Bullard v. Curry-Cloonan

• Decision Date: 13 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 9917.,9917.
• Citation: 367 A.2d 127
• Parties: Beulah BULLARD, Appellant, v. Aileen CURRY-CLOONAN, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

367 A.2d 127

Beulah BULLARD, Appellant, v. Aileen CURRY-CLOONAN, Appellee.

No. 9917.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued February 3, 1976.

Decided December 13, 1976.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Fredrick D. Palmer, Washington, D. C., with whom Jay R. Weill, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Albert E. Brault, Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Before FICKLING and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges, and HOOD, Chief Judge, Retired.

FICKLING, Associate Judge:

Appellant and appellee, as co-executrixes and principal residuary legatees under the will of James E. Curry, entered into a compromise agreement in settlement of their respective rights to inherit from decedent's estate. Appellant subsequently brought this action seeking to have that agreement declared null and void. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment below, pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56. The trial court dismissed appellant's motion and granted the motion of appellee, thereby upholding the agreement. This appeal followed.

Appellant contends on appeal that she, rather than appellee, was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Appellant avers that the settlement agreement in question was not supported by adequate consideration, and that appellee breached the fiduciary duties she owed, as co-executrix, to the appellant, as a residuary legatee. We disagree with both of these contentions, and therefore we affirm.

The facts in this case are undisputed.¹ James E. Curry, an attorney, died domiciled in the District of Columbia on August 23, 1972. In a valid will dated August 4, 1972, he named appellant (a friend) and appellee (his daughter) as co-executrixes of his estate and as principal residuary legatees.

Along with other assets, decedent at the time of his death owned, jointly with various relatives, $140,000 worth of United States Series E Savings Bonds. His will stated that, notwithstanding the joint ownership of these bonds, it was decedent's intent that "such . . . bonds shall be a part of my estate to be disposed of according to the terms of this will." At the time of his death, decedent was also entitled to a share in any legal fees which, although speculative at that time, might accrue later as payment for decedent's role in litigation involving claims by certain Indian Nations against the United States Government. The amounts that appellant and appellee would take under the residuary clause were directly affected by whether the bonds and the attorney's fees became assets of the estate.

Landon Dowdey, a personal friend and associate of the decedent who served as attorney for the estate, advised appellant and appellee that in his legal opinion the savings bonds passed to the respective co-owners at the time of decedent's death, and that any attempt to bring these bonds into the estate would, no doubt, be fruitless. Sometime after receiving this advice, appellee personally contacted the named coowners of the bonds (who were also her relatives) and found that the co-owners were willing to convey the bonds to the estate if appellee requested and approved such conveyances. Appellee had been exploring the possibility of filing a caveat to the will, and initially was unwilling to request her relatives to sign over the bonds.

Mr. Dowdey, working with the co-executrixes, arrived at a settlement agreement that was accepted orally by both parties on April 26, 1973. This agreement was then reduced to writing, but on April 30, 1973, appellant refused to sign, stating that she wanted more time to consider the agreement. On that day, appellee's right to contest the will expired.² Several weeks later, appellant submitted a proposed modification of the agreement, and on May 30, 1973, both parties signed the agreement as modified.

In essence, the settlement contract provided that appellee would surrender her statutory right to contest the will, and would arrange for the transfer to the estate by her relatives of all jointly owned United States Series E bonds and various jointly owned bank accounts. If she failed to acquire any of the bonds for the estate, appellee agreed that the value of those bonds would be debited against her expected legacy under the will. In return, appellant agreed to assign to appellee all of appellant's rights to share in any proceeds from the pending Indian claims cases. It was also understood that appellee would donate 10% of any such award to a charitable organization for the benefit of American Indians.

Under the agreement, bonds were conveyed and distribution of the estate proceeded according to the terms of the settlement agreement. Sometime thereafter, it became apparent to appellant that a share in the Indian claims attorney's fees would, in all likelihood, be forthcoming, and that the fees would be for substantial amounts. Appellant then filed her complaint praying for rescission of the settlement contract so that she could share in any subsequent award.

The granting of summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings and affidavits before the court show that there is no issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Yates v. District Credit Clothing, Inc., D.C.App., 241 A.2d 596, 598 (1968); Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(c).³ The dispositive facts in the instant case not being in dispute, our question becomes whether appellee was entitled as a matter of law to the grant of summary judgment which she received below.

Appellant first contends that the settlement agreement in question was void in that it was not supported by adequate consideration. Appellant avers that at the time the agreement was entered into, appellee's right to contest the will had already expired. Appellant also contends that appellee's promise to acquire the Series E bonds for the estate was not valid consideration in support of the agreement, since appellee was under a preexisting duty as a co-executrix to bring all of decedent's assets into the estate. We disagree with both of these contentions.

It is true that the validity of a settlement agreement is to be judged under general contract principles. We have held that for such an agreement to be valid, "there must be an offer and an acceptance, and consideration to support the agreement." Rommel v. West American Insurance Co., D.C.Mun.App., 158 A.2d 683, 685 (1960). It is equally true, however, that the law favors the settlement of litigated matters and the compromise of disputed claims. Id. at 684; Magruder v. National Metropolitan Bank, D.C.Mun.App., 40 A.2d 828, 830 (1945). We have noted in that regard that:

Ordinarily a settlement is motivated by a mutual desire to avoid the expense and risks of litigation. Unless a claim is unreasonable or the compromise imprudently consummated, the public policy of encouraging settlements should be recognized. . . . [Early Settlers Insurance Co. v. Schweid, D.C.App., 221 A.2d 920, 922 (1966).]

See also Autera v. Robinson, 136 U.S.App. D.C. 216, 218, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (1969). The record before us shows that appellant and appellee entered into their settlement agreement for the very reasons enunciated in Magruder: to avoid the expense and risk to both parties that are the by-products of litigating disputes.

We have often held that, as a general principle, the forbearance of a cause of action advanced in good faith, which is neither absurd in fact nor obviously unfounded in law, constitutes good and valuable consideration. Rommel v. West American Insurance Co., supra at 684; Saunders System Washington Co. v. Kuffner, D.C. Mun.App., 75 A.2d 136, 137 (1950); Magruder v. National Metropolitan Bank, supra at 830.

Appellant's contention — that appellee's forbearance of her right to file a caveat did not constitute consideration — fails in light of the record before us. The affidavit of Mr. Dowdey, which both parties have accepted as bring factually correct, shows that appellant and appellee agreed to the settlement contract orally on April 26, 1973, four days before appellee's right to file a caveat expired. Moreover, it appears that the only reason the written agreement was not finalized prior to the expiration of that right was appellant's refusal to sign the agreement until June 1, 1973. In light of this fact, appellant cannot be heard now to complain that there was a lack of consideration to support the settlement contract.

Furthermore, appellee undertook an additional obligation under the agreement by promising to either secure the conveyance of all of the Series E bonds into the...