Bullard Shoals Mining Co. v. Spencer

• Decision Date: 23 November 1922
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 604.
• Citation: 95 So. 1,208 Ala. 663
• Parties: BULLARD SHOALS MINING CO. v. SPENCER.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

95 So. 1

208 Ala. 663

BULLARD SHOALS MINING CO. v. SPENCER.

6 Div. 604.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 23, 1922

Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1923.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Hugh A. Locke, Judge.

Bill by T. H. Spencer against the Bullard Shoals Mining Company. Decree for complainant, and respondent appeals. Affirmed.

Huey &amp Welch, of Bessemer, for appellant.

A. C. &amp H. R. Howze, of Birmingham, for appellee.

GARDNER J.

The complainant to this bill (appellee here) was the purchaser of a certain 40 acres of land from the respondent, for which a deed was duly executed and delivered, and the purchase money paid; and complainant files this bill seeking a rescission of the contract and cancellation of the deed executed to him, as well as repayment of the purchase money with interest thereon, upon the ground that he was induced to make the purchase by false and fraudulent representations made by respondent through its agent, and upon which he relied, that there was a chert pit open upon said land, and that the same contained chert deposits. The equity of a bill of this character is well established by our decisions as well as by the general current of authority. Shahan v. Brown, 167 Ala. 534, 52 So. 737; Foster v. Gressett, 29 Ala. 393; Baptiste v. Peters, 51 Ala. 158; Cullum v. Branch Bank, 4 Ala. 21, 37 Am. Dec. 725; Perry v. Boyd, 126 Ala. 162, 28 So. 711, 85 Am. St Rep. 17; Merritt v. Ehrman, 116 Ala. 278, 22 So. 514; 9 C.J. pp. 1170-1173; note Johnson v. Swanke, 128 Wis. 68, 107 N.W. 481, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1049 et seq. 8 Ann. Cas. 544; Woodman v. Freeman, 25 Me. 531; Sherwood v. Salmon, 5 Day (Conn.) 439, 5 Am. Dec. 167.

It is insisted by counsel for appellant in a very forcible argument that the bill in the instant case does not come within the influence of the foregoing authorities, for the reason that here complainant seeks only the cancellation of a deed made to himself and the restoration of the purchase money; that his bill discloses he has offered to the respondent a rescission and a demand for the return of the purchase money, and that his right of action to recover the same in a court of law is full and complete, there being no averment of insolvency, and that he should be required to resort thereto. This argument has been given due consideration. We recognize courts of equity do not take jurisdiction merely for the purpose of declaring a rescission (Hafer v. Cole, 176 Ala. 242, 57 So. 757), and that in this state it is now settled that fraud alone is not a distinctive ground of equitable jurisprudence (Smith v. Cockrell, 66 Ala. 64; Gewin v. Shields, 167 Ala. 593, 52 So. 887; Merritt v. Ehrman, supra). The jurisdiction must rest upon the broad ground-the foundation stone of equity jurisprudence-of inadequacy of the remedy at law. 9 C.J. 1172; Hafer v. Cole, supra; Merritt v. Ehrman, supra.

In the instant case an action at law by the complainant prosecuted to a successful termination would still leave the legal title vested in him, which he must hold in trust for the respondent. The ends of the law will not be met unless the litigation results in equal justice to all concerned. Courts of equity delight to do justice and not in halves.

We have been unable to find where this precise question appears to be distinctly treated by any of our cases, but the exact situation seems to be presented in an old case from the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Sherwood v. Salmon, 5 Day (Conn.) 439, 5 Am. Dec. 167, where the court speaking to this question said:

"The next question is whether it is competent for a court of equity to give relief. Where a court of law can furnish adequate and complete relief, equity cannot interfere; but where this cannot be done at law, it is the proper province of equity to grant redress. The relief prayed for in this case is, that the contract should be rescinded, that the petitioner should reconvey the land, and the respondent refund the purchase money. This would place the parties in their former condition, and would do complete justice, for it would not be right that the petitioner should recover the purchase money and retain the land; and

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