Bullock v. Branch, C-167

• Decision Date: 11 May 1961
• Docket Number: No. C-167,C-167
• Citation: 130 So.2d 74
• Parties: Ben F. BULLOCK, Appellant, v. Lemmie J. BRANCH, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 74

130 So.2d 74

Ben F. BULLOCK, Appellant, v. Lemmie J. BRANCH, Appellee.

No. C-167.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 11, 1961.

Gray, Chandler, O'Neal & Carlisle, Gainesville, for appellant.

Greene, Ayres & Greene, Ocala, for appellee.

CARROLL, DONALD K., Judge.

The defendant in an action for damages has appealed from a final judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Marion County based upon a jury verdict in the amount to $14,000 in favor of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's complaint charged the defendant with negligence in the erection and maintenance of a metal sign which was affixed to the front of a building in which the defendant conducted his business. The building was immediately adjacent to a public sidewalk in the city of Ocala. While the plaintiff was walking upon the sidewalk, the sign fell and struck him, causing personal injuries.

One of the principal points pressed by the appellant on this appeal is that the court committed reversible error in permitting the plaintiff's counsel at the trial to make the so-called 'golden rule' argument to the jury, as set forth below.

During his argument the plaintiff's counsel said to the jury:

'And then, in addition to that--and I can't give you any guide to go by--the court will instruct you that he's entitled to compensation at your hand at such figure that you think is right for his pain suffering and for his discomfort, not only in the past but in the further. How much would you pay to have half inch cut inflicted in your skull?'

At this point the defense counsel objected to the argument on the ground that it was 'inflammatory and highly irrelevant and immaterial and improper'. The trial court overruled these objections, and the plaintiff's counsel continued as follows in his argument to the jury:

'How much would you gentlemen pay? What would I have to pay to inflict a half inch cut into your skull, to render you unconscious, to put you home in bed for a week, to force you to use a cane or crutches for months after that, and to leave you for the balance of your life with your walk affected, with your speech affected, with a tremor, with your memory affected, with your handwriting affected? What do you think it's worth? That's what I'm trying to get at. How much would I have to pay you for you to undergo that for the balance of your life? And how much would I have to pay you to shorten your life? The older you grow, the more precious and and [sic] the sweeter life becomes. How much would you sell me a year of your life for?'

At this point the defense counsel renewed his objections, which were promptly overruled by the Court.

There are many fundamental reasons why we think that the quoted argument was improper. The very essence of our court system in this country is the principle that every party is entitled to a fair and impartial jury as well as to a fair and impartial judge. This court, the Supreme Court of Florida, and other courts have held that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge,' to use the words of the immortal Edmund Burke and this the parties had in the present case. See State ex rel. Arnold v. Revels, Fla.App.1959, 113 So.2d 218, and State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 1939, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613. By the same token, we think that every party is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial jury when such body determines the questions of fact involved in his case. While the attainment of this ideal of the 'cold neutrality' of the jury may often seem unrealistic, nevetheless it is the duty of every lawyer, as an officer of the court and as a member of the team of the administration of justice, to refrain from all efforts to inflame the jury in a trial or otherwise to disturb them in their position of neutrality and try to cause the jury to make their sacred determination of questions of fact in a biased or partisan manner. This duty on the bar is even more compelling today in view of the fact that in our court system the jury is usually in effect the final arbiters of the facts involved in a case, whose determination of the facts can only rarely be disturbed by trial and appellate judges, who never are authorized to substitute their findings of fact for those of a jury when the jury's findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence. A trial court should remain ever alert to discourage and counteract any effort made by a party or his attorney to cause the laymen, who have been called under our court system to act as the final arbiters of the facts, to depart from their neutrality and make their determination from the point of view of bias or personal interest.

It is hard to conceive of anything that would more quickly destroy the structure of rules and principles which have been accepted by the courts as the standards for measuring damages in actions of law, than for the juries to award damages in accordance with the standard of what they themselves would want if they or a loved one had received the injuries suffered by a plaintiff. In some cases, indeed, many a juror would feel that all the money in the world could...