Bullock v. Sprowls

• Citation: 54 S.W. 661
• Parties: BULLOCK v. SPROWLS.
• Decision Date: 18 December 1899
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

54 S.W. 661

BULLOCK v. SPROWLS.

Supreme Court of Texas.

December 18, 1899.

Error from court of civil appeals of Fifth supreme judicial district.

Action by Frank Sprowls against W. L. Bullock. From a judgment for plaintiff, affirmed by the court of civil appeals (54 S. W. 657), defendant brings error. Affirmed.

A. H. Field and Jeff Word, for plaintiff in error. Harry P. Lawther, for defendant in error.

WILLIAMS, J.

The facts affecting the question on which this writ of error was granted are the following: Defendant in error, Sprowls, on the 3d day of February, 1894, being a minor 17 years of age, agreed with his stepfather, E. J. Allen, to buy a fifth interest in a mercantile business which the latter owned, and, in order to raise money to pay for it, proposed to sell to plaintiff in error, Bullock, the one-sixth interest now in controversy in land which he had inherited from his father. The parties met and discussed the proposition to sell the land to Bullock, who at first demurred on account of Sprowls' minority, but finally consented to buy, upon Sprowls and Allen agreeing to execute a bond, with security, binding Sprowls to obtain the removal of his disabilities; or, if he failed in that, to ratify the sale when he attained his majority; and, in the event of his failure to do both, to refund the money expended on the land, etc. The deed and bond were then executed by Sprowls, and delivered to Allen, to be by him carried and delivered to Bullock. Sprowls, at the same time, authorized Allen to receive from Bullock the purchase money of the land, and retain it as payment for the interest in the mercantile business, and gave Allen an order on Bullock, authorizing the latter to pay to the former the money for the purpose stated. The transaction was thus closed. Allen received and used the money ($666.66), and admitted Sprowls into the business as joint owner. While this joint business continued, Sprowls drew out of it $100. In a short time Allen bought Sprowls' interest in the business in exchange for a tract of land worth $1,200, incumbered by mortgages amounting to $900, besides interest. Not being able to discharge the liens, Sprowls sold his interest in the land for some personal property, which he disposed of for $150. All of these transactions occurred while he was still a minor, and the money received for the personal property was likewise spent—for what, he states, he does not remember—before he reached his majority. In the opinion of the court of civil appeals, it is stated that this money was expended for clothing and support, but there is no evidence in the record to this effect. What the $100 received by him out of the store consisted of, and the disposition made of it, are not stated. Sprowls had none of it when he became of age. During the whole time covered by these transactions, Sprowls' mother was living, and was his legal guardian. This action was brought by Sprowls upon reaching majority, having for one of its objects the setting aside of his deed to Bullock, and the recovery of the interest thereby conveyed. A judgment in his favor was affirmed by the court of civil appeals. The writ of error was granted upon the assignment that the judgment was erroneous in allowing plaintiff to recover without restoring the consideration received by him; our impression being that he should, at least, have been required to restore the $150 which the court of civil appeals stated had been used by him in obtaining support and clothing. Since the record does not bear out that statement, it is unnecessary to consider what would have been the proper judgment if the fact stated had existed.

The question presented is whether or not the plaintiff was required, as a condition of disaffirming his conveyance and recovering the land, to restore a consideration received for it which was not in his possession or control when he arrived at full age, but had been dissipated by him while still a minor. If he is to be required to restore, without inquiry as to the disposition made by him of such consideration, we can see no reason why the exaction should not be a restoration of the whole sum paid by Bullock. He would not, in our opinion, be exempted from this requirement by the principle laid down in Vogelsang v. Null, 67 Tex. 465, 3 S. W. 451. In that case the minor never received the purchase money, but it went into the hands of, and was appropriated by, those who joined with her in the conveyance. Here, while the money was not paid into the minor's hands, it was paid to Allen, with his consent and in accordance with his agreement. He received it in the way in which he stipulated to receive it. The transaction was, in effect, the same as if the money had been paid to him, and by him turned over to Allen, as the price of the interest in the business, and the question is exactly the same as would have arisen had such been the facts. He thus completely disposed of the money during his minority, and, in the same way, he disposed of the property received for the business, and the money eventually received for the property. There can be no reason for holding him bound to restore the avails of the property which would not equally authorize the requirement that he restore the original purchase money. He disposed of all during minority, without substantial or enduring benefit to himself.

In many of the opinions of this court, the general rule has been broadly announced that an attempt by the maker of a deed to disaffirm it, on the ground that it was executed while he was under the disability of minority, must, in order to be successful, be accompanied by a restoration of the consideration received for the property conveyed. Cummings...