Burgos v. Fontánez-Torres

• Decision Date: 27 June 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. 12–1641(FAB).
• Parties: Kristal BURGOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ángel FONTÁNEZ–TORRES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

951 F.Supp.2d 242

Kristal BURGOS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Ángel FONTÁNEZ–TORRES, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 12–1641(FAB).

United States District Court,

D. Puerto Rico.

June 27, 2013.

Michelle Annet Ramos–Jimenez, Rivera Law Office, Luis R. Rivera–Rodriguez, Luis Rafael Rivera Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Lavinia Aparicio–Lopez, Commonwealth Department of Justice, Christian E. Pagan–Cordoliani, Baerga & Quintana Law Offices, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER¹

BESOSA, District Judge.

This civil-rights action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) arising from the deaths of Jesús Emanuel González, Víctor Manuel Palomares, and Jean Carlos Palomares (“decedents”). Plaintiffs Kristal Burgos, widow of Jean Carlos Palomares; KPG, child of Jean Carlos Palomares; Lucy Cesáreo, mother of Jean Carlos Palomares and Víctor Manuel Palomares; Juan González–Carmona, brother of Jesús Emanuel González; JG and AG, children of Juan González–Carmona; Juan González–Vellón, father of Jesús Emanuel González; Victor González–Carmona, brother of Jesús Emanuel González; and Mayra Carmona, mother of Jesús Emanuel González (collectively, “plaintiffs”) commenced this action on behalf of themselves and the decedents against defendants Ángel Fontánez–Torres (“Fontánez”), and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Commonwealth”). Plaintiffs also claim damages pursuant to Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico. (“article 1802”).

Before the Court are defendants Fontánez's and the Commonwealth's motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). (Docket Nos. 5 & 8.) For the reasons discussed below, the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and defendant Fontánez's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUNDA. Factual History

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege the following facts, which for the purpose of deciding defendants' motions to dismiss, the Court takes as true. Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir.2010):

Plaintiffs contend that on July 17, 2011, defendant Fontánez negligently killed the decedents at La Placita Barceló, Santurce.²(Docket No. 1 at p. 3.) The decedents were at La Placita Barceló at approximately 3:44 a.m. when they got into a verbal disagreement with defendant Fontánez. Id. Defendant Fontánez, an agent of the Special Investigations Unit of the Puerto Rico Police Department (NIE), took out his weapon and shot the decedents. Id. Jesús Emanuel González died on the scene, Víctor Manuel Palomares died at the hospital, and Jean Carlos Palomares died at Centro Médico. Id. There is no allegation that the decedents used weapons against defendant Fontánez. Id. at p. 4.

B. Procedural History

On August 7, 2012, plaintiffs filed suit alleging three causes of action: First, plaintiffs allege violations of the decedents' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, minor plaintiff KPB alleges that, as the sole heir of Jean Carlos Palomares, KPB is entitled to receive full, just, and fair compensation for the damages suffered by Jean Carlos Palomares. Plaintiffs Juan González–Vellón and Mayra Carmona allege that, as the sole heirs of Jesús Emanuel González, they are entitled to receive full, just, and fair compensation for the damages suffered by Jesús Emanuel González. ³ Third, plaintiffs allege that defendant Fontánez's actions constitute a tort pursuant to article 1802 of the Civil Code, and that, as Fontánez's employer, the Commonwealth is liable. (Docket No. 1 at pp. 4–5.)

On September 17, 2012, defendant Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 5.) The Commonwealth contends that it is immune to suit in federal court for damages pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.⁴Id. at 8. On October 24, 2012, defendant Fontánez also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 8.) First, Fontánez contends that plaintiffs do not have a cognizable claim against him pursuant to section 1983 because his actions did not take place under color of law. Id. at p. 5. Second, Fontánez contends that plaintiffs' complaints are time-barred. Id. at p. 8.

On December 3, 2012, plaintiffs opposed defendant Fontánez's motion to dismiss arguing that (1) Fontánez was acting under color of state law because he was responding to a robbery; (2) pursuant to the Puerto Rico Police Department's Bylaws, “police agents are police agents 24 hours a day;” (3) the statute of limitations for the claims of minor plaintiffs KPB, JG, and AG are tolled because they are minors; and (4) the adult plaintiffs learned of the deaths of their relatives on July 17, 2011,⁵ but did not know who killed them on that date.⁶ (Docket No. 12 at pp. 2–3.) Plaintiffs failed to oppose the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

II. Section 1983 Standing

“Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a particular matter to the court for adjudication.” Benjamin v. Aroostook Med. Ctr., Inc., 57 F.3d 101, 104 (1st Cir.1995) (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.3, at 48 (1989)). A federal court is obliged to examine plaintiffs' standing pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution whether or not the issue is raised by the litigants. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977); Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir.2006).

As a general rule, plaintiffs do not have standing to assert claims for the violation of another person's legal rights. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); Ramírez–Lluveras v. Pagán–Cruz, 833 F.Supp.2d 151, 156–57 (D.P.R.2011). (“First Circuit case law holds that surviving family members cannot recover in an action brought under section 1983 for deprivation of rights secured by the federal constitution for their own damages from the victim's death unless the unconstitutional conduct was aimed at the familial relationship.”) Robles–Vázquez v. García, 110 F.3d 204, 206 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997). (“State action that affects the parental relationship only incidentally, even though the depravation may be permanent as in the case of an unlawful death, is not sufficient to establish a violation of an identified liberty interest.”) González Rodríguez v. Alvarado, 134 F.Supp.2d 451, 453 (D.P.R.2001) (citing Valdivieso Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.1986)). Therefore, “only the person toward whom the state action was directed, and not those incidentally affected may maintain a § 1983 claim.” Pérez–Sánchez v. Pub. Bldg. Auth., 557 F.Supp.2d 227, 239 (D.P.R.2007).

“As an exception to the general rule, an heir has standing to bring a Section 1983 action on behalf of a deceased person if the law of the state embracing the federal district court where the action is commenced permits recovery.” Ramírez–Lluveras, 833 F.Supp.2d at 157 (citing Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978)). Article 1802 of the Civil Code allows immediate heirs of decedents to bring decedents' claims for damages for pain and suffering. Rossi–Cortés v. Toledo–Rivera, 540 F.Supp.2d. 318, 327 (D.P.R.2008).

The alleged shooting of the decedents by defendant Fontánez did not target the familial relationships of any of the plaintiffs. As a result, no plaintiff has standing to sue pursuant to section 1983 in his or her personal capacity. As shooting victims, however, the decedents suffered pain and discomfort, thus permitting their heirs to recover damages on the decedents' behalf. See Rossi–Cortés, 540 F.Supp.2d at 327. Accordingly, the Court finds that the decedents' heirs have standing to bring the suit pursuant to section 1983. The complaint lists minor plaintiff KPB, Juan González–Vellón, Mayra Carmona, and Lucy Cesáreo as the heirs of the decedents. The complaint does not allege that plaintiffs Juan González–Carmona, Víctor González–Carmona, or minor plaintiffs JG and AG are heirs of any of the decedents, therefore, their section 1983 claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.⁷

III. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a “court must view the facts contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom....” R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara–Núñez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir.2006). “[A]n adequate complaint must provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible legal claim.” Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2011). Any “[n]on-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must ... be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Where those factual allegations “ ‘allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

IV. AnalysisA. Section 1983 Claims Against the Commonwealth

Section 1983 “affords redress against a person, who under color of state law, deprives another person of any federal constitutional or statutory right.” ⁸Omni Behavioral Health v. Miller, 285 F.3d 646, 650–51 (8th Cir.2002) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985)). It creates “no independent substantive right, but rather, provides a cause of action by which individuals may seek money damages for governmental violations of rights protected by federal law.” Cruz–Erazo v. Rivera–Montañez, 212 F.3d 617, 621 (1st Cir.2000).

It is well-settled that in order for a claim to be cognizable pursuant to section 1983, a court must determine: “(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under the color of state-law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of the...