La Buhn v. Bulkmatic Transport Co.
Decision Date | 30 September 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 86 C 3474.,86 C 3474. |
Citation | 644 F. Supp. 942 |
Parties | Joe LA BUHN, Plaintiff, v. BULKMATIC TRANSPORT CO., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
L. Steven Platt, Arnold and Kadjan, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
Lawrence C. DiNardo, James P. Osick, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
Joe La Buhn ("La Buhn") initially sued Bulkmatic Transport Company ("Bulkmatic") in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, claiming Bulkmatic had fired him in retaliation for (1) his complaints about unsafe working conditions and (2) his successful exercise of a contractually guaranteed right to grieve an earlier discharge. Bulkmatic promptly removed the action to this District Court on the ground La Buhn's claim necessarily arose under (and was preempted by) Labor Management Relations Act § 301 ("Section 301"), 29 U.S.C. § 185.
Now Bulkmatic has moved for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rules") 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1).1 For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, La Buhn's claims are dismissed — one of them (the safety-related claim) without prejudice.
La Buhn drove one of Bulkmatic's trucks (¶ 1). On September 24, 1983 he delivered a load of anhydrous sodium metasilicate ("Silicate Soda") to Overdale, one of Bulkmatic's customers (¶ 2). Though he observed appropriate safety precautions, he was exposed to Silicate Soda dust during the unloading process and became ill (¶¶ 5-6). That exposure was caused by (1) a defect in Bulkmatic's truck and (2) unsafe conditions at Overdale's receiving facility (¶¶ 7-8). La Buhn complained about the unsafe situation, and Bulkmatic took him off the Overdale route (¶ 9).
On August 30, 1984 Bulkmatic reassigned La Buhn to Overdale deliveries (¶ 10). After another exposure to Silicate Soda dust, La Buhn lodged a second complaint about Overdale's unsafe conditions, but Bulkmatic kept him on the route (¶¶ 11-12). Bulkmatic also sent La Buhn to make Silicate Soda deliveries to two other customers where unsafe conditions existed, and La Buhn was again exposed to harmful dust (¶¶ 13-14, 16-17). When he complained about each of those places, Bulkmatic was similarly unresponsive (¶¶ 15, 18). Nor did Bulkmatic take any steps to address La Buhn's general complaints about the lack of safety precautions afforded him and his fellow drivers (¶ 19).
Bulkmatic fired La Buhn in February 1985 — La Buhn says that was in retaliation for his complaints (¶ 20). However, he was reinstated by a union grievance panel (id.). Bulkmatic fired La Buhn again in February 1986, and that termination was upheld by the union grievance panel (id.; Removal Petition ¶ 2(f)).
La Buhn then sued in the state court, claiming (¶ 22):
Defendant's acts in terminating Plaintiff in retaliation for complaining about the unsafe conditions then and there existing with regard to the loading and unloading of a dangerous chemical, namely silicate soda, or alternatively, for exercising his contractually guaranteed right to grieve his discharge in February, 1985 were intentional and wilful.
According to Removal Petition ¶ 2 La Buhn omitted several facts from his Complaint:
Bulkmatic presents alternative grounds for dismissal:
For his part La Buhn urges this action was improperly removed and should be remanded to state court because, he says:
As to his Section 301 argument, La Buhn says nothing about (1) the preclusive effect of the CBA grievance procedure or (2) the absence of a duty-of-fair-representation claim. He stakes his whole fate on his argument that removal was improper.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ("Section 1441(a)") a state-court defendant may remove to federal district court:
any civil action ... of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction....
Absent diversity of citizenship between the parties (none is alleged here), that means a removable action must state a federal-question claim. La Buhn's state-court Complaint says nothing about a claim "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" — 28 U.S.C. § 1331's definition of a federal question.
Under well-established jurisdictional principles (Orsini v. Echlin, Inc., 637 F.Supp. 38, 39 (N.D.Ill.1986), adapted to this case):
But it is equally fundamental that a state-court plaintiff cannot defeat defendant's Section 1441(a) removal right "by omitting to plead necessary Federal questions in a complaint ..." (Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust of Southern California, 463 U.S. 1, 22, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2853, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983)). In that sense "necessary" federal questions exist where federal law has wholly preempted any possible state-law cause of action, making plaintiff's suit one arising under federal law willy-nilly (id. 23, 103 S.Ct. 2853; Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1345 (7th Cir.1986)). Consequently if La Buhn's retaliatory discharge suit states a cause of action preempted by Section 301, it was a suit "of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction" and was properly removed.
Section 301 has created a fertile field for preemption arguments. As Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910-11, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (footnote omitted) said:
Section 301 of the LMRA states:
Lueck, 105 S.Ct. at 1911-12 (footnotes omitted) went on to shape the scope of Section 301's preemptive force:
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