [Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B)] response."); Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that because the non-movant's Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) response "contained several extremely long, argumentative paragraphs, and in those paragraphs [the non-movant] simultaneously...

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