Buhrle v. State

• Citation: 627 P.2d 1374
• Decision Date: 13 May 1981
• Docket Number: No. 5425,5425
• Parties: Edith BUHRLE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1374

627 P.2d 1374

Edith BUHRLE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 5425.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 13, 1981.

Rehearing Denied May 29, 1981.

Harry G. Bondi, Asst. Public Defender, Wyoming Public Defender Program, and Philip S. Bovee, Casper, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument for appellant.

John D. Troughton, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Criminal Division, and John W. Renneisen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, signed the brief of appellee. Renneisen and Burton W. Gutz, County Atty., Natrona County, appeared in oral argument for appellee.

Before ROSE, C. J., RAPER, THOMAS and ROONEY, JJ., and BROWN, ^* District Judge.

BROWN, Justice.

Defendant-appellant was convicted by a jury of murder in the second degree, in the Seventh Judicial District, in and for Natrona County, Wyoming. The following issues have been raised by defendant on appeal:

1. WAS IT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENSE PSYCHOLOGIST?

2. WAS IT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO LIMIT APPELLANT'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS?

3. WAS IT PREJUDICIAL FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO LIMIT THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE WITNESS?

We find that the trial judge did not commit reversible error and, therefore, we affirm.

Kenneth Buhrle, the victim, and appellant had been married eighteen years at the time of Mr. Buhrle's death. During this time appellant suffered numerous instances of physical and mental abuse. On September 24, 1979, Mr. Buhrle had his lawyer draw up papers to institute a divorce action, and he also executed an affidavit in order to obtain a restraining order against his wife. The next day Mr. Buhrle and appellant got into an argument and during the altercation appellant threatened her husband with a shovel. Mr. Buhrle responded by beating his wife about the head, neck and shoulders with a pair of work boots. The following day Mr. Buhrle moved out of the family home and into the Bel Air Motel.

Appellant testified that her husband returned to the family home in the late afternoon of October 2, 1979, and requested that appellant drive out to the motel where he was staying so they could talk. When appellant arrived at the motel she had a hunting rifle and a pair of rubber gloves in her possession. Mr. Buhrle kept the night chain on the door of his motel room the entire time that the two talked. After standing outside her husband's motel room for an hour and forty-five minutes while they argued over money and the divorce, appellant shot her husband.

After appellant shot her husband she pushed open the motel room door and was kneeling over Mr. Buhrle when the people from the adjoining rooms arrived at the scene. Appellant then began shouting that someone had shot her husband. In addition, while appellant asserts that she made no effort to flee, she did attempt to conceal the pair of rubber gloves she was seen wearing shortly after the shooting and she hid the rifle underneath a nearby trailerhouse. At the time that appellant was arrested she had her husband's wallet in her possession.

At trial appellant relied upon the theory of self-defense. Edith Buhrle took the stand and told of a history of violence on the part of the deceased towards her, her children and the household furnishings. She further testified that when she shot her husband she had thought that he was reaching for the gun that he customarily kept under his bed so that he could kill her. No gun, however, was found in Mr. Buhrle's motel room.

EXCLUSION OF THE TESTIMONY OF A DEFENSE PSYCHOLOGIST

The criteria to be used in determining the admissibility of an expert witness' testimony are set out in Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.C.A.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 529, 54 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977). As stated by the court:

"(1) * * * the subject matter 'must be so distinctively related to some science, profession, business, or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman (emphasis added)'; (2) 'the witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth (emphasis added)'; (3) expert testimony is inadmissible if 'the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert.' " McCormick on Evidence, § 13, pp. 29-31 (2d Ed.1972)

In this case the trial judge used the criteria in Dyas v. United States, supra, in making his ruling. His reasons for rejecting the testimony of the expert witness, Dr. Lenore E. Walker, were set out in detail.

Dr. Walker possesses impressive academic and professional credentials and she is the pioneer in the field of the so-called "battered woman syndrome." ¹ By her own characterization she is the foremost authority on that phenomenon and also describes herself as a feminist psychologist.

During extensive voir dire by the State, it was shown that in the introduction of her book, The Battered Woman (1979), Dr. Walker stated at pp. xv-xvi:

"I think this research has raised more questions for me than it has answered. As a trained researcher, I felt uneasy about stating some of my conclusions in this book. They seemed too tentative to write down in the positive manner which I have used. Yet they are confirmed repeatedly by all the available data so far. * * *"

In answer to a follow-up question by defense counsel, Dr. Walker explained the statement from her book as follows:

"That's why I received the research grant, to study the matter in a much more scientific way. * * * " It was further revealed on voir dire that her research was ongoing and that a deadline for completion was yet in the future. Voir dire was followed by an offer of proof by defense counsel.

Appellant's offer of proof indicated that Dr. Walker would testify that:

1) Mrs. Buhrle was a battered woman and a battered woman's behavior differs from that of other women.

2) Mrs. Buhrle was in a state of learned helplessness resulting in loss of free will.

3) Because of learned helplessness, Mrs. Buhrle's ability to walk away from a situation or escape was impaired.

4) Mrs. Buhrle perceived herself to be acting in self-defense.

The trial judge ruled that Dr. Walker's testimony was not admissible. The reasons for this ruling were:

1) Voir dire did not adequately demonstrate that the state of the art permitted a reasonable opinion.

2) The reasons for opinions were not adequately explained, were difficult to understand; and therefore, would not aid the jury.

3) Appellant's state of mind at the time of the shooting was not adequately explained; and therefore, this testimony would not aid the jury in its determination.

The record indicates that research in the "battered woman syndrome" is in its infancy; that objectives are difficult to identify; that statistical analysis was in the preparation stage; and that acceptance or recognition of the phenomenon is largely limited to the people who are actively engaged in the research and the people making research grants.

In the case at bar the shooting occurred well after the altercation with the victim in which appellant was beaten. Seven days later Mrs. Buhrle went to the victim's motel room and after arguing with him an hour and forty-five minutes she shot him. Insofar as voir dire reveals, this is not the standard battered woman self-defense situation. In explaining her opinions, Dr. Walker did not consider these factors which are departures from the standard battered woman behavior. This is not to deny a battered woman syndrome and all its ramifications. Suffice it to say defendant failed to demonstrate to the trial court that the state of the art would permit a reasonable expert opinion, nor would the proposed opinions, considering omissions in foundation, aid the jury.

The quotation from Dr. Walker's book, The Battered Woman, supra, and elsewhere in her voir dire suggests that Dr. Walker may make certain conclusions and state certain theories, then engage in research to attempt to substantiate those theories and conclusions. The trial judge may have concluded that she did this with Mrs. Buhrle. Dr. Walker was vague in her explanation of Mrs. Buhrle's behavior if such behavior did not fit into the pattern of battered women. For example, her explanation of why Mrs. Buhrle took a hunting rifle to the motel and why she hid the gun and gloves after the shooting apparently did not fit into the battered woman syndrome; therefore, these acts were inadequately explained and apparently ignored by Dr. Walker in arriving at an opinion.

The trial judge expressed some difficulty in understanding Dr. Walker's explanations and after he had asked several questions of Dr. Walker, said, "But you probably answered my question satisfactorily to you, but not to me. I don't understand the answer to my question." This court experienced the same difficulty. It might reasonably be assumed, therefore, that if the trial court and the appellate court had difficulty understanding the expert's explanations, so would the jury. The "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness" surrounding scientific or expert testimony, particularly calls for trial court discretion. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).

In urging the admission of Dr. Walker's testimony, defendant relies principally on Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C.C.A.1979); and State v. Thomas, Nos. 39698, 40028 (Ohio App., filed July 24 1980). ² In both of these cases wives were charged with murder of their husbands. In both, the accused presented a theory of self-defense. Each was convicted after a jury trial; on appeal Ibn-Tamas was remanded and Thomas was reversed. In both cases the accused had sought to call expert witnesses to present testimony on the psychology of battered women, and in both cases the...