Bunch v. Britton, COA16-181
Decision Date | 06 June 2017 |
Docket Number | No. COA16-181,COA16-181 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | William BUNCH, III, Plaintiff, v. Lisa BRITTON, officially and Michael Proctor, officially, Defendants. |
Tim, Fulton, Walker & Owen, PLLC, Charlotte, by S. Luke Largess, for plaintiff-appellant.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General J. Joy for defendant-appellee Britton.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, Charlotte, by Scott D. MacLatchie, for defendant-appellee Proctor.
Plaintiff appeals a trial court order dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice. Defendants each raised several defenses, and the trial court dismissed plaintiff's claims as to both defendants without stating the legal rationale for the dismissal. Because plaintiff has asserted constitutional violations of liberty interests and equal protection under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, these claims are not barred by sovereign or governmental immunity. Plaintiff also had standing to bring all of his claims except his claim for injunctive relief. But plaintiff's liberty interest claim ultimately fails because he was afforded due process as to his sex offender registration though he failed to exercise his statutory right in Michigan to request removal from the registry before he moved to North Carolina. Plaintiff's equal protection claim fails because the State of North Carolina treated plaintiff exactly as it treats all individuals who have final convictions that require sex offender registration in other states. Because ultimately both of plaintiff's claims fail on the face of the complaint, we affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.
In February of 2012, "[a]fter consulting with the local sheriff," plaintiff compulsorily registered as a sex offender in Cleveland County, North Carolina. In re Bunch , 227 N.C.App. 258, 259, 742 S.E.2d 596, 598 (2013) (" Bunch I "). Plaintiff then petitioned "to terminate his registration requirement" and ultimately prevailed. Id. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a civil action, this action , against two government employees whom he alleged had wrongfully compelled his unnecessary registration. To understand the background of plaintiff's current appeal, we turn first to plaintiff's original action for termination of his registration as a sex offender. See generally In re Bunch , 227 N.C.App. 258, 742 S.E.2d 596 (2013) (" Bunch I ").
227 N.C.App. 258, 259–60, 742 S.E.2d 596, 597–98 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
This Court dismissed the State's appeal because it had not preserved the issue before the trial court. Id. at 259, 742 S.E.2d at 597. The State then petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review which was denied. See In re Bunch , 367 N.C. 224, 747 S.E.2d 541 (2013). Thus, ultimately the trial court's order was upheld for plaintiff to be removed from the sex offender registry. See generally Bunch I , 227 N.C.App. 258, 742 S.E.2d 596, disc. rev. denied , 367 N.C. 224, 747 S.E.2d 541. With this background in mind, we turn to the action before us.
In August of 2015, plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Ms. Lisa Britton, "supervisor or head administrator of the State's sex offender registration program[,]" for the State Bureau of Investigation in the Department of Public Safety and Mr. Michael Proctor, "administrator of the sex offender registration program" for the Cleveland County Sheriff's Department, based upon his requirement to register which was ultimately overturned in Bunch I . See id. Plaintiff alleged that when he moved to North Carolina he was contacted by defendant Proctor. Defendant Proctor informed plaintiff he would need to register as a sex offender. Plaintiff explained to defendant Proctor that he did not believe he should have to register because "his offense in Michigan was not a crime in North Carolina and was no long[er] a mandatory sex registry offense in Michigan[.]" Defendant Proctor informed plaintiff that if he did not register, he would be arrested.
To avoid arrest and criminal prosecution, on 8 February 2012, plaintiff registered "under protest." Thereafter, plaintiff was barred from going to his son's school and accompanying his son to the doctor and was required to move because his apartment was too close to a daycare facility. Plaintiff brought these claims under Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution regarding violations of his liberty interests and equal protection. Plaintiff requested damages in excess of $10,000.00.
In September 2015, defendant Proctor answered plaintiff's complaint and pled the affirmative defenses of sovereign immunity based on allegations of the Sheriff's Office's lack of liability insurance coverage; estoppel; plaintiff's failure to mitigate his damages; and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Also in September 2015, defendant Britton filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint under North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to sovereign and governmental immunity and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a proper claim. In November of 2015, defendant Proctor filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, citing North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), "on the grounds the Amended Complaint on file herein fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in that Plaintiff was properly advised of state law requirements for sex offender registration upon relocating to North Carolina." On 4 December 2015, the trial court allowed defendants' motions to dismiss. Thus, all claims were dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.
The entire substance of the trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims reads:
Thus, the trial court allowed defendant Britton's motion under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) and defendant Proctor's motion under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Plaintiff makes several arguments on appeal, but we first consider plaintiff's last argument relating to dismissal based upon North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
We first note that since the trial court did not specifically identify the legal basis for the dismissal, and defendants raised several different grounds for dismissal, we must consider each possible rationale. We will start with sovereign or governmental immunity, since if defendants are protected by sovereign or governmental immunity, the court has...
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