Burgaz v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs for Jefferson Cnty. Colo.
| Decision Date | 14 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-1049 |
| Parties | The ESTATE OF Susanne BURGAZ, BY AND THROUGH personal representatives Erika ZOMMER, Kristian Arnold, and Amelia Eudailey; Erika Zommer, individually; Kristian Arnold, individually; Amelia Eudailey, individually, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR JEFFERSON COUNTY COLORADO; Jeff Shrader, in his official capacity; Petrina Pesapane, individually; Joseph Scalise, individually, Defendants - Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Zachary D. Warren, Highlands Law Firm, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Rebecca P. Klymkowsky, Assistant County Attorney, Jefferson County Attorney's Office, Golden, Colorado (Rachel Bender, Assistant County Attorney, Jefferson County Attorney's Office, Golden, Colorado, and Gordon Vaughan and David R. DeMuro, Vaughan & DeMuro, Denver, Colorado, with her on the brief) for Defendants-Appellees.
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Following Susanne Burgaz's suicide in the Jefferson County Detention Facility, Ms. Burgaz's children and estate sued two individual Jefferson County Sheriff's deputies on duty the night she died, and various other County officials. They argued the deputies were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs and the County and sheriff negligently operated the jail.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted the motion. We agree with the district court that both individual deputies are entitled to qualified immunity because the Estate failed to allege either deputy violated Ms. Burgaz's constitutional rights. The Monell claim against the sheriff was also properly dismissed. And because all the claims arising under federal law were properly dismissed, the district court correctly dismissed the remaining state-law claims.
We therefore AFFIRM the dismissal of all the claims.
Ms. Burgaz was arrested and booked into the Jefferson County Detention Facility (JCDF) on August 30, 2017. At her booking, a deputy decided—based on a variety of factors, including a previous suicide attempt at the same jail—to place Ms. Burgaz in the Special Housing Unit (SHU), an area of the jail where detainees with special medical needs are placed. Deputies use the jail's information management system, named Tiburon, to view information about inmates, including health information, criminal history, and prior incarcerations. The Tiburon system noted Ms. Burgaz had significant medical needs including the use of a walker, a history of self-harm, a drug addiction, and a previous suicide attempt at the same jail. The complaint, however, does not allege that Ms. Burgaz was placed on suicide watch at booking.
The day after Ms. Burgaz was booked, she attended a hearing about her charges, and a judge ordered her released. After the hearing, Ms. Burgaz was transported back to the jail and placed in the SHU dayroom while she awaited her release. The dayroom is a small room, filled with only a book cart, a table, chairs, and a mounted television. The dayroom's only door has a frosted glass pane, and the inside of the dayroom is only visible from the adjacent hallway through a tiny, transparent slit on the frosted glass.
At about 9:02 p.m., Ms. Burgaz, who was alone in the dayroom, used her walker to walk to the window and get the attention of a deputy. About a minute later, Deputy Petrina Pesapane walked to the window and spoke to Ms. Burgaz. Ms. Burgaz asked for an update about her release, at which point Deputy Pesapane went to the control room and learned Ms. Burgaz had two outstanding warrants in a different jurisdiction. Because of the warrants, Deputy Pesapane informed Ms. Burgaz she would not be released that night. Deputy Pesapane then helped Ms. Burgaz gather some documents she had left in her cell and escorted her back to the dayroom.
At about 9:09 p.m., Deputy Pesapane left Ms. Burgaz alone again in the dayroom. At 9:17 p.m., Ms. Burgaz began to peer through the door's viewing pane and banging on the door, attempting to get a deputy's attention. About a minute later, she walked back to the table where she had been sitting. At about 9:22 p.m., Ms. Burgaz shuffled over to the wall-mounted television and began to fashion a noose from the wires and cords.
Around that time, at 9:25 p.m., Deputy Joseph Scalise conducted a walk-through of this portion of the jail. During the walk-through, Deputy Scalise walked down the hallway and past the dayroom where Ms. Burgaz was attempting to hang herself. Deputy Scalise did not look directly into the dayroom. Instead, he walked briskly on the far side of the hallway. At 9:28 p.m., he finished his walk-through.
From 9:22 p.m. to 9:29 p.m., Ms. Burgaz twice attempted to hang herself, but the noose did not hold. On her third attempt, she hanged herself. Deputies found her at about 10:00 p.m. Despite medical attention, she died two days later.
Plaintiffs-Appellants (the Estate) sued Deputies Pesapane and Scalise in their individual capacities, alleging they violated Ms. Burgaz's Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care in jail. The Estate sued the Board of County Commissioners and Jefferson County Sheriff Shrader in his official capacity based on an entity liability theory for the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C § 1983.1
The Estate also pleaded two state-law violations. The first was for negligence in the operation of a jail resulting in wrongful death against the Board and Sheriff Shrader in his official capacity. The other was a survival claim against the Board, Sheriff Shrader (in his official capacity), and Deputies Pesapane and Scalise (in their individual capacities).2
The defendants filed for dismissal for failure to state a claim based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion and dismissed all the claims. The Estate appeals.
The Estate contends the district court erred in (1) granting qualified immunity to both individual deputies; and (2) dismissing the Monell and state-law claims against Sheriff Shrader.
We review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Stan Lee Media, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co. , 774 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 2014). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complainant must allege facts that, if true, state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Mayfield v. Bethards , 826 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016). In reviewing the motion to dismiss, we accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Montano , 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013).
First, we will assess the deliberate indifference claims against the individual deputies. Then, we will discuss the Monell claim against Sheriff Shrader. And finally, we will review the state-law claims against Sheriff Shrader.
The Estate contends that Deputies Pesapane and Scalise were deliberately indifferent to Ms. Burgaz's risk of suicide. The deputies assert qualified immunity, arguing they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. See Lindsey v. Hyler , 918 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cir. 2019). When assessing whether a constitutional violation occurred and whether the law was clearly established, we have the discretion to decide which question to answer first. Panagoulakos v. Yazzie , 741 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 2013).
Here, we conclude the Estate failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation against either deputy because it did not plausibly allege that either deputy was deliberately indifferent to Ms. Burgaz's medical needs. Consequently, each deputy is entitled to qualified immunity.
Jail officials "cannot ‘absolutely guarantee the safety of their prisoners.’ " Cox v. Glanz , 800 F.3d 1231, 1248 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lopez v. LeMaster , 172 F.3d 756, 759 (10th Cir. 1999) ). But jail officials and municipalities have a constitutional duty to take reasonable steps to protect prisoners’ safety and bodily integrity. Berry v. City of Muskogee, Okl. , 900 F.2d 1489, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990). Claims based on a jail suicide are considered and treated as claims based on the failure of the jail officials to provide necessary medical care for those in their custody. Cox , 800 F.3d at 1248. Thus, the claims are assessed for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Estate of Hocker ex rel. Hocker v. Walsh , 22 F.3d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 1994).
The test for deliberate indifference has a dual objective and subjective component. For the objective component, the complainant must demonstrate that the deprivation is sufficiently serious to warrant intervention or treatment. Mata v. Saiz , 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005). The subjective inquiry asks whether the defendants "knew [the detainee] faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Redmond v. Crowther , 882 F.3d 927, 939–40 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Martinez v. Beggs , 563 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The objective component of the deliberate indifference test "requires showing the alleged injury is ‘sufficiently serious.’ " Redmond , 882 F.3d at 939 (citing Self v. Crum , 439 F.3d 1227, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2006) ). Death by suicide satisfies that requirement. See Martinez , 563 F.3d at 1088–89.
The subjective prong requires an official to know of and disregard an excessive risk to a detainee's health or safety. Redmond , 882 F.3d at 939–40. "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. " Id. at 936 n.3 (citing Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ) (...
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