Burks v. Walker

• Decision Date: 14 December 1909
• Parties: BURKS v. WALKER.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

109 P. 544

25 Okla. 353, 1909 OK 317

BURKS v. WALKER.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

December 14, 1909

Syllabus by the Court.

That act of the Legislature entitled "An act creating and establishing a county superior court for each county of the state having a population of 30,000, and a city therein of 8,000," etc. (Sess. Laws 1909, p. 181), does not violate sections 1 and 10 of article 7 of the Constitution.

Said act is general in its nature and uniform in its operation and does not violate section 59, art. 5, Const.

(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff).

The phrase "original jurisdiction" means the power to entertain cases in the first instance as distinguished from appellate jurisdiction, and does not mean exclusive jurisdiction. A court of original jurisdiction is one in which an action has its origin.

Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; George W. Clark, Judge.

Action by D. W. Walker against F. H. Burks. From an order transferring the cause, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

M Fulton, for plaintiff in error.

HAYES J.

Plaintiff in error seeks by this proceeding to reverse an order of the district court of Oklahoma county transferring this cause from that court to the superior court of Oklahoma county. Defendant in error, plaintiff below, seeks by this action in that court to recover the sum of $5,000 as damages for personal injuries sustained by him from an alleged assault upon his person by plaintiff in error, defendant below. The order of transfer was made upon motion of plaintiff under the provisions of section 10 of an act approved March 24, 1909 entitled: "An act creating and establishing a county superior court for each county of the state having a population of 30,000 and a city therein of 8,000, and fixing the jurisdiction of said court," etc. (Sess. Laws 1909, p. 181), which act we shall hereafter refer to as the "Superior Court Act." A reversal of this order is sought upon the ground that several of the provisions of the act creating the court and conferring upon it jurisdiction of certain causes are in conflict with the Constitution, and, further, that said act is lacking in some essentials necessary to the establishment of any court thereunder.

Section 2 of the act confers upon the courts established thereby concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in all proceedings, causes, or matters, and concurrent jurisdiction with the county court in all civil and criminal matters except matters of probate. It is urged that that portion of the section which confers concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in all matters violates section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution (Snyder's Ed. p. 205), in that it creates a court with jurisdiction equal to the jurisdiction of the district court, and violates section 10 of the same article for the reason that it confers jurisdiction upon the superior courts that is by said section of the Constitution conferred exclusively upon the district courts. Section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution provides: "The judicial power of this state shall be vested in the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, a Supreme Court, district courts, county courts, courts of justices of the peace, municipal courts, and such other courts, commissions or boards, inferior to the Supreme Court, as may be established by law." That portion of the section reading "and such other courts, commissions or boards, inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established by law," clearly contemplates and provides that a portion of the judicial power of the state may be vested in other courts than those specifically named in the section. It is to be borne in mind that a state Constitution, in so far as it relates to the legislative department of the state, does not grant powers, but limits them, and such department possesses all the legislative powers not prohibited or restricted by the provisions of the Constitution. The only limitation imposed by this section upon the power of the Legislature to create other courts is that such courts shall be inferior to the Supreme Court. The words "inferior courts," as used in constitutional and statutory provisions, are sometimes used in a technical sense and apply to courts of special and limited jurisdiction which are created on such principles that their judgments, taken alone, are entirely disregarded, and the proceeding must show their jurisdiction. Lessee of Robert Grignon et al. v. Astor et al., 2 How. 319, 11 L.Ed. 283. They are also used in the more general sense as applying to that class of courts from which an appeal lies to some appellate court and to express the relation between said classes of courts. Swift v. Wayne Cir. Judges, 64 Mich. 479, 31 N.W. 434; State v. Daniels, 66 Mo. 192; Ex parte Orr, 51 Ala. 42; Sanders v. State, 55 Ala. 42. The words "inferior" and "courts" do not appear in the provision of the Constitution now under consideration in the relative positions that they occur in similar provisions of the Constitutions of some of the other states. The relative positions of these words as they appear in section 1, supra, aid materially in arriving at the meaning intended. This section provides that the judicial power shall be in certain named courts and such other courts "inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established by law." The position of the word "inferior" indicates that it was intended to fix the relation that any court created by the Legislature should bear to the Supreme Court, and that it in no way attempted to fix the relation of such courts to the other courts named in said section. No limitation or prohibition is contained in this section against the Legislature creating courts with jurisdiction concurrent with any of the other courts named therein, and, if such limitation or prohibition exists, we must look to other provisions of the Constitution to find it.

In Morris et al. v. Bunyan, 58 Kan. 212, 48 P. 864, a provision of the Kansas Constitution not identical with the one now under consideration, but very similar, was considered by the Supreme Court of that state, and held not to prohibit the creation of another court having jurisdiction concurrent with the district court of that state in one or all classes of cases. The court in the opinion said: "Section 1 of the same article vests the judicial power of the state in the Supreme Court, district courts, probate courts, justices of the peace, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be provided by law. No restriction is anywhere imposed on the creation of courts inferior to the Supreme Court. The Legislature is left free, not only to create such courts inferior to the Supreme Court as it deems best, but also to confer so much, or so little, jurisdiction on them as it sees fit. *** The Constitution does not prohibit the Legislature from conferring concurrent jurisdiction on two or more courts, and no good reason is apparent, opposed to the policy even, of doing so." Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah, 473, 88 P. 609, 120 Am. St. Rep. 935, is another case in point. The Constitution of Utah (article 8, § 1) provides that the judicial power of the state shall be vested "in a Supreme Court, in district courts, in justices of the peace, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established by law." The Legislature of that state passed an act creating a juvenile court and conferring upon it jurisdiction of certain cases that had theretofore been exercised by the district court. In discussing the contention of appellant in that case that the act was void, because it gave to the juvenile court certain powers theretofore exercised by the district court, Mr. Justice Frick in the opinion said: "But the fact that certain powers or duties may be exercised by certain courts does not prohibit the Legislature from creating new courts and conferring upon those like powers and duties. Indeed, our Constitution seems to have been framed with this object in view. *** While there are certain limitations in respect to certain powers as applied to certain courts, the Constitution wisely refrains from conferring exclusive original jurisdiction upon any of the courts, but vests such original jurisdiction in all the courts to be apportioned and exercised as the Legislature may direct."

Section 10 of article 7 of the Constitution (Snyder's Ed. p 218), in part, provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, civil and criminal, except where exclusive jurisdiction is by this Constitution, or by law, conferred on some other court, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be provided in this Constitution, or by law." It is urged that this clause of the Constitution confers upon the district courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases, except where exclusive jurisdiction is by the Constitution or by law conferred upon some other court. This contention would have us interpret the words "original jurisdiction" to mean "exclusive original jurisdiction." The phrase "original jurisdiction" means the power to entertain cases in the first instance as distinguished from appellate jurisdiction. Castner v. Chandler, 2 Minn. 86 (Gil. 68). It does not mean exclusive jurisdiction. A court of original jurisdiction is one in which an action has its origin. Abbott v. Knowlton, 31 Me. 77 . This phrase, it is true, when influenced by the context of a statutory or constitutional provision of which it forms a part, may be construed to confer exclusive jurisdiction, and was so construed in Caulfield v. Hudson et al., 3 Cal. 389, and Zander v. Coe, 5 Cal. 230. This meaning, however, was given in those cases as a result of the influence of the context of the Constitution of which these words formed a part, and in connection with the...