Burks v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp.
| Decision Date | 29 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-2950.,05-2950. |
| Citation | 464 F.3d 744 |
| Parties | Pamela J. BURKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Marcia L. Traska, and Mary P. Forlenza, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
David E. Lasker (argued), Lasker & Edwards, Madison, WI, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Michael J. Losse (argued), Office of the Attorney General Wisconsin Department of Justice, Madison, WI, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before BAUER, RIPPLE and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
After her employment was terminated on August 9, 2002, Pamela Burks brought this action against her former employer, the Wisconsin Department of Transportation ("WDOT"), as well as two WDOT employees, Marcia Traska and Mary Forlenza. In her complaint, Ms. Burks alleged a number of claims against the defendants: discrimination and the creation of a hostile work environment on the basis of disability in violation of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1974 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794; unlawful discrimination based on race, color and ancestry in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; retaliation for activities protected by Title VII; retaliation on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and harassment and retaliation on the basis of race also in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
A. Facts
Ms. Burks is of African-American and Hispanic descent. As a result of a 1984 automobile accident, she suffers from permanent hearing and sight impairment, and shoulder, neck and spinal cord injuries. These injuries make it difficult for her to walk, sit or stand for extended periods of time.
In 2000, Ms. Burks applied for a position in the WDOT Bureau of Transit and Local Roads, Local Transportation Programs and Finance Section. She interviewed with Ms. Traska and Ms. Forlenza in December of 2000, and she disclosed the nature of her disabilities, as well as some of her requested accommodations. Ms. Burks ultimately was hired and appointed to the position of program manager in November 2001; in that position, she was required to complete a probationary period of six months before assuming permanent employee status. Ms. Traska was a Unit Supervisor in the Bureau of Transit and was Ms. Burks' immediate supervisor during her term of employment.1 Ms. Forlenza was a Planning and Analysis Administrator at WDOT and was Ms. Traska's immediate supervisor.
According to Ms. Burks, soon after she was hired, she filled out a disability self-identification form. She also informed Ms. Traska and Ms. Forlenza that, because she previously had been employed by the State of Wisconsin, her disability information already should have been on file. Ms. Burks claims that, because of her disability, she needed a number of reasonable accommodations: an amplified telephone, visually contrasting paper, large grip pencils and pens, reduced lighting, a chair with adjustable arm rests and a raised work station so that she may work while sitting or standing. Ms. Burks alleged that in late November or early December 2001, she was invited to the WDOT chair lab to select a chair that would accommodate her disability. Plans for the raised work station were not approved until May 2002, and the work station was not completed prior to Ms. Burks' termination. Ms. Burks believes that the untimeliness of these accommodations is evidence of disability discrimination.
In her position as program manager, Ms. Burks processed applications from localities for program benefits from WDOT. According to Ms. Burks, a substantial portion of her workload involved the use of a computer application, the Local Roads Improvement Program ("LRIP"). At the time of Ms. Burks' hire, another employee, Ms. Cole, held a position similar to the one Ms. Burks assumed. Ms. Burks and Cole often worked closely together on projects, completing the same type of work and using the same computer program. Ms. Burks also had frequent interaction with Ms. Watzke, a receptionist on the floor, and Ms. Brigham-Abrouq, who managed the LRIP computer application and consulted with the unit on the use of that application.
On February 19, 2002, Ms. Burks received a positive three-month probationary review, completed by Ms. Traska. The review stated that Ms. Burks was "meet[ing] normal performance standards," and that "she can be counted on to follow through on assignments" in a timely manner. R.9, Ex.E at 2.
According to Ms. Burks, she complained to Ms. Forlenza for the first time in March 2002 that she was being harassed because of her race and disabilities. Ms. Burks claims that the harassment included Ms. Traska's coming to her office several times a day, as well as Ms. Traska's spreading of rumors around the office about Ms. Burks' disabilities and her need for accommodation. After March, Ms. Burks alleges that she continued to alert Ms. Forlenza about incidents of discrimination. Ms. Burks also claims that, over the course of her employment, both Ms. Traska and Ms. Forlenza "became increasingly critical, hostile, and down-right rude." R.16 at 8. According to Ms. Burks, Ms. Traska and Ms. Forlenza would "verbally attack" and "berate" her at unit meetings. R.15 at 9-10. She also alleges that the defendants began to criticize the manner in which she took meeting notes that were shared with the group.
On May 15, 2002, Ms. Burks received her second evaluation from Ms. Traska; it was noted that her performance "d[id] not meet normal performance standards." R.9, Ex.G at 2. Ms. Traska also noted that there had been a decline in the "level and dependability of [Ms. Burks'] work performance and attitude" since the three-month evaluation, and that her performance had "been uneven and unpredictable." Id. Also, Ms. Traska wrote that the "inconsistent quality of her work and accompanying attitude are not acceptable" and that Ms. Burks tended to blame others for her mistakes. Id. However, Ms. Traska noted that Ms. Burks "recently ... [had] take[n] more initiative, responsibility, and accountability for her work." Id. Accordingly, Ms. Forlenza extended Ms. Burks' probationary period three more months, for a total of nine months, and set up weekly monitoring of Ms. Burks by Ms. Traska.
On August 9, 2002, Ms. Burks was terminated during her extended probationary period. A letter sent to Ms. Burks gave five reasons for her termination: (1) "Failure to meet assigned deadlines;" (2) "Failure to follow-up and effectively communicate with local officials;" (3) "Lack of initiative in performing [her] job duties;" (4) "Not following directions and providing deliverables as requested;" and (5) "Not taking personal responsibility for effectively completing [ ] work assignments." R.9, Ex.I at 1.
After Ms. Burks was terminated, Cole was asked to remove all paperwork from Ms. Burks' desk and to complete a detailed inventory of everything found there. Watzke assumed Ms. Burks' former duties as a program manager.
Ms. Burks later filed this action. She alleged claims against WDOT for retaliation and for racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. She further alleged discrimination and creation of a hostile work environment based on disability in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Ms. Burks' action also included claims against Ms. Traska and Ms. Forlenza under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; for discrimination and retaliation based on disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and for deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all these claims.
At issue in this appeal is the defendants' alleged discrimination based on race and disability, as well as their alleged retaliation against Ms. Burks based on her complaints of racial and disability discrimination.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, examining the facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Burks as the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Haywood v. Lucent Techs., 323 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir.2003).
Ms. Burks alleges racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment. Our analysis is the same for both claims.2 In her response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Ms. Burks claims that she has demonstrated racial discrimination under the indirect method,3 thus establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the familiar burden-shifting test of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir.1997). To do so, she must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) her job performance met WDOT's legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) another similarly situated individual who was not in the protected class was treated more favorably than the plaintiff. See id.
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination is raised, and the burden shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. (). If the employer meets this burden, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Riley v. Vilsack
...a charge with the EEOC. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1931, 170 L.Ed.2d 887 (2008); Burks v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 464 F.3d 744, 758 (7th Cir.2006). Plaintiff includes one sentence in his complaint about retaliation: "when he and other workers began to opp......
-
Anderson v. The Foster Group
...Count II, Plaintiff may prove his claim of retaliation in violation of the ADA via direct or indirect evidence. Burks v. Wise. Dep't of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 758 (7th Cir.2006). Under the direct approach, a plaintiff must present evidence that he engaged in a statutorily protected activity......
-
Williams v. Brunswick County Bd. Of Educ.
...Gen. of U.S. Postal Serv., 335 Fed.Appx. 21, 26 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (unpublished) (same); Burks v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 756 n. 12, 758 & n. 16 (7th Cir.2006) (same); see also Warren v. Goord, No. 06-3349-PR, --- Fed.Appx. ----, ----, 2008 WL 5077004, at *2 (2d Cir. ......
-
Jones v. Nat'l Council of Young Men's Christian Associations of U.S.
...class was treated more favorably than the plaintiff [or plaintiffs].” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 845 (citing Burks v. Wis. Dep't of Trans., 464 F.3d 744, 750–51 (7th Cir.2006) ). “Once a prima facie case is established, a presumption of discrimination is triggered.” Id. The burden then shifts to ......