Burchett v. Department of Labor & Industries

• Decision Date: 08 December 1927
• Docket Number: 20313.
• Citation: 261 P. 802,146 Wash. 85
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: BURCHETT v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES.

261 P. 802

146 Wash. 85

BURCHETT v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES.

No. 20313.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 8, 1927

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Webster, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries by James Burchett, claimant, who was employed by one Christensen. The Department of Labor and Industries rejected the claim, and on appeal to the superior court the Department's decision was reversed, and it appeals. Affirmed.

John H Dunbar and Mark H. Wight, both of Olympia, for appellant.

Clyde H. Belknap, of Spokane, for respondent.

HOLCOMB. J.

Respondent filed a claim for compensation with the department of Labor and Industries, claiming an injury on January 3, 1927 resulting in hernia. The department, after investigating the claim, rejected it on the ground that the claimant was not a workman, but an independent contractor. The claimant thereupon appealed to the superior court of Spokane county, where the cause was tried and judgment rendered, reversing the decision of the department.

The record is short, and the facts are undisputed. Respondent entered upon a service of some kind for one Christensen, whereby he agreed to haul logs for Christensen furnishing his own truck and gas, and his own services, and to be compensated therefor at the rate of $4 per 1,000 feet for all logs hauled. No definite quantity of logs was specified; respondent thus being free to quit at any time and Christensen being free to discharge him at will. From the time of the commencement of the work it was continuous; respondent working until he was hurt, and hauling for no other person than Christensen during the period. Respondent hauled only the logs which were loaded upon his truck by other employees of Christensen in the woods, and was not permitted to haul any other logs. He unloaded the logs at a place designated by Christensen. Respondent was obliged to report at a certain time in the morning, when the other employees of Christensen were at hand to load the logs upon his truck. He was not permitted to carry any passengers upon his truck during the hauling, nor permitted to leave the logs on the truck overnight.

It is upon these facts that the trial court found that respondent at all times, while hauling the logs, was subject to the supervision of Christensen, that Christensen might at any time terminate the employment, and that respondent was not in any sense an independent contractor. Upon the foregoing findings the trial court concluded that the relation between Christensen and respondent at the time of the injury was that of master and servant, and that he was entitled to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 7673-7796).

The only question before us is whether respondent was an employee or an independent contractor. If respondent was an employee, he was a workman within the comtemplation of the Workmen's Compensation Act, wherein 'workman' is defined as one engaged in the employment of an employer. Section 7675, Rem. Comp. Stats.

Appellant forcefully contends that under our decisions, regardless of the requirement of liberality in construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act as to those entitled to its benefits, an 'independent contractor' is defined the same as at common law. As to our decisions defining 'independent contractor' according to the common-law meaning thereof, see Engler v. Seattle, 40 Wash. 72, 82 P. 136; Cary v. Sparkman & McLean Co., 62 Wash. 363, 113 P. 1093; Glover v. Richardson & Elmer Co., 64 Wash. 403, 116 P. 861; North Bend Lumber Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co., 76 Wash. 232, 135 P. 1017; Watson v. Hecla Mining Co., 79 Wash. 383, 140 P. 317; and as applied to the Workmen's Compensation definition itself, Machenheimer v. Department of Labor and Industries, 124 Wash. 259, 214 P. 17.

On the contrary, the trial court accepted the contention of respondent and in summing up the case said:

'There is nothing binding on either of these parties except the rate of wage. The employee could quit as soon as he began, and the employer could have stopped him before he started. The first morning he appeared with his truck the employer could have said, 'I do not want you to do this work,' and dismissed him.'

Respondent quotes 12 R. C. L. 74, 75, as follows:

'The fact that a person is paid by the piece or by the job, though indicating that he is an independent contractor, is not conclusive on the question, and he may nevertheless be held to be a servant. Particularly is this so when there is no definite amount of work to be done, and either party is at liberty to terminate the employment whenever he wishes, and the employee receives pay for just the amount of work done.'

And further, ...