Burdick v. Boehm

• Decision Date: 23 March 2017
• Citation: 49 N.Y.S.3d 795,148 A.D.3d 1439
• Parties: In the Matter of Jeffrey Wilson BURDICK Jr., Appellant, v. Sarah Lynn BOEHM, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

148 A.D.3d 1439

49 N.Y.S.3d 795

In the Matter of Jeffrey Wilson BURDICK Jr., Appellant,

v.Sarah Lynn BOEHM, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

March 23, 2017.

Amanda FiggsGanter, Albany, for appellant.

Before: PETERS, P.J., McCARTHY, GARRY, ROSE and AARONS, JJ.

McCARTHY, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Cortland County (Campbell, J.), entered May 18, 2016, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct. Act article 6, to modify a prior order of custody.

Petitioner (hereinafter the father) and respondent (hereinafter the mother) are the parents of a son (born in 2006), born in New York. In 2014, Family Court issued an order, on the parties' consent, granting the father's petition to modify a prior custody and visitation order, and awarded the parties joint custody of the child with placement with the mother effective June 25, 2014. The 2014 order granted the father visitation with the child during summer vacations and school breaks of three consecutive days or more and as the parties mutually agree. The father apparently remained in New York while the mother and child have lived in Illinois and then Wisconsin with various relatives.¹ In May 2016, the father commenced this modification proceeding seeking sole custody of the child, alleging that, among other things, the mother lacks stable housing and is a substance abuser, and that the child has been living with either his maternal grandmother or great-grandmother since March 2016. Prior to a response by the mother, Family Court sua sponte dismissed the petition, finding that New York does not have continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the child's custody pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (see Domestic Relations Law art. 5–A). The father appeals.²

We reverse. A New York court that has previously made a child custody determination "has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until ... a court of this state determines that neither the child [nor] the child and one parent ... have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships" (Domestic Relations Law § 76–a[1][a] ; see Matter of Wengenroth v. McGuire, 127 A.D.3d 1278, 1280, 6 N.Y.S.3d 729 [2015], lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 913, 0201 WL 284878 [2015] ). In dismissing the petition, Family Court relied upon the fact that the child and the mother had not resided in New York for over two years and that the " events which [the father] asserts in support of his petition occurred in Wisconsin." However, the father, who shares joint custody of the child pursuant to the 2014 order and has apparently lived continuously in New York since before the 2014 custody order was issued, alleges in an affidavit in support of his petition that the child spent the prior summer—from June 22, 2015 to August 22, 2015—with him in New York pursuant to the 2014 order³ (SEE MATTER OF belcHer v. lawrence, 98 a.d.3d 197, 200–201, 948 N.Y.S.2d 187 [2012] ; compare Matter of Wengenroth, 127 A.D.3d at 1280, 6 N.Y.S.3d 729 ; Matter of Zippo v. Zippo, 41 A.D.3d 915, 916, 837 N.Y.S.2d 771 [2007] ). The allegations in the petition, while somewhat confusing, further suggest that the child lived in New York from his birth until June 2014 and for a period of several months in early 2016, and that the child has a half sibling living with the father with whom he is bonded. According to the father, the child has his own room, a bank account, a YMCA membership and many familial and social relationships in New York.

Family Court "should have given the parties an opportunity to present evidence as to whether the child[ ] has maintained a significant connection with New York, and whether substantial evidence is available in New York concerning the child['s] ‘care, protection, training, and personal relationships' " (Pyronneau v. Pyronneau, 130 A.D.3d 707, 708, 11 N.Y.S.3d 881 [2015], quoting Domestic Relations Law § 76–a[1][a] ). Given due process concerns, sua sponte dismissal of pleadings is to be used sparingly in the absence of extraordinary circumstances (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Pabon, 138 A.D.3d 1217, 1219, 31 N.Y.S.3d 221 [2016] ; Maynard v. Maynard, 138 A.D.3d 794, 794, 30 N.Y.S.3d 192 [2016] ). Crediting the father's factual allegations at this early juncture,⁴ as we must, we find that the child continues to have significant connections to New York (see Matter of Seminara v. Seminara, 111 A.D.3d 949, 950–951, 976 N.Y.S.2d 121 [2013] ; Matter of Mercado v. Frye, 104 A.D.3d 1340, 1341, 961 N.Y.S.2d 717 [2013], lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 859, 2013 WL 3198162 [2013] ; Matter of Belcher v. Lawrence, 98 A.D.3d at 200–201, 948 N.Y.S.2d 187 ; Matter of Hissam v. Mancini, 80 A.D.3d 802, 803, 916 N.Y.S.2d 248 [2011], lv. dismissed and denied 16 N.Y.3d 870, 923 N.Y.S.2d 406, 947 N.E.2d 1184 [2011] ; Matter of Sutton v. Sutton, 74 A.D.3d 1838, 1839, 902 N.Y.S.2d 746 [2010] ; see also Vernon v. Vernon, 100 N.Y.2d 960, 972, 768 N.Y.S.2d 719, 800 N.E.2d 1085 [2003] ). That is, while significant evidence concerning the child's current "care, protection, training, and personal relationships" (Domestic Relations Law § 76–a[1][a] ) may be in Wisconsin, the same may ultimately be said about New York, which retains significant connections with the father and the child. Family Court, which presided over...