Bullock v. Superior Court of Contra Costa Cnty.

• Decision Date: 24 June 2020
• Docket Number: A160153
• Citation: 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 699,51 Cal.App.5th 134
• Parties: Dyjuan BULLOCK, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

51 Cal.App.5th 134

264 Cal.Rptr.3d 699

Dyjuan BULLOCK, Petitioner,

v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent;The People, Real Party in Interest.

A160153

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Filed June 24, 2020

Counsel: Robin Lipetzky, Deputy Public Defender, Diana Alicia Garrido and Jermel Thomas, Public Defenders, for Petitioner.

Jeremy Seymour, Assistant District Attorney, Amy Bailey and Ryan Wagner, Deputy District Attorneys, Diana Becton, District Attorney, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Real Party in Interest.

SIMONS, Acting P.J.

On March 13, 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic took hold in California, respondent Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Superior Court) announced it would be closed to the public between March 16 and April 1 and ceased conducting most, but not all, proceedings.

Petitioner Dyjuan Bullock (Petitioner) contends his custodial preliminary hearing should have occurred during the March closure period under Penal Code section 859b.¹

We hold, among other things, that this writ petition challenging the failure to provide a timely preliminary hearing is properly brought under section 871.6. Substantively, we conclude that good cause to delay the hearing was not established: the Superior Court's finding that "the unprecedented [COVID-19] pandemic conditions that California was facing directly impacted the court[ ] operations" is insufficient. In the absence of a particularized showing of a nexus between the pandemic and the Superior Court's purported inability to conduct Petitioner's preliminary hearing in a timely fashion, the Superior Court abused its discretion in finding no violation of section 859b.² Nonetheless, because Petitioner recently pled no contest to one of the charges against him pursuant to a negotiated disposition, we dismiss his petition for writ of mandate.³

BACKGROUND

On March 3, 2020, Petitioner was charged by complaint in the underlying criminal action (docket no. 04-199189-2) with one count of human trafficking (§ 236.1, subd. (b)) and two counts of pimping ( § 266h, subd. (a) ).

Arraignment on the complaint occurred on March 4. Petitioner pled not guilty to all charges, and he did not waive section 859b ’s 10-court-day timeframe for a preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for March 16. March 18 was the tenth court day following the arraignment and plea.

On March 4, 2020, pursuant to Government Code section 8625, California Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency due to the global COVID-19 outbreak.⁴ On March 10, the Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County declared a state of emergency.⁵ On March 11, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic.⁶

On March 13, 2020, the Superior Court's Public Information Office announced that, due to "the unique and continuing public safety challenge presented by the coronavirus (COVID-19) and the numerous public health orders suggesting or requiring that public gatherings be limited," the Superior Court would be "closed at all locations for approximately two weeks," from March 16 until April 1. The release continued, "The Court appreciates the careful balance that must be maintained between the timely administration of justice and the protection of public health and safety. At the Court's request and as permitted under Government Code section 68115, the Chief Justice ... has issued an emergency order providing that, at least until April 1, 2020, the court closure will have the effect of being a public holiday as far as statutory or other timelines are concerned." The release specified that in-custody arraignments would be handled in Martinez but "all courthouses are closed to the public" (except counsel at arraignments) and any hearings scheduled during the closure period "will be reset to a later date." The release closed with the statement, "Importantly, this closure is not in response to a specific notice of exposure at any Court facility or to any Court staff. Instead, it is in an abundance of caution to help limit the spread of the virus and the potential for future exposure."

The referred-to order from the Chief Justice of California, Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, acting in her capacity as Chairperson of the Judicial Council, was also issued on March 13, 2020, "[u]pon the request of [Superior Court] Presiding Judge Barry Baskin." The order provided the Superior Court a number of accommodations due to "the COVID-19 pandemic." Among many other things, the order "declare[d]" that March 16 through April 1 "be deemed holidays for purposes of computing time" under specific sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Penal Code, and the Welfare and Institutions Code. Significantly, section 859b was not among the listed provisions. (This order is discussed further in Part IV.A., post .) As to that statute, the order extended "the time period provided in section 859b of the Penal Code for the holding of a preliminary examination from 10 court days to not more than 15 court days, applicable only to cases in which the statutory deadline otherwise would expire from March 16, 2020, to April 1, 2020, inclusive ( Gov. Code, § 68115(a)(9) )."

On March 16, 2020, the Superior Court issued an order implementing the Chief Justice's order, using essentially identical operative language. The order also declared, "The single department the Court now maintains to handle urgent issues such as in-custody arraignments shall also handle any felony or misdemeanor cases in which sentencing must occur during the period of closure."

Also on March 16, 2020, the Health Officer of the County of Contra Costa issued a "shelter-in-place" order.⁷ On March 19, Governor Newsom issued Executive Order N-33-20, directing all Californians to stay at home, with no end date.⁸ Courts are essential government functions, and court staff are exempt from the county and state orders.

The preliminary hearing in Petitioner's case did not take place on March 16, 2020 or by March 18, which was ten court days after Petitioner's arraignment and plea.

On March 20, 2020, the Chief Justice sent an "advisory" to the state's superior courts "to provide guidance on ways that might mitigate some of the health risks to judicial officers, court staff, and court users" during the COVID-19 pandemic.⁹

The advisory noted that the Governor's shelter in place order was "not meant to close our courts" because the courts are "considered as an essential service." The Chief Justice continued, "I recognize, however, that this new adjustment to health guidelines and direction likely may require further temporary adjustment or suspension of certain court operations, keeping in mind, as we all are, that we are balancing constitutional rights of due process with the safety and health of all court users and employees." The Chief Justice "strongly encourage[d]" superior courts to consider specified measures that could "be taken immediately to protect constitutional and due process rights of court users." Among the recommended measures was to "[p]rioritize arraignments and preliminary hearings for in-custody defendants , and the issuance of restraining orders." (Emphasis added.)

The preliminary hearing in Petitioner's case did not take place by March 25, which was fifteen court days after Petitioner's arraignment and plea. On March 30, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under section 859b, or in the alternative, if the court found good cause for the continuance, to release him on his own recognizance (docket no. 5-200531-2).

Also on March 30, 2020, the Chief Justice issued a statewide emergency order that, among many other things, authorized superior courts to "[e]xtend the time period provided in section 859b of the Penal Code for the holding of a preliminary examination and the defendant's right to release from 10 court days to not more than 30 court days."¹⁰ On the same date, the Chief Justice issued a second Contra Costa-specific order authorizing the Superior Court to, among many other things, "[e]xtend the time period provided in section 859b of the Penal Code for the holding of a preliminary examination from 10 court days to not more than 15 court days, applicable only to cases in which the statutory deadline otherwise would expire from April 1, 2020, to April 28, 2020," pursuant to Government Code section 68115, subd. (a)(9). On April 1, the Superior Court issued an order implementing the Contra Costa-specific order, and on April 2 the Superior Court issued an order implementing the statewide order. It appears that, in effect, the April 2 order superseded the April 1 order as relates to section 859b by extending the time period to 30 court days.

On April 2, 2020, Petitioner's motion to dismiss or release was heard by Judge David E. Goldstein, acting in the capacity of a magistrate. The magistrate denied Petitioner's motion, reasoning that the Chief Justice's March 30 statewide emergency order extending time for preliminary hearings to 30 court days was retroactive. Petitioner's preliminary hearing was set for April 9. The parties agree the Superior Court had resumed conducting preliminary hearings on March 30. According to the magistrate, as of the April 2 hearing, the Superior Court was conducting preliminary hearings on a daily basis.

On April 7, 2020, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court challenging the magistrate's denial of his motion for dismissal or release on his own recognizance.¹¹ On April 9, the Superior Court ordered the People, the real party in interest, to show cause why the relief should not be granted. On that same date, the Superior Court conducted a preliminary examination in Petitioner's case and held Petitioner to answer on the charges in the complaint. The Superior Court approved Petitioner's release with electronic monitoring, but Petitioner did not qualify for the monitoring program and remained in custody. On April 13, the...