Buhler v. People

Decision Date14 January 1963
Docket NumberNo. 20146,20146
PartiesPatricia Ann BUHLER, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Caddes & Capra, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., J. F. Brauer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.

HALL, Justice.

On February 7, 1961, the plaintiff in error, to whom we shall refer as Patricia, was named as defendant in an information filed in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, under C.R.S. '53, 60-1-13 (Cum.Supp.), wherein she is charged (in Criminal Action No. 47983) with the crime of forgery committed in the State of Illinois.

'* * * as defined by the statutes of the State of Illinois, in said State of Illinois, and has been charged in said State of Illinois with the commission of said crime, and has fled from justice in said State, and is believed now to be in this State; contrary to the form of the statute * * *.'

The crime is alleged to have been committed on September 7, 1960.

Patricia was arrested on February 7, 1961, pursuant to criminal capias issued in said action, and released on bond for appearance.

On March 3, 1961, there was filed in said case:

1. Petition of the district attorney of Whiteside County, Illinois, for requisition of Patricia directed to the Governor of the State of Illinois, wherein, among other things, it is set forth that Patricia 'stands charged by the accompanying certified coty of complaint and affidavit with the crime of forgery * * *.' (Emphasis supplied).

(a) Certified copy of aforementioned complaint and affidavit wherein Patricia is charged with the violation of Section 277, Chapter 38, of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, which section defines the crime of forgery (Emphasis supplied).

(b) Affidavit of Robert J. Buhler (husband of Patricia) wherein it is set forth that (1) Patricia was in Illinois at the time of the alleged crime of forgery, and that (2) she 'forged his name to a deed to said real estate.'

2. Section 277, of Chapter 38 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois.

3. Requisition of the Governor of Illinois directed to the Governor of the State of Colorado, demanding that Patricia be apprehended and delivered to designated agents of Illinois for return to that state.

4. Orders of the Governor of Colorado, dated February 24, 1961, directing the arrest of Patricia and her surrender to officers of Illinois for the purpose of removal from Colorado to Illinois.

On May 12, 1961, Patricia filed her petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the above mentioned 'Criminal Action No. 47983,' in which she appears as petitioner and the Sheriff of the City and County of Denver is named as respondent, wherein she asserts that the warrant for her arrest and surrender to authorities of Illinois, issued and directed by the Governor of Colorado, are in direct violation of C.R.S. '53, 60-1-3 (Cum.Supp.), illegal and void, and she is being unlawfully restrained of her liberty by the respondent.

The respondent made no answer to this petition; however, it appears that the district attorney filed his answer thereto, putting in issue many matters that were fully established by documents filed by him in the case.

Hearing was had on the issues made up by the petition and answer, the writ of habeas corpus was denied, and Patricia remanded to the custody of the sheriff to be released to the Illinois authorities for return to that state.

Petitioner is here by writ of error seeking reversal.

Petitioner specifies numerous reasons, many clearly without merit, why the extradition proceedings are void and the judgment erroneous. We need not pass on all of these alleged errors. One reason advanced is that the 'complaint and affidavit' filed in the justice court in Illinois does not charge an offense under the revised statutes of the State of Illinois. With this contention we are in accord.

C.R.S. '53, 60-1-3 (1960 Cum.Supp.) provides:

'No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another state shall be recognized by the governor unless in writing alleging * * * that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, that thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied * * * by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, [Illinois] together with a copy of the warrant which was issued thereupon; * * *. The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state. * * *' As pointed out above, there is attached to the demand of the Governor of Illinois a duly authenticated copy of the 'complaint and affidavit' made before a magistrate in Illinois, together with a duly authenticated copy of the criminal statutes of Illinois governing the crime of forgery, including the aforementioned Section 277, Chapter 38, thereof. This statute provides that one who forges the name of another:

'* * * with intent to damage or defraud any person * * * shall be deemed guilty of forgery, * * *.'

Clearly, the mere signing of another's name to a document is no offense under that statute, and this is all that Patricia is charged with doing--she is not charged with delivering the document or acting with intent to damage or defraud anyone. More important than the act of signing is the intent and purpose in signing and what use is made of the false document.

In 37 C.J.S. Forgery, § 4, p. 34, it is said:

'An intent to defraud is the gist of the crime of forgery.'

And at § 49:

'The indictment must allege intent to defraud unless the statute on which the prosecution is based dispenses with intent to defraud as an element of the offense or is silent as to intent.'

The Illinois statute does not dispense with, nor is it silent as to intent, but expressly makes 'intent to damage or defraud' a necessary element to constitute an offense.

The complaint against Patricia fails to state any offense. Such being the...

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13 cases
  • Stilley v. Tinsley, 19940
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • August 26, 1963
    ...of the inquiry based on the information. * * *' To the same effect, see Lowe v. People, 139 Colo. 578, 342 P.2d 631, and Buhler v. People, 151 Colo. ----, 377 P.2d 748. Third: We feel constrained to revisit the oft cited case of Hart v. Best, 119 Colo. 569, 205 P.2d 787, decided April 18, 1......
  • Hithe v. Nelson
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • June 22, 1970
    ...purpose is the determination by the court of whether a person is lawfully in custody. North v. Koch, Colo., 457 P.2d 915; Buhler v. People, 151 Colo. 345, 377 P.2d 748; Oates v. People, 136 Colo. 208, 315 P.2d 196. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable to special statutor......
  • North v. Koch, 23076
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • August 25, 1969
    ...in nature and have for their sole purpose the determination of whether the person in custody is being lawfully detained. Buhler v. People, 151 Colo. 345, 377 P.2d 748; McGrath v. Tinsley, 138 Colo. 18, 328 P.2d 579; Riley v. Denver, 137 Colo. 312, 324 P.2d 790; Oates v. People, 136 Colo. 20......
  • Johnson v. Cronin
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • November 26, 1984
    ...Leach, 626 P.2d 164 (Colo.1981); Lovato v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 1203 (Colo.1980). In addition, petitioner's reliance on Buhler v. People, 151 Colo. 345, 377 P.2d 748 (1963), is misplaced. Buhler does not require that a demanding state must always allege mental state before a petitioner is "sub......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Interstate Rendition Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 6-12, December 1977
    • Invalid date
    ...supra, note 37. 70. Samples v. Cronin, ___ Colo. ___, 536 P.2d 306 (1975). 71. Fox v. People, supra, note 37. 72. Buhler v. People, 151 Colo. 345, 377 P.2d 748 (1963). 73. C.R.S. 1973, § 16-19-104. 74. Wynsma v. Leach, supra, note 33. 75. Wynsma v. Leach, supra, note 33; Byers v. Leach, 187......

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