Burkham v. State, F--75--157

• Decision Date: 18 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. F--75--157,F--75--157
• Citation: 1975 OK CR 150,538 P.2d 1121
• Parties: Bobby J. BURKHAM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 1121

538 P.2d 1121

Bobby J. BURKHAM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F--75--157.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

July 18, 1975.

Ogden, Ogden & Board, Guymon, for appellant.

Larry Derryberry, Atty. Gen., James L. Swartz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Patton, Legal Intern, for appellee.

OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

Appellant, Bobby J. Burkham, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged, tried and convicted in the District Court, Texas County, Case No. CRF--74--41, for the offense of Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property, After Former Conviction of a Felony. His punishment was fixed at three (3) years in the State Penitentiary, and from said judgment and sentence a timely appeal has been perfected to this Court.

On February 23, 1974, Mr. Jerry Gass, a field inspector for the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association, contacted the sheriff of Guymon, Oklahoma. Mr. Gass believed he had a substantial lead in a case of stolen hogs which he was investigating. After contacting the sheriff, four officers and Mr. Gass proceeded to the farm leased by the defendant. Mr. Gass stated he saw, from the county road, a sow some distance from the Burkham farm. From that vantage point he could not tell if the sow was the stolen property which he sought. After arriving at the house, Undersheriff Luellen proceeded to the door and talked with Mrs. Burkham, asked who she was and if Mr. Burkham was at home. Officer Luellen returned to the car and they started to leave. As the car turned, Mr. Gass gained a better view of the property, causing them to stop again. Undersheriff Luellen returned to the house and asked permission to look at the hogs.

Undersheriff Luellen testified to the facts previously stated by Mr. Gass. He further stated that he asked permission of Mrs. Burkham to view the hogs, which permission she granted. Nonetheless, when they returned in Guymon, Mr. Borth, owner of the stolen hogs, was contacted. Also, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Bobby J. Burkham.

The testimony of Sundie Burkham, wife of the defendant, varied substantially from that of Mr. Gass and Officer Luellen. She related she was in the barn when she heard the dogs barking. When she came from the barn she observed Mr. Gass and Officer Luellen looking at the hogs. She stated at that time neither had asked permission to view the hogs, but when she first observed them they were already viewing the hogs. She specifically denied giving them permission and suggested they wait until her husband returned. At the conclusion of Mrs. Burkham's testimony, the defense rested.

In his only assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained by the officers during their warrantless search of his premises as described above. We note at the outset the familiar rule that a warrantless search, absent certain exceptions, is per se unreasonable and in contravention of the Fourth Amendment; however, an equally familiar exception to that rule is that such a search is not unreasonable where preceded by a free and voluntary consent. The question before us, then narrows to whether consent to search jointly-occupied premises, here a leased farmhouse and curtilage, given by a spouse can operate as a constitutional basis for a search as against the nonpresent nonconsenting spouse. ¹ We believe the question can be answered in the affirmative in accord with what we perceive to be the modern trend of authority as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 248 (1974). Therein, Mr. Justice White stated:

'It has been assumed by the parties and the courts below that the voluntary consent of any joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly occupied as valid against the co-occupant, permitting evidence discovered in the search to be used against him at a criminal trial. This basic proposition was accepted by the Seventh Circuit in this case, 476 F.2d (1083) at 1086, as it had been in prior cases, and has generally been applied in similar circumstances by other Circuit Courts of Appeal, and various state courts. This Court left open, in Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317, 41 S.Ct. 266, 267, 65 L.Ed. 654 (1921), the question whether wife's permission to search the residence in which she lived with her husband could 'waive his constitutional rights,' but more recent authority here clearly indicates that the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared. . . . (W)hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third parth who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effect sought to be inspected. ⁷ . . .' (Footnotes omitted, except footnote 7, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows)

We believe that the above statement of the law accurately sets forth the rule to be followed in the instant case. We also agree...