Burbank v. Boston Police Relief Ass'n
| Decision Date | 09 May 1887 |
| Citation | 11 N.E. 691,144 Mass. 434 |
| Parties | BURBANK v. BOSTON POLICE RELIEF ASS'N. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
C.T. Gallagher, for plaintiff.
The acts of the legislature (chapter 78) of 1882 did not give to the defendant any more right to enact a by-law relative to retired members than it previously possessed. That act provided that the benefit to accrue by reason of the decease of members should be extended to retired members of the police force, and provided, further, that such retired members should have no voice in the government of the association, etc. The limitation, under the by-law, (article 1,) to those who had been members five years, was an interference with the vested right of a member who had continued his membership after the act of 1882 took effect and such a by-law could only affect members who joined after its passage. It was in the nature of an ex post facto law and unauthorized. Mor. Corp. § 496, and cases cited. The plaintiff claims that if, by any technicality, Morey had ceased to be a member of the association, the above by-law had in effect been waived by the association and its officers, and Morey and his beneficiary were entitled to all benefits at his death. With full knowledge of the facts, the corporation at its annual meetings accepted Morey as a member, and authorized its directors and officers to recognize him as such. Plaintiff submits that on all the evidence the case should have at least been submitted to the jury for their consideration.
J.F Cronan and E.J. Jenkins, for defendant.
Plaintiff cannot maintain this action, although she is a daughter of said deceased, and was designated by him as his beneficiary, if not a member of his family at the time she was so designated. Elsey v. Odd Fellows' M.R. Ass'n, 142 Mass. 224, 7 N.E. 844. The designation of the plaintiff as beneficiary by the deceased was subsequent to his retirement from the police department, and was invalid. Article 1, By-Laws. Plaintiff was not entitled to have her first prayer for instructions given, because whether or not deceased was a member of the defendant association depended not only upon questions of law, but upon facts in dispute, to-wit, among other things, upon whether or not defendant, as a corporation, ever authorized its treasurer to receive the assessments, or did anything that would estop defendant from saying deceased was not a member thereof at the time of his death, and assumed that acts of its officers not authorized by defendant were acts of the corporation. Pratt v. Amherst, 140 Mass. 167, 2 N.E. 772. Plaintiff was not entitled to have the instructions asked for by her second prayer given, because it would submit to the jury questions of law, and because the board of directors, at least, with the approval of the finance committee, were alone to decide whether or not plaintiff was entitled to this money before defendant could pay it; and said directors decided plaintiff was not entitled to it. St.1882, c. 78, authorized defendant to make article 1 of said by-laws, and plaintiff was not entitled to have the instruction given as asked for in her third prayer. Boston City Ord. 1883, c. 24, § 12; Goddard v. Worcester, 9 Gray, 88. Plaintiff was not entitled to have the instructions asked for in her fourth prayer given, because they assumed that what the officers of defendant corporation did individually were the acts of the corporation, (Pratt v. Amherst, 140 Mass. 167, 2 N.E. 772,) and there was no conclusive evidence that defendant, as a corporation, did the acts alleged, and those acts of individual officers could not bind the corporation. Baxter v. Chelsea Ins. Co., 1 Allen, 294. Plaintiff was not entitled to have the instructions asked for in her fifth prayer given, for neglect of its officers alone could not make defendant liable as upon a contract made by it, because it never made the contract. Baxter v. Chelsea Ins. Co., supra. Plaintiff was not entitled to have the instructions given asked for in her sixth prayer, because they would submit to the jury questions of law, and because the evidence requested would not warrant a verdict for plaintiff.
OPINION
The defendant was incorporated by St.1876, c. 16, "for the purpose of assisting the families of deceased members of said association, and the members thereof when sick and disabled or upon the decease of their wives." It was required that all the members should be members of the police department of the city of Boston. It was provided by article 1 of by-laws adopted that the corporation should be composed of members of the police department of the city of Boston and that, "when a member leaves the police department by resignation,...
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