Burgess v. Ally Bank
| Decision Date | 28 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:14-1676,3:14-1676 |
| Parties | SHAWNELLIAS BURGESS v. ALLY BANK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
By Order entered December 12, 2014 (Docket Entry No. 53), this action was referred to the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Rule 72(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for further pretrial matters.
Presently pending in this action is the Defendant's motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 26), to which the Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition (Docket Entry Nos. 45 and 46).1 Also before the Court is the Defendant's reply (Docket Entry No. 51). For the reasons set out below, the Court recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted.
The Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pro se on August 15, 2014, against Ally Bank seeking various types of damages. Although he stated in the Complaint that the lawsuit was brought as an appealfrom a decision rendered in the Davidson County General Sessions Court, he asserted that federal question jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 13312 and set out claims that Ally Bank had violated Regulation E.3 See Complaint (Docket Entry No. 1). His claims were based upon events that arose after a merchant, Snap Fitness, charged a $25.00 fee to a check card issued to the plaintiff by Ally Bank. The plaintiff disputed the validity of the fee to the merchant and also to Ally Bank, through a Regulation E claim, and he ultimately filed suit against Ally Bank and Snap Fitness in the General Sessions Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, on July 1, 2014. The state court action was dismissed in favor of the two defendants on August 12, 2014. See Exhibit 1 (Docket Entry No. 1-1) to Complaint, at 1, and Docket Entry No. 7-2.
Defendant Ally originally moved to dismiss the instant action under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that this Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the Plaintiff's request for an appeal of the General Sessions Court decision under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that the federal lawsuit was the second lawsuit brought by the Plaintiff against Ally Bank based on the same claims and was barred by res judicata. See Docket Entry No. 7. By Order entered September 16, 2014 (Docket Entry No. 11), the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint and denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss withoutprejudice to being renewed after the amended complaint was filed. The Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint (Docket Entry No. 22), and the Defendant again moved to dismiss the action.
In his Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff deleted any references to the General Sessions lawsuit and judgment, removed his request for an appeal of the decision of the General Sessions Court, and significantly revised the factual allegations of his pleading to minimize any reference to the dispute with the merchant and Ally Bank over the $25.00 fee. See Docket Entry No. 22, at 1-2. The Plaintiff then asserted claims of violations of Regulation E, violations of "UDAAP under Dodd-Frank Act," violations of Tenn. Code. Ann. § 47-18-104, fraud, and breach of contract. Id. at 3-5. The Plaintiff also stated that he would be filing a motion "for class action status shortly" and sought various forms of damages as relief. Id.
In the pending motion to dismiss, the Defendant argues that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because the instant action continues to be barred by res judicata even in light of the new allegations and claims made by the Plaintiff. The Defendant further argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court from hearing the Regulation E claims that were raised, heard, and dismissed in the Plaintiffs' prior General Sessions lawsuit. Finally, the Defendant contends that there is no private cause of action under the Dodd-Frank Act as referenced by the Plaintiff and that the Amended Complaint is lacking in specific factual allegations that support claims for relief based on the other three new causes of action set out in the Amended Complaint.
The Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss, arguing that it is untimely and should be summarily denied for that reason alone. See Docket Entry No. 45, at 1-3. The Plaintiff also contends that his Amended Complaint does not seek to overturn the decision of the General Sessions Court and that his action does not rely upon the same core facts as were at issue in the GeneralSessions lawsuit but is based upon Defendant Ally Bank's alleged non-compliance with the terms and provisions of its Deposit Agreement with the Plaintiff. Id. at 3-4.
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed under the standard that the Court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint, resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor, and construe the complaint liberally in favor of the pro se plaintiff. See Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2006); Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999); Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 11-12 (6th Cir. 1987). However, although the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must provide the grounds for his entitlement to relief and this "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
The factual allegations supplied must be enough to show a plausible right to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-61. More than bare assertions of legal conclusions are required to withstand a motion to dismiss and the complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all of the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Id.; Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1988). The Court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds, Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d855 (2001). Although Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not constitute a "hyper-technical, code-pleading regime," it "does not unlock the doors of discovery for a Plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678-79. A complaint does not "suffice if it tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant requires the Court to view his pleading with some measure of a liberal construction. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). However, the "lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits." Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). "Neither this Court nor other courts ... have been willing to abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits." Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing cases).
Initially, the Court finds no merit to the Plaintiff's argument that the Defendant's motion to dismiss was untimely filed and should be summarily denied without consideration of the Defendant's substantive arguments for dismissal. The Court notes that, by Orders entered October 3, 2014 (Docket Entry No. 20), and October 31, 2014 (Docket Entry No. 25), the Court has denied the Plaintiffs' two motions (Docket Entry Nos. 16 and 23) seeking default judgment in the action based upon arguments made by the Plaintiff about the timeliness of the Defendant's responses to the Plaintiff's pleadings.
Addressing the Defendant's substantive arguments, the Court first notes that the Rooker-Felman4 doctrine would clearly have prevented this Court from asserting jurisdiction over the instant lawsuit had the Plaintiff continued to rely upon his original Complaint, in which he specifically sought appellate review of the decision from the General Sessions Court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars district courts from exercising appellate review over challenges to state court judgments. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006); Hood v. Keller, 341 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2003). The application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is less clear to the extent it concerns the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in light of his lack of a specific request to overturn the decision from the General Sessions Court and his inclusion of four new claims that he did not raise before the General Sessions Court. In such a situation, the injury he complains about is not a result of the state court decision itself, but the result of actions by Defendant Ally Bank and, thus, Rooker-Feldman would not apply to prevent the Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's action. See Duncan v. U.S. Bank, NA, 574 F. App'x 599, 601 (6th Cir. 2014); McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 394 (6th Cir. 2006). The Sixth Circuit has noted that the doctrine does not bar federal jurisdiction "simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court." Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)).
However, even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, the Court finds that the motion to dismiss should be granted because the instant action is barred by the...
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