Burgess v. Coronado Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 24 December 2020
• Docket Number: D076263
• Citation: 59 Cal.App.5th 1,272 Cal.Rptr.3d 919
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Randall BURGESS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CORONADO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent; Voice of San Diego, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

59 Cal.App.5th 1

272 Cal.Rptr.3d 919

Randall BURGESS, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.CORONADO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent;

Voice of San Diego, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

D076263

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed December 24, 2020

Law Office of Felix Tinkov and Felix M. Tinkov, Escondido, for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

herronlaw and Matthew V. Herron, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

DATO, J.

News outlet Voice of San Diego (Voice) requested records from the Coronado Unified School District (District) under the California Public Records Act (PRA; Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq. ) concerning its employee Randall Burgess, who had been the subject of unsubstantiated molestation allegations. Burgess sued the District to enjoin disclosure. After Voice intervened in his lawsuit, the trial court ordered the District to disclose publicly available court filings and materials submitted to the District at a public hearing. Thereafter, it denied Voice's request for attorney's fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5,¹ finding the production of these limited materials did not confer a significant public benefit.

Voice argues the trial court misconstrued the significant benefit requirement under section 1021.5 and abused its discretion in denying its fee request. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Voice made its first records request to the District in November 2017, seeking "[a]ll public records relating to any substantiated claims of sexual misbehavior and related misconduct for any employee, official, contractor, agent or volunteer of the District arising within the last 10 years." As it later clarified, "substantiated claims" included yet-unproven complaints that appeared well founded. Upon receiving this request, the District informed Burgess that it intended to produce certain responsive documents, which prompted Burgess to initiate this "reverse-PRA" petition for writ of mandate and request for injunctive relief to prevent their disclosure. ²

Voice filed a second records request in August 2018, seeking "[a]ll letters, emails, and other correspondence submitted to Coronado Unified School District with regard to Randall Burgess starting on January 1, 2017 through to the present," including "comments delivered to the school board by members of the public at one or more public hearings."

The parties appeared before Judge Judith Hayes in October 2018. Because Voice's request to intervene was unopposed, the court granted it. It then turned to Burgess's request for preliminary injunctive relief. The District submitted 27 pages of records under seal that it believed were responsive to Voice's first records request. Judge Hayes concluded that five of the pages did not "relate to allegations of a ‘substantial nature’ and enjoined their disclosure." But she reached a different result as to the remaining 22 pages, which consisted of publicly available filings in Burgess's separate lawsuit against the District seeking his reinstatement.³ Accordingly, the District produced 22 pages consisting of Burgess's writ petition for reinstatement, the District's Answer, and extraneous notices contained in the case file. Judge Hayes did not make any rulings in reference to Voice's second records request, directing the parties to meet and confer over whether Burgess had to file a separate petition to enjoin production of any documents responsive to that request.

When Judge Hayes retired, the case was transferred to Judge Richard Whitney. In November 2018, Burgess filed an amended petition for writ of mandate to enjoin the District from disclosing documents responsive to Voice's second request. He once again sought a preliminary injunction.

Judge Whitney denied the request for injunctive relief in January 2019, reasoning that Burgess failed to show the requested documents concerned "complaints of a confidential nature." The documents discussed unproven allegations that Burgess had molested a student, but these allegations "were known to the public" and were what "prompted the District to put [Burgess] on leave and for the public to submit comments in support of or against [him]." Burgess had not shown that the records were or should have been part of his personnel file, and thus the documents would be ordered released. Accordingly, the District was ordered to release a second production to Voice consisting of a student complaint describing alleged molestation; two short status update letters from the Commission on Teacher Credentialing to the District, 74 pages of e-mails from parents that alternately praised or criticized Burgess, and a petition signed by 1,144 parents seeking Burgess's reinstatement. Before the District could send these documents to Voice, Burgess released them to another media outlet. Shortly thereafter, Burgess voluntarily dismissed the case.

In May, Voice filed a motion seeking $78,720 in attorney's fees pursuant to section 1021.5.⁴ Voice claimed that it would be entitled to fees under the PRA had it sued the District ( Gov. Code, § 6259, subd. (d) ), and private attorney general act fees were therefore appropriate for its successful intervention in Burgess's reverse-PRA suit. According to Voice, it met the elements of section 1021.5 by prevailing in efforts to enforce an important public right.

Opposing Voice's motion, Burgess argued, among other things, that the District's opposition rendered Voice a "mere observer"; Judge Hayes enjoined disclosure of key documents responsive to the first records request; and the documents that were disclosed were "so lacking in substance" that Voice admitted as much in bringing its own PRA action against the District. Burgess lodged a copy of the separate writ petition and complaint Voice filed against the District.⁵ In it Voice alleged the District "in total, disclosed a de minimis set of records including publicly available court filings made by Burgess in response to his suspension by the DISTRICT and public letter[s] and comments made to the DISTRICT relating to Burgess."

The court heard argument on the fee motion in June 2019. Responding to the court's tentative to deny the request, Voice noted that "any member of the public seeking records certainly has no idea of the content of the records they are seeking." Although many of the produced records turned out to be publicly available, Voice "couldn't know what those records were" when it intervened. Judge Hayes had prevented Voice from expanding the scope of litigation, which is what prompted the separate suit. By calling the production de minimis in its own pleading, Voice was referring to the volume of materials produced, not their substantive nature. The court took the matter under submission.

In a written order, the court later confirmed its tentative and denied Voice's motion. It reasoned that disclosure "was limited to public court filings and public letters and comments made to [the District]." Following both productions, Voice "sued the District and claimed the disclosure was ‘de minimis,’ " and the court agreed with this assessment. Voice "did not cause the District or [Burgess] to disclose any public records of any significance that was not already available to the public in some manner." Therefore, in the court's view, attorney's fees were not warranted.

DISCUSSION

Voice takes issue with the court's finding that its participation did not confer a significant public benefit. As we explain, the court properly construed the "significant benefit" requirement and did not abuse its discretion in finding this factor unmet.⁶

1. Legal Principles

Section 1021.5 permits a trial court to award attorney's fees to a successful party in any action that "(1) enforced an important public right, (2) conferred a significant public benefit, and (3) is of a type that private enforcement was necessary, and the financial burden justifies subsidizing the successful party's attorneys." ( Carlsbad, supra , 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 145, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 646, citing Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1214, 1216-1217, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 342, 241 P.3d 840 ( Whitley ).)⁷ "Although the statute is phrased in permissive terms, a court's discretion to deny attorney's fees to a party that meets the statutory requirements of section 1021.5 is limited. [Citation.] Unless special circumstances would render an award of 1021.5 fees unjust , fees must be awarded under the statute where the statutory criteria are met." ( Carlsbad , at p. 145, 262 Cal.Rptr.3d 646.) A successful intervener seeking records disclosure in a reverse-PRA action is entitled to seek attorney's fees under section 1021.5. ( Ibid. ; Pasadena Police Officers Association v. City of Pasadena (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 147, 164-166, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 292 ; City of Los Angeles v. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 290, 306, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 202.)

The trial court denied Voice's fee request because it did not find that the second eligibility criterion had been met. In its view, the documents that were ordered produced did not confer a significant public benefit. "On appeal from an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5, ‘ "the normal standard of review is abuse of discretion. However, de novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of law." ’ " ( Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1018, 1025-1026, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 358, 262 P.3d 568.)

2. The trial court applied the proper standard.

Voice first contends that the trial court misconstrued the significant benefit requirement as a matter of law. It asserts that it conferred a significant public benefit by securing public access to government records that...