Bundy v. Dugger, 86-968-CIV-ORL-18.

• Decision Date: 22 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-968-CIV-ORL-18.,86-968-CIV-ORL-18.
• Citation: 675 F. Supp. 622
• Parties: Theodore Robert BUNDY, Petitioner, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

675 F. Supp. 622

Theodore Robert BUNDY, Petitioner, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Respondent.

No. 86-968-CIV-ORL-18.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division.

December 22, 1987.

James E. Coleman, Jr., Polly J. Nelson, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Gregory Costa, Andrea Hillyer, John Koenig, Jr., Mark Menser, Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., for respondent.

ORDER

GEORGE KENDALL SHARP, District Judge.

This case is before the Court pursuant to the mandate of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bundy v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 564 (11th Cir.1987). On November 17, 1986 this Court entered an Order rejecting the claim of the Petitioner, Theodore Robert Bundy, that he was incompetent to stand trial for the first degree murder of Kimberly Diane Leach in Lake City, Florida. In addition, this Court denied the Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing to determine his mental state at the time of the Leach murder trial because Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence raising a legitimate doubt as to his competence to stand trial. On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of this Court and held:

The district court erred in denying a hearing on the ground that, because Bundy did not raise this claim at trial, granting him a hearing now would be a "perversion of justice." A defendant cannot waive his right not to stand trial if he is incompetent. Thus, a defendant can challenge his competency to stand trial for the first time in his initial habeas petition and, if he presents facts raising a legitimate doubt as to his competency to stand trial, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the district court. (citations omitted).

We do not suggest in any way, however, that Bundy was incompetent to stand trial. That determination can be made only after a full and fair evidentiary hearing. We hold simply that the district court's finding that Bundy failed to present evidence sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on his competency to stand trial is clearly erroneous.¹

Bundy v. Dugger, 816 F.2d at 567-68.

Accordingly, this Court conducted an evidentiary hearing which lasted five days, beginning October 22, 1987 and continuing on December 14 through 17, 1987. The limited issue before this Court is whether the Petitioner, Theodore Robert Bundy, was competent to stand trial for the first degree murder of Kimberly Diane Leach in Lake City, Florida.

1. Legal Standard

"A defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if he lacks a `sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and if he lacks `a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" Bundy v. Dugger, 816 F.2d at 565-66 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)). In addition, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.211(1) sets forth several criteria which must be considered when pondering the issue of competence to stand trial:

(1) In considering the issue of competence to stand trial, the examining experts should consider and include in their report, but are not limited to an analysis of the mental condition of the defendant as it affects each of the following factors:

(i) Defendant's appreciation of the charges;

(ii) Defendant's appreciation of the range and nature of possible penalties;

(iii) Defendant's understanding of the adversary nature of the legal process;

(iv) Defendant's capacity to disclose to attorney pertinent facts surrounding the alleged offense;

(v) Defendant's ability to relate to attorney;

(vi) Defendant's ability to assist attorney in planning defense;

(vii) Defendant's capacity to realistically challenge prosecution witnesses;

(viii) Defendant's ability to manifest appropriate courtroom behavior;

(ix) Defendant's capacity to testify relevantly;

(x) Defendant's motivation to help himself in the legal process;

(xi) Defendant's capacity to cope with the stress of incarceration prior to trial.

The criteria used by experts to determine competency is not always the same. Consequently, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.211(1), addresses those factors which should be considered by experts at both ends of the spectrum. See Committee Note to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.211.

2. Merits

At the hearing on Petitioner's claim of incompetency to stand trial, Petitioner presented the expert testimony of Psychiatrist Dorothy Lewis. Dr. Lewis opined that the Petitioner suffers from a bipolar mood disorder, better known as manic depressive mental illness. Bipolar mood disorders are characterized by wide changes in mood or mood swings. During the manic phase, the person can be loud, angry and violent or grandiose. At the other extreme, the person would experience periods of extreme depression.

In support of her theory, Dr. Lewis described several instances of supposedly irrational or bazaar behavior. For example, Dr. Lewis testified that there were instances during the Petitioner's childhood when he would place knives in the beds of other family members. According to Dr. Lewis, such behavior was bizarre for a three-year-old child and suggested that Petitioner may have been seriously traumatized as a youngster. Dr. Lewis opined that perhaps the Petitioner's grandfather, an allegedly violent person, had traumatized the Petitioner at a very early age. Dr. Lewis also suggested that members of Petitioner's family exhibited symptoms of possible mental illness.

Dr. Lewis also found significance in the Petitioner's college transcripts. According to Dr. Lewis, the Petitioner's ability to function in school fluctuated widely as indicated by periods in which Petitioner would first perform favorably and on other occasions perform unfavorably. Dr. Lewis also characterized a period in Petitioner's life in which he became involved in politics as a hypomanic state.

Based on her research, Dr. Lewis concluded that the Petitioner's mental illness or bipolar mood disorder caused the Petitioner to be mentally incompetent at the time of trial in the Kimberly Leach case. According to Dr. Lewis, Petitioner acted in a grandiose manner throughout the trial and was incapable of communicating with his attorneys or aiding his defense in a meaningful manner. In addition, Dr. Lewis suggested that Petitioner was unable to appreciate the jeopardy he was facing.

On cross-examination, the Court observes that Dr. Lewis could not satisfactorily explain certain data which was inconsistent with her diagnosis of bipolar mood disorder. For example, Petitioner graduated with distinction from the University of Washington with a B.S. in psychology. Members of Petitioner's own family could not recall that Petitioner suffered from any depressive episodes. Dr. Lewis admitted that she believed Petitioner would lie on occasion and did lie during the course of several interviews between herself and Petitioner. Finally, Dr. Lewis did not explain in a satisfactory or reasonable manner why she rejected the findings of Dr. Cleckley, Dr. Jorganson and Dr. Carlyle. These physicians believed that Petitioner was not mentally ill. Yet, Dr. Lewis reviewed Dr. Cleckley's report and the reports of Dr. Jorganson and Dr. Carlyle and discounted their findings without a satisfactory explanation.

Dr. Lewis' testimony was also inconsistent and contrary to the observations of the eyewitnesses who observed the Petitioner throughout the trial and pretrial proceedings in the Leach murder case. Dr. Lewis described the Petitioner as being "higher than a kite" during the Leach murder trial in order to illustrate her belief that Petitioner was under a hypomanic state. This opinion, however, is inconsistent with the testimony of Judge Wallace Jopling and State Prosecutor George Dekle. These witnesses observed that Petitioner's behavior was at all times appropriate with the exception of one brief outburst which took place out of the presence of the jury. Further, members of Petitioner's defense team testified that Petitioner was subdued and appeared disinterested in his case. The Court finds, therefore, that Dr. Lewis' opinions are not supported by the evidence as to what actually occurred during the Leach murder trial and pretrial proceedings.

Petitioner also offered the deposition testimony of psychiatrist Emanuel Tanay taken December 14, 1987 in support of Petitioner's claim that he was incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Tanay's impression was that Petitioner was rather intelligent and well informed. However, Dr. Tanay testified that Petitioner suffered from a lifelong personality disorder or psychopathic personality which is characterized by manipulative and destructive behavior. In addition, Dr. Tanay suggested that Petitioner's ability to control his impulses was impaired and that Petitioner involved himself in self-destructive gamesmanship during the course of the Chi Omega murder trial and pretrial proceedings in Tallahassee, Florida. In addition, Dr. Tanay testified that Petitioner did not appreciate the evidence linking him to the crime because Petitioner believed the evidence against him was not compelling and could be overcome.

Dr. Tanay believed that Petitioner's rejection of the plea agreement was not a rational act. According to Dr. Tanay, Petitioner desired to have the proceedings go on in order to satisfy his pathological needs. Also, Petitioner's desire to represent himself was behavior typical for a psychopath guided by a desire for showmanship. Further, Dr. Tanay testified that he believed Petitioner was unable to appreciate the gravity of the charges against him and the weight of the state's evidence. According to Dr. Tanay, he understood the state's evidence against Petitioner was conclusive of guilt and, for that reason, Petitioner's refusal to recognize that he would undoubtedly be found guilty was irrational.

Dr. Tanay's opinion, however, was...