Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd.
| Decision Date | 26 September 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 20589,20589 |
| Citation | 127 Idaho 565,903 P.2d 730 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | Harold BURGESS; La Ray Easterday and Janet Easterday, husband and wife; Jim Fowler, Jr., and Robin Fowler, husband and wife; Jim Fowler, Sr.; Larry D. Olsen and Sherrel E. Olsen, husband and wife, individually, and d/b/a Miracle Hot Springs; Le Grand Nelson and Alice Nelson, husband and wife; Jerry Olsen and Sheryl Olsen, husband and wife, Ken Olsen and Jean Olsen, husband and wife; Eloise Olsen; L.J. Rice & Sons, Inc., a corporation; Robert W. Ring and June Ring, husband and wife; Dale M. Wright; Magic Water Company, a corporation; Lenard Easterday and Lorene I. Easterday, husband and wife; Mark Herzinger, Personal Representative for the Estate of Betty Herzinger; Elden Easterday and Annita Easterday, husband and wife; Richard L. Kerbs and Pat Kerbs, husband and wife; James M. Feeney and Maureen Feeney, husband and wife; William Feeney and Belinda C. Feeney, husband and wife; Dortha Handy; Donald A. Jensen; John F. Jensen and Anna Dee Jensen, husband and wife; Richard S. Kerbs; Richard E. Kopp and Beatrice Kopp, husband and wife; Rick C. Parks; Sharon Parks; Joseph I. Sherwood and Helen B. Sherwood, husband and wife; David M. Cooper; Robert A. Norman; Jensen Family Partnership; Mutual of Enumclaw, a corporation; Jaynette Connolly; and John Does I through X, Plaintiffs, v. SALMON RIVER CANAL COMPANY, LTD., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, and Buhl Highway District, a Body Politic and a Public Corporation of the State of Idaho; and Twin Falls Highway District, a Body Politic and a Public Corporation of the State of Idaho, Third Party Defendants-Respondents. Twin Falls, November 1994 Term |
Webb & Webb, Twin Falls, and Cosho, Humphrey, Greener & Welsh, Boise, for Appellants Salmon River Canal Company, Ltd. Lloyd J. Webb argued.
Racine, Olson, Nye, Cooper & Budge, Pocatello, for Respondent Buhl Highway District. Louis F. Racine, Jr. argued.
Benoit, Alexander, Sinclair, Doerr, Harwood & High, Twin Falls, for Respondent Twin Falls Highway District. J. Robert Alexander argued.
A full statement of the facts leading up to this litigation is provided in Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Company (Burgess I), 119 Idaho 299, 805 P.2d 1223 (1991), wherein this Court remanded the matter to the district court for a new trial. A brief summary of the subsequent proceedings which lead to the present appeal follows.
On December 18, 1992, the trial court filed its Opinion and Order as to various pretrial motions filed by the parties. Of relevance is the court's decision to allow Salmon River Canal Company (SRCC) to use tort claim notices filed by some of the plaintiffs against the Twin Falls and Buhl Highway Districts (the Highway Districts) for impeachment purposes. Midway through the trial, the court reversed its earlier order regarding SRCC's use of the tort claim notices, concluding after nearly a month of trial that, pursuant to Rule 403 of the Idaho Rules of On March 16, 1993, a Special Verdict was returned by the jury, finding SRCC solely liable for the plaintiffs' losses, and awarding damages in the amount of $1,981,387.80. Judgment was entered the same day.
[127 Idaho 569] Evidence (I.R.E.) use of the notices would be more prejudicial than probative.
On April 2, 1993, SRCC filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the trial court erred in barring SRCC's use of the plaintiffs' tort claim notices for impeachment purposes, and in the admission of lay opinion testimony from two of the plaintiffs absolving the Highway Districts of any responsibility for their damages. On July 28, 1993, the court entered an order granting SRCC's motion, stating that it erred in excluding use of the tort claim notices for impeachment purposes, and that its error was unduly prejudicial to SRCC. However, on August 4, 1993, the court rescinded its July 28th order, stating that it was signed by mistake. The court then filed a memorandum opinion and order on October 28, 1993, denying SRCC's motion.
In reaching its decision to deny SRCC's motion for a new trial, the court concluded that no error was committed in barring the use of the tort claim notices. The court further concluded that, even if it was error to exclude the evidence and prohibit SRCC from using it to impeach the plaintiffs' testimony, SRCC's substantial rights were not prejudiced given the overwhelming amount of physical and testimonial evidence presented against SRCC.
While this appeal was pending, SRCC concluded a settlement with the plaintiffs in the amount of $2.2 million. The settlement was in full satisfaction of the trial court's judgment against SRCC, together with all interest, attorneys fees, and costs claimed by the plaintiffs in SRCC's Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. 1 An order approving the compromise and satisfaction was entered May 6, 1994, in United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho.
In the settlement, the parties stipulated that all issues between SRCC and the plaintiffs in the state court proceeding "shall be resolved with prejudice." However, the agreement specifically excluded:
any and all issues posed by the Debtor's Third Party Claim therein against Twin Falls Highway District and Buhl Highway District creditors, their responses thereto, and all issues of the Idaho Supreme Court presently pending as may relate to a third party claim, the defenses thereto, and the issues of the appeal that may in any way relate to the claims of negligence against the Twin Falls Highway District and the Buhl Highway District.
In mid-May, the plaintiffs and SRCC filed a stipulation with this Court requesting dismissal with prejudice of SRCC's appeal as to the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. On May 20, 1994, this Court entered a partial remittitur dismissing SRCC's appeal of the trial court's judgment as to the plaintiffs. On July 7, 1994, pursuant to a motion by Twin Falls Highway District, this Court entered an order taking judicial notice of the bankruptcy court's order approving SRCC's compromise and satisfaction of the plaintiffs' claims, and SRCC's dismissal of its appeal against the plaintiffs.
Following the settlement, SRCC and the Highway Districts agreed that six of the twenty-three issues SRCC originally cited on appeal were mooted by the settlement. Those issues pertained to a jury instruction on gross negligence; an award of prejudgment interest to the plaintiffs; a jury instruction on special damages; the award of attorney fees and costs incurred by the plaintiffs as to one defense theory; and the addition of a new party plaintiff following remand of the matter for a new trial in Burgess I.
SRCC and the Highway Districts also agree that three other issues, pertaining to the use of a special verdict form, the propriety of jury instructions on the law of governmental immunity, and the lack of jury instructions specific to the duty owed by the Highway Districts to the plaintiffs, were unaffected by the settlement.
However, SRCC and the Highway Districts disagree as to the effect of the settlement on the fourteen remaining issues.
This Court exercises free review over issues that present questions of law. Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 876, 865 P.2d 965, 967 (1993). However, a jury verdict on issues of negligence and causation will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears to the reviewing court that the verdict is either not supported by substantial competent evidence or is against the clear weight of the evidence. Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 726, 735 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1987).
The first issue this Court must address is what effect SRCC's settlement with the plaintiffs had on fourteen of the remaining seventeen issues SRCC cites on appeal.
SRCC voluntarily withdrew six of the issues it originally cited on appeal following its settlement with the plaintiffs. However, SRCC now argues that all seventeen of the remaining issues were unaffected by the settlement. SRCC argues that the issue presented by its settlement with the plaintiffs is analogous to a multi-party negligence action in which a negligence verdict as to one or more parties is reversed on appeal and the case is remanded for reapportionment of liability. SRCC cites Ferbrache v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 317, 597 P.2d 40 (1979), as a case in point. In Ferbrache, the Court held that two of the four parties found negligent in a jury trial were not negligent as a matter of law. Id. at 319, 597 P.2d at 42. As a result, it was necessary to reapportion the liability between the remaining tortfeasors. However, the position SRCC takes here is inapposite. SRCC argues that the issues relating to the duty it owed the plaintiffs and its defense of comparative negligence remain viable because the Court should remand this action for a new trial to reapportion the liability "among and between all three parties, notwithstanding the settlement." [Appellant's brief, p. 6 (emphasis supplied) ].
The Highway Districts, on the other hand, rely on Bob Rice Ford, Inc. v. Donnelly, 98 Idaho 313, 563 P.2d 37 (1977), for the proposition that an appeal is moot where a judgment debt is paid prior to oral argument. Id. at 315, 563 P.2d at 39. In Bob Rice, the Court held that the defendant's appeal was moot only as to his appeal of the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, to whom he had authorized payment of the amount owing. Id. However, the effect of that satisfaction of judgment on the defendant's appeal of his cross-claim against Bronco Motors was not addressed by this Court. Unlike SRCC here, the defendant in Bob Rice did not argue that issues relative to his defense of the plaintiff's claim were relevant to his appeal of the judgment for the cross-defendant.
The resolution of this issue lies not in our prior case law but in the terms of...
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