Bullin v. Moore, 673
Decision Date | 13 December 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 673,673 |
Citation | 122 S.E.2d 765,256 N.C. 82 |
Parties | Ruth BULLIN v. Billy MOORE. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Allen, Henderson & Williams, Elkin, for plaintiff appellee.
Norman & Reid, Pilot Mountain, for defendant appellant.
The question for decision on this appeal is whether the trial and judgment can be sustained in the face of the exceptions shown in the record and debated on briefs. We are constrained to answer in the affirmative.
Question I: Did the court err in failing to strike plaintiff's testimony as to defendant's speed?
The record reveals that on cross-examination, plaintiff was asked to state the facts on which she based the belief that defendant was driving at a speed of 80 miles per hour. The questions and answers were as follows:
Whereupon, defendant moved to strike all of plaintiff's testimony with reference to speed, on the ground that she had no basis for her opinion except hearsay. The motion was denied.
In this connection, if it should appear that plaintiff's opinion of defendant's speed was based, to some extent, on what she was told by the patrolman as to the exact distance her truck was pushed, it also appears from the above testimony that her opinion was based, in part on the physical occurrences which she experienced and subsequently observed at the scene of the collision. And to this extent, it might well be argued that the jury was entitled to the benefit of this testimony on the theory, often stated by this Court in connection with evidence of speed, that 'physical facts speak their own language and are often heard above the voices of witnesses.' State v. Hough, 227 N.C. 596, 42 S.E.2d 659, 660; Atkins v. White Transportation Co., 224 N.C. 688, 32 S.E.2d 209; Powers v. S. Sternberg & Co., 213 N.C. 41, 195 S.E. 88, and many others.
However, if it be conceded that it was error to admit plaintiff's testimony as to defendant's speed, it does not appear that such error would be prejudicial to defendant. Plaintiff's witness, Sid Parker, testified that he observed defendant's automobile for at least a quarter of a mile immediately before it struck plaintiff's truck, and that, in his opinion, defendant's car was traveling approximately 70 miles per hour at the time. Another witness, Billy Smith, testified that he was standing in a service station which is situated on Highway 268 about three-tenths or a quarter of a mile from the seene of the collision, and that he observed the defendant's car pass the service station immediately prior to the accident. In his opinion, the defendant was traveling at a speed of 75 miles per hour when he passed the service station.
Therefore, it appears that there was sufficient evidence tending to show that defendant's automobile was being driven at a speed of 70 miles per hour or more immediately prior to the collision. In such a situation, the rule is that the admission of incompetent evidence will not be held prejudicial when its import is abundantly established by other competent testimony. Town of Belhaven v. Hodges, 226 N.C. 485, 39 S.E.2d 366; Carpenter, Solicitor, v. Boyles, 213 N.C. 432, 196 S.E. 850; Owens v. Blackwood Lumber Co., 212 N.C. 133, 193 S.E. 219; Pickett v. Fulford, 211 N.C. 160, 189 S.E. 488; Phipps v. Royal Indemnity Co., 203 N.C. 420, 166 S.E. 327; Sawyer v. Weskett, 201 N.C. 500, 160 S.E. 575.
Question II: Did the court err in allowing the following questions to be asked of an expert witness, the witness being the doctor who examined and treated plaintiff for injuries received in the accident?
Objection. Overruled.
Objection. Overruled.
Defendant contends that the above questions were 'highly improper and prejudicial', in that they were not hypothetical questions with the applicable facts of plaintiff's injuries incorporated therein. We cannot agree. As was stated by Adams, J., speaking of substantially similar testimony in Dulin v. Henderson-Gilmer Co., 192 N.C. 638, 135 S.E. 614, 615, 49 A.L.R. 663: ...
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Wilson County Bd. of Ed. v. Lamm
...its import is abundantly established by other competent testimony, or the testimony is merely cumulative or corroborative. Bullin v. Moore, 256 N.C. 82, 122 S.E.2d 765; Town of Belhaven v. Hodges, 226 N.C. 485, 39 S.E.2d 366; Carpenter, Solicitor v. Boyles, 213 N.C. 432, 196 S.E. 850. The t......
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Wilson v. Lowe's Asheboro Hardware, Inc.
...merely corroborates other evidence admittedly competent, would at most be harmless error, not warranting a new trial. Bullin v. Moore, 256 N.C. 82, 122 S.E.2d 765; Hall v. Atkinson, 255 N.C. 579, 122 S.E.2d 200; In re Will of Knight, 250 N.C. 634, 109 S.E.2d Did the court err in refusing to......
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State v. Holton
...v. Highway Comm., 279 N.C. 313, 182 S.E.2d 373 (1971); Rubber Co. v. Tire Co., 270 N.C. 50, 153 S.E.2d 737 (1967); Bullin v. Moore, 256 N.C. 82, 122 S.E.2d 765 (1961). It is well settled in the law of evidence that a physician or surgeon may express his opinion on the cause of the physical ......