Burgh v. Borough Council of the Borough of Montrose, No. 99-4032

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: ROTH
• Citation: 251 F.3d 465
• Parties: (3rd. Cir. 2001) TIMOTHY M. BURGH, v. BOROUGH COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF MONTROSE; TIMOTHY BURGH, Appellant
• Docket Number: No. 99-4032
• Decision Date: 25 May 2001

Page 465

251 F.3d 465 (3rd. Cir. 2001) TIMOTHY M. BURGH,
v.
BOROUGH COUNCIL OF THE BOROUGH OF MONTROSE; TIMOTHY BURGH, Appellant No. 99-4032 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Argued November 6, 2000,
Opinion Filed May 25, 2001,

Page 466

David S. Dessen, Esquire (Argued), Dessen, Moses & Sheinoff, Philadelphia, PA, Attorney for Appellant.

Patrick J. Murphy, Esquire (Argued), Murphy, Piazza & Genello, Scranton, PA, Attorneys for Appellee.

Before: ROTH, RENDELL and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Timothy M. Burgh, an African-American male, applied for a job as a part-time police officer with the Borough of Montrose (Pennsylvania) Police Department. He was not hired for the position, which was filled by a white male with no prior on-the-job police experience. Burgh brought suit against the Borough under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., and under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. C.S. 951, et seq., alleging that the Borough did not hire him because of his race. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Borough and against Burgh on both counts, finding that the claims had been filed beyond the applicable statutory limitations periods. For the reasons that follow, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand both claims to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS

The facts underlying the instant dispute have not been developed in detail, given the early stage at which the matter was resolved in the District Court. Burgh's complaint is the only pleading in the record and no discovery has been taken.

According to the complaint, in April 1993, Burgh applied for a position as a

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part-time police officer with the Borough's police department. He updated this job application sometime before June 1994. In April 1994, Burgh accepted a position as a part-time police officer in the Clifford Township (Pennsylvania) Police Department. Clifford Township is located approximately 25 miles from Burgh's home in South Montrose.

In June 1994, the Montrose Police Department hired a white male, allegedly with no prior on-the-job police experience, as a part-time police officer, filling the position that Burgh had sought. The Montrose Police Department did not interview Burgh for this, or any other, position. Burgh alleges that he was more qualified than the person hired and that the department failed to hire him because of his race.

On December 8, 1994, Burgh filed a charge of racial discrimination against the Borough with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) under the PHRA, 43 Pa. C.S. 955(a).¹ The PHRA claim was filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, the Borough's failure to hire Burgh because of his race. The state administrative complaint was therefore timely. See 43 Pa. C.S. 959(h).

Burgh requested that his complaint be referred to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for dual filing as a Title VII charge. The federal claim was accepted and docketed by the EEOC on March 20, 1995. This claim was filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice and it too was timely. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1). On May 20, 1995, the EEOC sent Burgh a letter advising him of the filing of his Title VII claim. The letter stated that the EEOC would investigate and resolve the charge and that the Commission must issue a Notice of Right Sue before Burgh could file a court action under Title VII.

On March 18, 1996, the PHRC sent Burgh a letter advising him that it had been one year since he filed his complaint with the PHRC and notifying him that he now had the right to bring a private civil action under the PHRA in the Court of Common Pleas. The letter stated that Burgh was not required to file such a private action and that the Commission was continuing to process his case and would make every effort to resolve it as soon as possible. If, however, Burgh did wish to file in state court, the Commission would dismiss the administrative complaint and would not decide the case. The letter further advised Burgh to ensure that any complaint was properly filed, particularly that it was timely filed, and to consult an attorney about representing him in court. There is no dispute that Burgh received this letter. Burgh never filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas. The PHRC apparently took no further action on the administrative charge.

Sometime prior to October 1998, Burgh retained counsel. On October 19, 1998, Burgh's attorney sent a letter to the EEOC, requesting that the agency issue a right-to-sue letter in "light of the Pennsylvania Commission's extended delay in resolving this matter." The EEOC on December 1, 1998, sent a letter to Burgh's attorney, advising Burgh of his right to institute a civil action under Title VII within 90 days of receipt of that letter. Burgh filed his lawsuit, alleging violations of Title VII and the PHRA, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. His suit was filed on February

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26, 1999, 87 days after the right-to-sue letter was issued.

On May 28, 1999, Burgh moved for default judgment; this motion was withdrawn by stipulation, dated June 21, 1999. On June 28, 1999, the Borough filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending that, because Burgh had brought suit beyond the applicable statutes of limitations, his discrimination claims were untimely.

The District Court notified both parties during a case management conference that the motion would be treated as one for summary judgment; both parties agreed to rest on their memoranda and neither requested the opportunity to file additional evidence. On November 16, 1999, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.

The District Court held first that Burgh could not rely on the fact that he had not received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC prior to December 1998 as reason for the delay in filing his action because to "accept Plaintiff's argument we would have to decide we could wait forever to file suit even when the commission takes no action and fails to notify the Plaintiff. This flies in the face of the basic reason for a statute of limitations." The court then determined that the issuance of a right-to-sue letter was not a necessary prerequisite to the commencement of a civil action. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on case law holding that the PHRC's failure to issue a notice of right to sue after one year does not bar a civil action under the state statute. See Rogers v. Mount Union Borough by Zook, 816 F. Supp. 308, 316 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (citing Snyder v. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Sch. Retirees, 389 Pa. Super. 261, 566 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)). The court concluded that each agency should have responded to Burgh's administrative complaints within one year of filing with that agency--the PHRC by December 8, 1995; the EEOC by March 20, 1996. The court reasoned that after the passage of one year, Burgh could have brought a private civil action on the federal and state claims. As a result, the statute of limitations for each claim began to run on the one year anniversary of its filing with the agency.

The District Court went on to determine the period after the one-year anniversary within which a complainant could bring suit. Because the court found no specific limitations period in Title VII, it decided to borrow a state statute of limitations governing an analogous cause of action. The court held that Pennsylvania's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which has been applied to federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, should govern Title VII. The court found a rationale for this conclusion in the fact that both statutes provide redress for employment discrimination. Working from March 20, 1996, the one-year anniversary of the referral of the complaint to the EEOC, the court held that Burgh had until March 20, 1998, to file suit.² Because he did not file until

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February 1999, his suit was 11 months late and therefore time-barred.

The District Court did note that the inaction of the PHRC and EEOC was partially to blame for the delays. However, the court held that the filing of the action almost five years after the filing of the first administrative complaint was "clearly unreasonable" and therefore untimely. This timely appeal followed.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had original federal question jurisdiction over the Title VII claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the PHRA claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). We have appellate jurisdiction over the final decision of the District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.

The District Court granted summary judgment, which is subject to plenary review, applying the same legal standard used by the District Court. See Pacitti v. Macy's, 193 F.3d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1999); Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John LaBatt, Inc., 90 F.3d 737, 741 (3d Cir. 1996). Further, the issue of the proper limitations period under Title VII is primarily a legal one, involving the interpretation of federal law, and our review is plenary. See Lavia v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrs., 224 F.3d 190, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P 56(c); DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).

III. DISCUSSION

Both Title VII and the PHRA make it unlawful to fail or refuse to hire or employ an individual because of that individual's race or color. See 42 U.S.C. 2000 e-2(a)(1); 43 Pa. C.S...