Buford v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 20 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | 99-9073 |
| Citation | 149 L.Ed.2d 197,121 S.Ct. 1276,532 U.S. 59 |
| Parties | PAULA L. BUFORD, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATESSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The United States Sentencing Guidelines, as relevant here, define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provide that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions, advising that they are "related" when, inter alia, they were consolidated for sentencing. The Seventh Circuit has held that because two prior convictions might have been consolidated for sentencing, and hence related, even if a sentencing court did not enter a formal consolidation order, a court should decide whether such convictions were nonetheless functionally consolidated, meaning that they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. Petitioner Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery. At sentencing, the Government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related, but did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court decided that the drug and robbery cases had not been consolidated, either formally or functionally, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reviewing the District Court's decision deferentially rather than de novo.
Held: Deferential review is appropriate when an appeals court reviews a trial court's Sentencing Guideline determination as to whether an offender's prior convictions were consolidated for sentencing. The relevant federal sentencing statute requires a reviewing court not only to "accept" a district court's "findings of fact" (unless "clearly erroneous"), but also to "give due deference to the court's application of the guidelines to the facts." 18 U.S.C. 3742(e) (emphasis added). The "deference that is due depends on the nature of the question presented." Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98. Although Buford argues that the nature of the question here-applying a Guideline term to undisputed facts-demands no deference at all, the district court is in a better position than the appellate court to decide whether individual circumstances demonstrate functional consolidation. Experience with trials, sentencing, and consolidation procedures will help a district judge draw the proper inferences from the procedural descriptions provided. In addition, factual nuance may closely guide the legal decision, with legal results depending heavily upon an understanding of the significance of case-specific details. And the decision's fact-bound nature limits the value of appellate court precedent, which may provide only minimal help when other courts consider other procedural circumstances, state systems, and crimes. Insofar as greater uniformity is necessary, the Sentencing Commission can provide it. Pp. 4-7.
201 F.3d 937, affirmed.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
This case raises a narrow question of sentencing law. What standard of review applies when a court of appeals reviews a trial court's Sentencing Guideline determination as to whether an offender's prior convictions were consolidated, hence "related," for purposes of sentencing? In particular, should the appeals court review the trial court's decision deferentially or de novo? We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that deferential review is appropriate, and we affirm.
The trial court decision at issue focused on one aspect of the United States Sentencing Guidelines' treatment of "career offenders," a category of offender subject to particularly severe punishment. The Guidelines define a "career offender" as an offender with "at least two prior felony convictions" for violent or drug-related crimes. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 4B1.1 (Nov. 2000) (USSG). At the same time, they provide that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior felony conviction all those that are "related" to one another. USSG 4B1.2(c), and comment., n. 3; 4A1.2(a)(2). And they advise (in an application note) that prior convictions are "related" to one another when, inter alia, they "were consolidated for . . . sentencing." 4A1.2, comment., n. 3.
The Seventh Circuit has refined this "prior conviction" doctrine yet further. It has held that two prior convictions might have been "consolidated for sentencing," and hence "related," even if the sentencing court did not enter any formal order of consolidation. See United States v. Joseph, 50 F.3d 401, 404, cert. denied, 516 U. S 847 (1995). In such an instance, the Circuit has said, a court should decide whether the convictions were nonetheless "functionally consolidated," which means that the convictions were "factually or logically related, and sentencing was joint." 201 F.3d 937, 940 (2000) (emphasis added).
This case concerns "functional consolidation." Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, a crime of violence, in federal court. The federal sentencing judge had to decide whether Buford's five 1992 Wisconsin state-court convictions were "related" to one another, and consequently counted as one single prior conviction, or whether they should count as more than one.
The Government conceded that four of the five prior convictions were "related" to one another. These four involved a series of gas station robberies. All four had been the subject of a single criminal indictment, and Buford had pleaded guilty to all four at the same time in the same court. See USSG 4A1.2, comment., n. 3 (prior offenses are "related" if "consolidated for trial or sentencing").
The Government did not concede, however, that the fifth conviction, for a drug crime, was "related" to the other four. The drug crime (possession of, with intent to deliver, cocaine) had taken place about the same time as the fourth robbery, and Buford claimed that the robberies had been motivated by her drug addiction. But the only evidentiary link among the crimes was that the police had discovered the cocaine when searching Buford's house after her arrest for the robberies. Moreover, no formal order of consolidation had been entered. The State had charged the drug offense in a separate indictment and had assigned a different prosecutor to handle the drug case. A different judge had heard Buford plead guilty to the drug charge in a different hearing held on a different date; two different state prosecutors had appeared before the sentencing court, one discussing drugs, the other discussing the robberies; and the sentencing court had entered two separate judgments.
Buford, without denying these facts, nonetheless pointed to other circumstances that, in her view, showed that the drug crime conviction had been "consolidated" with the robbery convictions for sentencing, rendering her drug conviction and robbery convictions "related." She pointed out that the State had sent the four robbery cases for sentencing to the very same judge who had heard and accepted her plea of guilty to the drug charge; that the judge had heard arguments about sentencing in all five cases at the same time in a single proceeding; that the judge had issued sentences for all five crimes at the same time; and that the judge, having imposed three sentences for the five crimes (6 years for the drug crime, 12 years for two robberies, and 15 years for the other two), had ordered all three to run concurrently.
The District Court, placing greater weight on the former circumstances than on the latter, decided that the drug case and the robbery cases had not been consolidated for sentencing, either formally or functionally. Buford appealed. The Court of Appeals found the "functional consolidation" question a close one, and wrote that "the standard of appellate review may be dispositive." 201 F.3d, at 940. It decided to review the District Court's decision "deferentially" rather than "de novo." Id., at 942. And it affirmed that decision. Ibid.
Buford sought certiorari. In light of the different Circuits' different approaches to the problem, we granted the writ. Compare United States v. Irons, 196 F.3d 634, 638 (CA6 1999) (); United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1219 (CA10) (same), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 889 (1999); United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 338 (CA2) (same), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 901 (1999); United States v. Maza, 93 F.3d 1390, 1400 (CA8 1996) (same), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1138 (1997); United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 1565 (CA11 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1112 (1996) (same), with United States v. Garcia, 962 F.2d 479, 481 (CA5) (), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 902 (1992); United States v. Davis, 922 F.2d...
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