Burks v. Dayton Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 14 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | C. A. 29583 |
| Citation | 2023 Ohio 1227 |
| Parties | SHIRLETTE "PEGGY" C. BURKS Appellant v. DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL. Appellees |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
(Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Trial Court No. 2022 CV 01157)
PETER K. NEWMAN, Attorney for Appellant
W JOSEPH SCHOLLER, CHARLES B. GALVIN, JONATHAN E. ROACH, MARION H. LITTLE, JR., & KRIS BANVARD, Attorneys for Appellee
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant Shirlette C. Burks appeals from two orders of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court. The first order granted the Dayton Public Schools Board of Education's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss; the second order denied Burks's motion for leave to amend the complaint regarding additional defendants, Jason Stuckey and the Law Firm of Bricker & Eckler, LLP. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
{¶ 2} On March 16, 2022, Burks filed a complaint against the Dayton Public Schools Board of Education, Joseph Lacey in his capacity as a Dayton Public Schools Board of Education Member, Judith Spurlock in her capacity as the Former Executive Director of Human Resources for Dayton Public Schools, Jason Stuckey in his capacity as an attorney for Dayton Public Schools Board of Education, by and through his law firm Bricker & Eckler, LLP, as well as the law firm itself.
{¶ 3} The facts alleged in the complaint stated that Burks worked for Dayton Public Schools ("DPS") for over 50 years, most recently as the Principal of Charity Adams Earley Academy for Girls. In the fall of 2017, based on an allegation that another teacher had observed two students engaging in a public display of affection, Burks called the students into her office and engaged in a conversation with them. According to Burks, during the meeting she explained the school's policy against public displays of affection and advised the students not to engage in it at school. According to the mothers of the two students, Burks made derogatory statements to the students during the meeting. The mothers complained to Joseph Lacey, which purportedly resulted in Judith Spurlock's asking Burks to either resign or be terminated. Although Burks denied the allegations made by the mothers and intended to continue working for another five years, she agreed to resign early so long as the Board of Education agreed to two conditions: 1) the Board would keep the parents' allegations "strictly confidential and [they] would never be discussed in the future," and 2) the Board would not interfere with Burks' retirement and medical benefits. Complaint at ¶ 10. Based on an oral representation from Spurlock on behalf of the Board of Education agreeing to Burks' two conditions, Burks submitted her resignation on March 16, 2018. Id. No written document was ever produced regarding the alleged confidentiality agreement to keep the parents' allegations "strictly confidential."
{¶ 4} On March 14, 2019, Burks testified at an unrelated administrative hearing involving the termination of a DPS teacher. During that hearing, Jason Stuckey, who represented the DPS Board of Education, attempted to attack Burks' credibility during cross-examination. Id. at ¶ 12. A copy of the transcript from that hearing was attached to the complaint as Plaintiff's Exhibit A. The transcript reflects that Stuckey questioned Burks regarding the charges and specifications made against her by the school district for which she had been placed on paid administrative leave. Complaint Exhibit A, Tr. 439-443. This included the allegations the parents made in 2017. Id. According to the complaint, after Burks' testimony was completed, an unnamed attorney informed Stuckey that he had broken the Board's agreement with Burks to keep the allegations confidential, and Stuckey was warned not to breach the confidentiality agreement again. Complaint at ¶ 13.
{¶ 5} On June 5, 2019, Burks testified again during a separate unrelated administrative hearing regarding another DPS teacher's termination. Id. at ¶ 14. A copy of the transcript from that hearing was attached to the complaint as Plaintiff's Exhibit B. The transcript reflects that during that hearing, Stuckey again questioned Burks during cross-examination regarding the charges and specifications made against her by the school district. Complaint Exhibit B, Tr. 693-698. When confronted with an objection to that line of questioning, Stuckey stated that he was "not aware of any confidentiality agreement regarding this." Id. at 695. Burks alleged in her complaint that as a proximate cause of Stuckey's first and second breaches of the DPS Board of Education's confidentiality agreement with Burks to keep the parents' false allegations against her confidential, and Stuckey's false assertion that he had not known about the confidentiality agreement, Burks suffered, and continued to suffer, severe emotional distress. Complaint at ¶ 15.
{¶ 6} Based on these facts, in March 2022, Burks alleged a cause of action against DPS Board of Education, Lacey, and Spurlock (collectively identified as" the DPS Board") for tortious interference with a contract. The remaining two causes of action were against all the listed defendants and alleged promissory estoppel and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").
{¶ 7} In lieu of an answer, on April 15, 2022, defendants Stuckey and Bricker & Eckler, LLP (collectively identified as "the Bricker Defendants") filed a motion to dismiss Burks' complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The Bricker Defendants stated that not only did Burks not make any claims that the Bricker Defendants had been involved in making the alleged promises, but her claim for promissory estoppel failed to state a claim against them based on the law of agency. They argued that, as agents of a disclosed principal, the agents could not be held vicariously liable for the actions of the principal in making the promise or agreement. Additionally, the Bricker Defendants argued that the claim of IIED failed because it was premised on a breach of contract, which is not a tort under Ohio law. Further, they contended that Burks failed to set forth sufficient facts to constitute "extreme and outrageous" conduct as a matter of law.
{¶ 8} In response, Burks alleged that the "promissory estoppel claim is based on [the Bricker Defendants'] breach of the fiduciary duty which they owed her to comply with their clients - the [DPS Board] - confidentiality agreement[.]" Burks Motion in Opposition to Bricker Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 1-2. Burks declared that although she "did not specifically allege her breach of fiduciary duty claim against [the Bricker Defendants], her Complaint presents sufficient facts on which this Court can recognize her claim." Id. at p. 4. Burks stated that if the trial court disagreed, then "the appropriate remedy would be to grant Mrs. Burks leave to amend her Complaint." Id. at p. 6. Burks attached additional documentation to her motion that was not attached to her original complaint.
{¶ 9} On May 12, 2022, the Bricker Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss in which they chided Burks for attempting to add a new claim for breach of fiduciary duty when it had not previously been raised. Further, they opposed the introduction of any new materials filed with Burks' response.
{¶ 10} The trial court sustained the Bricker Defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety on June 2, 2022. On June 29, 2022, Burks filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint to add a claim of breach of fiduciary duty related only to the Bricker Defendants. The amended complaint also repeated the original claim for IIED but did not include a cause of action for promissory estoppel as to the Bricker Defendants. The trial court denied her motion on August 25, 2022.
{¶ 11} Meanwhile, on May 18, 2022, the DPS Board filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The DPS Board alleged that Burks' tortious interference with a contract claim must fail because the Board could not interfere with its own employment contract. Likewise, the DPS Board argued that a cause of action for tortious interference with an employment contract cannot lie against a supervisory employee acting within the scope of his or her duties such that neither Lacey nor Spurlock could be found liable. The DPS Board further argued that as a political subdivision engaged in a governmental function, the DPS Board and its employees could not be found liable under a theory of promissory estoppel and were entitled to immunity. Finally, the DPS Board stated that Burks' claim for IIED was facially deficient as there were no allegations in the complaint that the DPS Board had intended to cause Burks serious emotional distress or that any extreme and outrageous conduct had occurred as a matter of law.
{¶ 12} In her response, Burks acknowledged that she could not bring a tortious interference claim against the DPS Board because it was a party to her employment contract. However, she argued that Lacey and Spurlock had acted outside the scope of their duties by engaging in unlawful conduct. Burks further acknowledged that she could not bring a promissory estoppel claim against either Lacey or Spurlock but argued that her promissory estoppel claim against the DPS Board survived because the DPS Board had not been engaged in a governmental function but rather unlawful conduct when (1) Spurlock induced Burks to resign, and (2) the DPS Board breached the confidentiality agreement, i.e., when Stuckey cross-examined Burks during the administrative hearings. Lastly, Burks claimed she alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for IIED because a claim of IIED implicitly alleges...
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