Burden v. People
| Decision Date | 07 November 1872 |
| Citation | 26 Mich. 162 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | James Burden v. The People |
Heard October 29, 1872
Error to Genesee circuit.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.
William Newton and E. H. Thompson, for the plaintiff in error.
Dwight May, Attorney General, for the people.
Plaintiff in error was charged with the murder of Daniel Soules, on the third day of June, 1870, and has been convicted of murder in the second degree. The undisputed facts in the case, as we gather from the record, are these: Soules worked the farm of Burden, and occupied a part of his dwelling-house, Burden living alone in the other part. Previous to the day of the homicide, they had had some difficulty on one or more occasions, but during the forenoon of that day they had been at work on the highway together, and returned to the house at noon in the same wagon, and in apparent harmony. The cattle which had drawn the wagon were taken off in the rear of the house, and while Soules remained there for a little work, he directed his son, eighteen years of age, who had been at work with them, to take the cattle to feed on the grass in front of the house. Burden, in the meantime, had gone into the house, and seated himself at the window to read. Seeing the cattle brought into his part of the front yard, he went out and complained, with some apparent feeling, that his young trees or shrubs would be destroyed, and Soules, hearing the complaint, or being informed of it, directed his son to lead the cattle to the other side of the yard, which he did. Soon after this Soules came around in front of the house, where Burden then was, and some words passed between them, followed by blows; Soules, as the evidence tends to show, striking once or more with a thin piece of board, three or four inches in width. Burden then ran into the house, caught up a loaded gun which stood six or eight feet from his front door, and stepping back to the door, where Soules then was, shot him down, killing him almost instantly. In this general outline of the facts, the witnesses, consisting of the family of Soules, and the defendant, are in substantial agreement; but in regard to accompanying circumstances which characterize the transaction, and tend to show the presence or absence of criminal intent, the discrepancies in the evidence are very serious. Burden claims to have been acting in self-defense throughout.
The first exception taken on the trial relates to the overruling of a challenge to a juror for cause. The juror, it appears, had been summoned upon the regular panel for the term, and the cause of exception assigned was, that he had already sat on the trial of one cause at the same term. The question arises under the statute of 1869 (Sess. L. 1869, p. 106, § 3), which provides that, "It shall be a good cause of challenge to any juror, in any court of record in this state, in addition to the other causes of challenge allowed by law, that such person has served as a juror upon the regular panel, or as a talesman, in such court, at any time within one year previous to such challenge." The objection assumes that a person can sit as a juror upon the trial of one cause only within a year; but the circuit judge ruled that to serve as a juror upon the regular panel means to serve for the term, and not merely for one case. If this ruling is erroneous, it must be obvious that the summoning of a regular panel of jurors for a term, has become a very useless ceremony, for all trials, after the first one or two, must be in the main by jurors summoned specially. We are not aware that this construction has ever been insisted upon in any other case, and it obviously rests upon a very narrow and literal interpretation of the words made use of in the statute. Before we can accept it, we ought to be able to see that it accords with the apparent intent of the legislature, and tends to remedy the evil at which the statute was aimed. That evil we understand to have been the summoning upon juries of a class of persons who were known as professionals; persons who, from a disinclination to steady employment, and sometimes from more reprehensible motives, either through the favor of officers or by solicitation, succeeded in being summoned to an important duty, the responsibilities of which they did not feel, and the trust imposed, it was sometimes their purpose to abuse. If the regular panel is so far done away with by this statute, it is easy to perceive that the responsibility and authority of the officer in summoning juries is at the same time in like proportion increased, and a long step is taken in the direction of introducing new evils of the same general nature with those the statute sought to preclude. We have no doubt whatever that the circuit judge was correct in this ruling.
It is also assigned for error that witnesses who were on the ground soon after the homicide, were not allowed to testify what Burden said to them concerning bruises on his person, and how he received them. It appears from the record, that the questions by which these statements were sought to be called out, were put on the cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution; and the objection seems to have been that they were not proper on cross-examination, because the...
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People v. Williams
...who had sat as a petit or grand juror during the previous year, from sitting on another jury panel. The Supreme Court in Burden v. People, 26 Mich. 162 (1872), interpreted a predecessor statute containing the same one-year requirement. The Court held that the one-year provision did not proh......
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People v. Wysocki
...accused of crime could not be sworn as witnesses in their own behalf. They could only make a statement to the court or jury. Burden v. People, 26 Mich. 162;People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314;Durant v. People, 13 Mich. 351;Annis v. People, 13 Mich. 511. The proper practice, prior to the effective......
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Harris v. People
...important duty, the responsibilities of which they did not feel, and the trust imposed, it was sometimes their purpose to abuse.' Burden v. People, 26 Mich. 162.' Justice Breese, of the Supreme Court of Illinois, pays his respects to that class of undesirables in these words: 'There had gro......
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Waite v. People
...important duty, the responsibilities of which they did not feel, and the trust imposed, it was sometimes their purpose to abuse.' Burden v. People, 26 Mich. 162. Mr. Justice Breese, of the Supreme Court of Illinois, his respects to that class of undesirables in these words: 'There had grown......