People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 04 May 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 52228
• Citation: 114 Mich.App. 186,318 N.W.2d 671
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Edward WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. 114 Mich.App. 186, 318 N.W.2d 671
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 671

318 N.W.2d 671

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Edward WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 52228.

114 Mich.App. 186, 318 N.W.2d 671

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 9, 1981.

Decided March 17, 1982.

Released for Publication May 4, 1982.

[114 MICHAPP 190] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., John M. Smietanka, Pros. Atty. and Angela Baryames, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.

Sheila Hughes, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before T. M. BURNS, P. J., and R. B. BURNS and KELLY, JJ.

KELLY, Judge.

Defendant was charged with arson of a dwelling house, M.C.L. Sec. 750.72; M.S.A. Sec. 28.267, and conspiracy to commit arson of a dwelling house, M.C.L. Sec. 750.157a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.354(1). On October 5, 1978, a jury found him guilty of the conspiracy count, and he was sentenced to 11 to 20 years imprisonment on January 9, 1979. Defendant appeals by right, GCR 1963, 806.1.

Defendant owned a home located at 5856 Paw Paw Lake Road in Berrien County. On March 13, 1976, the building caught fire but was not totally destroyed. According to the evidence, there was considerable indication that the fire was intentionally set. On March 29, 1976, a second fire destroyed the house. ¹

[114 MICHAPP 191] At defendant's trial, Detective William Anderson of the Michigan State Police Fire Division testified that he investigated both the March 13 and March 29, 1976, fires. He testified that the natural gas and electrical services were terminated after the March 13, 1976 fire. Anderson opined that the absence of a heating and electrical system coupled with the fact that the fire was ignited in more than one location within the house demonstrated that the fire was caused by arson.

The prosecution presented a number of witnesses who testified concerning the conspiracy count. Wanda Hawks testified that defendant suggested that she buy the house in 1975. According to Hawks, defendant expressed his intent to burn the house and collect the insurance proceeds. She testified that he offered her part of the proceeds if she helped him. She also testified that between the first and second fire, she overheard defendant tell Ronnie Sims that, "he didn't like to go back the second time but the place was a hell of a mess, and that he had to go back". Thomas Reynolds, who rented the house in 1974, testified that defendant offered him $2,500 to burn the house. Reynolds' testimony was corroborated by his wife.

Constance Stroder, who rented the home, testified that defendant requested her to move into a trailer owned by defendant in February, 1976. On March 29, 1976, she observed defendant and his son at a garage located near the trailer. Defendant's son requested a siphon hose, which Stroder gave him. Later that night, she saw someone in the garage. According to Stroder, some two weeks after the second fire, defendant asked her if anyone had spoken to her about the fire. After being told the fire marshall had spoken to her, defendant stated that anyone who got him into trouble would be sorry.

[114 MICHAPP 192] The prosecution also introduced photographs which depicted the condition of the house after the March 13, 1976, fire. Fireman Merle Thurton, an employee of the Coloma Township Fire Department, also testified that if the house was cleaned it would have been habitable after the first fire.

After the prosecutor rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict claiming the prosecutor had failed to prove that the building was a dwelling house. The trial court denied defendant's motion.

Ruby Williams, defendant's ex-wife, testified that she held the deed to the house and had sold it to Ronald Sims on a land contract. She also denied that defendant discussed burning the house with either Reynolds or Sims. Defendant also called a number of character witnesses who testified as to his good character. Finally, defendant testified in his own behalf and denied any involvement in a conspiracy to burn the home. After the jury was instructed, it returned a guilty verdict on the conspiracy count.

I

Defendant argues that the magistrate erred when he bound defendant over for trial on the arson charge. According to defendant, the prosecutor failed to show the corpus delicti of arson during the preliminary exam.

In People v. Goode, 106 Mich.App. 129, 136, 308 N.W.2d 448 (1981), this Court stated:

"An examining magistrate is to bind a defendant over for trial if it appears that a crime has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it. MCL 766.13; MSA 28.931, People v. Asta, 337 Mich 590, 609-610; 60 NW2d 472 (1953). [114 MICHAPP 193] While positive proof of guilt is not required, there must be evidence on each element of the crime charged or evidence from which those elements may be inferred. People v Oster, 67 Mich App 490, 495; 241 NW2d 260 (1976), lv den, 397 Mich 848 (1976). Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that a person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. People v. Dellabonda, 265 Mich. 486, 490; 251 NW 594 (1933). A magistrate's determination at the preliminary examination should not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 101; 276 NW2d 9 (1979)."

In order to establish the corpus delicti of arson of a dwelling house, the prosecutor must show not only a burning of a dwelling house but also that the burning resulted from an intentional criminal act. M.C.L. Sec. 750.72; M.S.A. Sec. 28.267, People v. Lee, 231 Mich. 607, 611-612, 204 N.W. 742 (1925). Where only a burning is shown, a presumption arises that it was accidentally caused. Id., 611-612, 204 N.W. 742.

When establishing the corpus delicti of a crime, the extrajudicial confessions of the accused cannot be used. People v. Allen, 91 Mich.App. 63, 66, 282 N.W.2d 836 (1979). However, statements made by the accused prior to the time the crime was committed do not amount to confessions because, at the time they were made, no crime had yet been committed. Id., 66, 282 N.W.2d 836. Therefore, statements made prior to the time the crime was committed may be used to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. Id., 66-67, 282 N.W.2d 836.

In this case, the defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to show that the burning resulted from an intentional criminal act. During the preliminary examination, Detective Anderson opined that the source of ignition was from a human [114 MICHAPP 194] agent because of the absence of an accidental source. Wanda Hawks also testified that she overheard defendant and Sims state that the "house would have to go again". This conversation occurred between the first and second fires. These facts presented a reasonable ground of suspicion warranting a cautious man to believe defendant committed the crime. The magistrate did not abuse his discretion when he bound defendant over for trial.

II

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it refused to exclude a juror for cause where the juror had served on another jury during the same term. M.C.L. Sec. 600.1306; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1306, which was in effect at the time of defendant's trial, prohibited a juror, who had sat as a petit or grand juror during the previous year, from sitting on another jury panel. The Supreme Court in Burden v. People, 26 Mich. 162 (1872), interpreted a predecessor statute containing the same one-year requirement. The Court held that the one-year provision did not prohibit a juror from serving on more than one jury during the same term. Id., 164-165. In this case, the juror stated that he had sat on another jury during the same term. The trial judge did not err when he refused to excuse the juror for cause.

III

Defendant's next claim of error concerns the trial court's refusal to grant a directed verdict on the arson of a dwelling house charge. According to defendant, the prosecutor had failed to establish that the house was fit for habitation.

[114 MICHAPP 195] In People v. Hampton, 407 Mich. 354, 368, 285 N.W.2d 284 (1979), the Supreme Court stated the test for reviewing motions for a directed verdict:

"In summary, the trial judge when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal must consider the evidence presented by the prosecution up to the time the motion is made, Garcia, supra [People v. Garcia, 398 Mich. 250, 247 N.W.2d 547 (1976) ], view that evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 463; 227 NW2d 535 (1975), and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson, supra, [Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ]."

In People v. Reed, 13 Mich.App. 75, 163 N.W.2d 704 (1968), a structure which had previously been used as a dwelling was destroyed by a fire. The evidence presented at trial established that the building was unoccupied and in a dilapidated condition prior to the fire. While the building could have been renovated to make it habitable, this Court reversed defendant's conviction for arson of a dwelling house stating the building was not presently capable of being dwelt in. The Court held:

"Unless a structure is actually being dwelt in or lived in, it would seem that if it is unoccupied it would have to be a structure that could reasonably be presumed to be a place capable of being dwelt in or lived in to qualify as a dwelling house within the meaning of the statute." Id., 79, 163 N.W.2d 704.

A similar result was reached in People v. Foster, 103 Mich.App. 311, 316, 302 N.W.2d 862 (1981), lv. den. 411 Mich. 980 (1981).

It is undisputed that the house in question was [114 MICHAPP 196] unoccupied at the time of the second fire. The evidence presented by the...