Burks v. Blackman, S.F. 20181
| Citation | 52 Cal.2d 715,344 P.2d 301 |
| Decision Date | 02 October 1959 |
| Docket Number | S.F. 20181 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
| Parties | Mary R. BURKS, Appellant, v. Boise BLACKMAN et al., Respondents. |
Vernon W. Humber and Thaddeus J. Kukula, San Francisco, for appellant.
Theodore Tamba, San Francisco, for respondents.
From a judgment in favor of defendants after trial before a jury in an action to recover damages for personal injuries, plaintiff appeals.
Facts: Defendant are owners and operators of an apartment house. Plaintiff rented one of the apartments, and in connection with the use thereof it was necessary for her to use a porch * and a stairway in the rear of her apartment immediately outside and opposite her back door.
On July 22, 1954, while plaintiff was walking along the porch it collapsed, and she was thrown to the ground and suffered personal injuries.
The porch upon which plaintiff was walking when it collapsed was used exclusively by plaintiff and her husband. However, it was contiguous to other parts of the apartment structure used in common by all the tenants in the building. Such parts had the same basic support as the porch used exclusively by plaintiff.
A structural engineer examined the porch soon after the accident and discovered that there was a generalized rotted and decaying condition under it and that a supporting member of the collapsed porch also had supported a porch and some steps that led to apartments above the one occupied by plaintiff.
Questions: First. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury regarding the landlord's duty to his tenant?
Yes. The trial court's instructions on this subject may be summarized as follows:
1. You are first required to determine whether the portion of the stairway that collapsed was a common area or whether it was for the exclusive use of the plaintiff tenant.
a. The test is not whether it is supported by a beam which also supports a common area.
b. The distance between this area and any area of common use is immaterial.
c. The test is: Whether plaintiff had the right to exclusive possession of the landing, and whether she had the right to order other tenants or even a landlord off the landing. If the other tenants and the landlord have a right to control, the right to use the landing, it was a common passageway or common area. If they did not have such right, it was a private area for the exclusive use of the plaintiff.
d. If you find that the landing was not a common way but was within the exclusive control of the plaintiff, there is no duty on a landlord to inspect the premises to be rented with the object of locating latent or hidden defects, nor to repair patent or obvious defects.
e. Put another way, if you find from the evidence that the platform gave access and egress solely to the flat occupied by the plaintiff, and to no other portion of the building used or necessary or convenient for the use of other tenants, then if you so find, I instruct you that the defendants, as lessors, were not liable for any condition of the porch unless, at the time of the letting thereof the defendants actually knew * * * of the condition of the porch, and with such knowledge failed to inform or advise the plaintiff thereof.
f. The instructions just given apply only in the event that you find that the platform was in the exclusive control of the plaintiff. If it were in the exclusive control of the plaintiff, and in the absence of contributory negligence * * * no liability should be attached to the landlord unless he actually knew of the defective condition and failed to report it to the tenant.
2. Now to the subject of the law if you find that platform number 2 was a common area or passageway. Now these instructions apply only if you find that landing number 2 was a common area, under the control of the landlord and other tenants, or that the landlord and other tenants had a right to exercise control or use of landing number 2, and if landing number 2 was not exclusively leased to the plaintiff or under the control of the plaintiff. (The correct standards of liability in the 'common passageway' situation were then stated.)
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