Burch v. Buss

Decision Date15 August 2011
Docket NumberCase No. 3:09cv118/LAC/EMT
PartiesTRACEY ALLEN BURCH, Petitioner, v. EDWIN G. BUSS, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the court on Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and supporting memorandum, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docs. 1, 2). Petitioner is represented by counsel in this proceeding. Respondent filed an answer and relevant portions of the state court record (docs. 22, 31). Petitioner filed a reply (doc. 29).

The matter is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N. D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(b). After careful consideration of all issues raised by Petitioner, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(a). It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The relevant aspects of the procedural background of this case are undisputed and established by the state court record (see doc. 2 at 2-4; doc. 22 at 1, exhibits).1 Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County, Florida, Case No. 01-95-CFA, with one count of lewdor lascivious battery (on a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age), a violation of Florida Statutes § 800.04(4) (Ex. B at 8). The offense conduct occurred between September 1 and October 31, 2000 (id.). On December 6, 2001, Petitioner entered a written plea agreement ("Plea Agreement"), pursuant to which he agreed: (1) to plead nolo contendere to the charge, (2) to be sentenced at the court's discretion, and (3) that a factual basis for the plea existed (id. at 10-11). On January 15, 2002, the trial court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and sentenced him to fifteen (15) years of imprisonment (id. at 118-23, 147-54). Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his plea (id. at 115). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion (id. at 130, 156-79).

Petitioner, through counsel, appealed the judgment of conviction and sentence to the Florida First District Court of Appeal ("First DCA"). On January 29, 2003, the First DCA affirmed the judgment per curiam without written opinion (Ex. E). Burch v. State, 837 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (Table).

On May 15, 2003, Petitioner filed, through counsel, a motion for post-conviction relief, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. F at 1-6). The state circuit court summarily denied the motion (id. at 237-398). Petitioner appealed the decision to the First DCA. On March 30, 2006, the First DCA affirmed the decision per curiam without written opinion, with the mandate issuing April 17, 2006 (Exs. G, H). Burch v. State, 925 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (Table).

On September 14, 2006, Petitioner filed, through counsel, a motion to correct illegal sentence, pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. J at 1-3). Petitioner filed an amendment to his Rule 3.800(a) motion and simultaneously filed a second Rule 3.850 motion (id. at 4-33). The state circuit court summarily denied the motions (id. at 44-68). Petitioner appealed the decision to the First DCA. On October 20, 2008, the First DCA affirmed the decision per curiam without written opinion, with the mandate issuing November 6, 2008 (Exs. M, N). Burch v. State, 992 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (Table).

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas action on March 23, 2009 (doc. 1). Respondent concedes that the petition is timely (doc. 22 at 2-3).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts may issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub.L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19. In relevant part, § 2254(d) provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).

The United States Supreme Court explained the framework for § 2254 review in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000).2 The appropriate test was described by Justice O'Connor as follows:

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Id., 529 U.S. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The federal habeas court "determining whether [it] should overturn the state courts' rejection of the claim at issue" should "review the highest state court decision disposing of the claim." Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1237(11th Cir. 2011); see Knowles v. Mirzayance, — U.S.—, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419, 173 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2009).

Employing the Williams framework, on any issue raised in a federal habeas petition upon which there has been an adjudication on the merits in a formal state court proceeding, the federal court should first ascertain the "clearly established Federal law," namely, "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court render[ed] its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The law is "clearly established" only when a Supreme Court holding at the time of the state court decision embodies the legal principle at issue. Dicta in opinions is not controlling. Thaler v. Haynes, — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1173, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (2010); Bowles v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 608 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010). A federal court of appeals decision cannot clearly establish federal law for § 2254 purposes, even if its holding is directly on point. Bowles, 608 F.3d at 1316 (citing Renico v. Lett, — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1866, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)).

After identifying the governing legal principle, the court determines whether the state court adjudication is contrary to the clearly established Supreme Court case law. To be entitled to deference, the state court decision need not cite to Supreme Court case law. As the Supreme Court clarified: "Avoiding th[e] pitfalls [of § 2254(d)(1)] does not require citation to our cases—indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S. Ct. 362, 154 L. Ed. 2d 263 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). If the state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law, the federal habeas court must independently consider the merits of the petitioner's claim. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 168 L. Ed. 2d 662 (2007).

If the state court decision is not contrary to clearly established federal law, the federal habeas court must then determine whether the state court "unreasonably applied" the governing legal principles set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. The federal court defers to the state court's reasoning unless the state court's application of the legal principle was "objectively unreasonable" in light of the record before the state court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; see Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 652, 124 S. Ct. 2736, 159 L. Ed. 2d 683 (2004) (per curiam); cf. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.685, 697 n.4, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002) (declining to consider evidence not presented to state court in determining whether its decision was contrary to federal law). An objectively unreasonable application of federal law occurs when the state court "identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case" or "unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new context." Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). A state court may "decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme Court]" without running afoul of the "unreasonable application" clause. Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1419. Notably, even a state court's incorrect or erroneous application of clearly established law will not warrant federal habeas relief unless it is also objectively unreasonable. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 167 L. Ed. 2d 836 (2007) ("The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold."); Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) ("As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law...

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