Bullard v. Stonebraker

• Decision Date: 25 January 1967
• Docket Number: No. 8057,8057
• Citation: 422 P.2d 700,101 Ariz. 584
• Parties: Carl Wilson BULLARD, Appellant, v. Hollis Marlin STONEBRAKER, Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 700

422 P.2d 700

101 Ariz. 584

Carl Wilson BULLARD, Appellant, v. Hollis Marlin STONEBRAKER, Appellee.

No. 8057.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division.

Jan. 25, 1967.

Alan P. Bayham and Leven Ferrin, Phoenix, for appellant.

Snell & Wilmer and Roger W. Perry, Phoenix, for appellee.

BERNSTEIN, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff brought an action in the Superior Court of Maricopa County for damages resulting from an automobile accident. He appeals from a jury verdict for the defendant.

During trial, the plaintiff testified that on the evening of November 5, 1959, he was driving north on 32nd Street in the City of Phoenix, and while traveling between Fillmore and Randolph Streets on 32nd Street, he was involved in a collision with defendant. Defendant testified that he also was driving north on 32nd Street. The front left side of defendant's car collided with the right back door and rear panel of the plaintiff's car leading to the present action brought by plaintiff for damages. At trial, the defendant put on the witness stand a police officer who had inspected the scene of the accident some twenty minutes after the accident had occurred. On direct examination, after disclosing his personal qualifications, the officer was permitted to state his opinion relating to the point of impact of the two automobiles as well as his opinion concerning the general angle at which the two cars collided. His opinion was based upon a 'splotch of dirt' found on the highway, the location of the damage to the respective automobiles, as well as an Absence of tire marks or other physical evidence on the shoulder of the road. This testimony was elicited by the defense in an attempt to prove that the plaintiff's testimonial reconstruction of the accident was contrary to fact and to show that the plaintiff had been guilty of contributory negligence. (If the accident had occurred where plaintiff contended then he could not have been turning onto 32nd Street off of Fillmore as claimed by the defense. The officer's testimony also made it appear that plaintiff was on the wrong side of the center line at the time of the accident.)

The plaintiff continuously objected during the trial to the admission of the police officer's opinions. He argued that his objections should have been sustained for the reason that the officer was not equipped with sufficient facts to form an admissible opinion.

Both parties direct our attention to Gray v. Woods, 84 Ariz. 87, 324 P.2d 220, in which we had the following to say:

'It is now generally recognized that a highway patrolman or other officer, when shown to have proper training and experience in the investigation of traffic accidents, testifying as an expert witness, may properly give an opinion as to the point of impact in a traffic accident where his opinion is based on marks on the highway, damage to the vehicles involved, and the location of debris on the highway or other indicia at the scene, but not when such opinion is founded on statements made to him by other persons.'

On appeal the plaintiff does not challenge the qualifications of the police officer to testify as an expert, but rather confines his argument to...