Burlington County Welfare Bd. v. McClain

• Decision Date: 07 February 1983
• Citation: 189 N.J.Super. 152,458 A.2d 1348
• Parties: BURLINGTON COUNTY WELFARE BOARD, Plaintiff, v. Jane McCLAIN, Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey District Court

Page 152

189 N.J.Super. 152

458 A.2d 1348

BURLINGTON COUNTY WELFARE BOARD, Plaintiff, v. Jane McCLAIN, Defendant.

District Court, Burlington County New Jersey.

Feb. 7, 1983.

Jeffrey David Kotler, Mount Holly, for plaintiff (Sidney W. Bookbinder, Burlington, attorney).

James G. Gavin, Burlington, for defendant (Camden Regional Legal Services, Inc.).

GOTTLIEB, J.J.D.R.C. (temporarily assigned).

This case questions whether a person who assumes the responsibility for raising a child qualifies as a relative eligible to receive benefits for that child under the aid to families with dependent children program (AFDC), 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq.; N.J.S.A. 44:10-1 et seq.

In December 1963 a child was placed for adoption by Camden Social Services of the Diocese of Camden with defendant and her husband. Although an adoption was intended at the time of placement, difficulties arose when it was ascertained that the child had cerebral palsy. The child continued to reside with defendant and her husband, even though no adoption order was obtained, until December 1980. ¹ At that time defendant and the child separated from defendant's husband as a result of acts of domestic violence. Defendant then applied for and received $1,497 as an assistance grant under AFDC. Plaintiff board seeks to recover that amount, asserting defendant's nonqualification under AFDC.

To be eligible under AFDC the child must live with certain relatives enumerated in 42 U.S.C.A. § 606(a)(1). See, also, N.J.S.A. 44:10-1(c)(2). These relatives include "mother." Defendant contends that although she is not the natural or adoptive mother of the child, her actual interrelationship with the child is that of a mother. She asserts that the statutes should be liberally interpreted to allow her inclusion as a qualifying relative.

In determining whether "mother" includes a nonrelated individual who takes a child into her home and provides the nurture, love, care and guidance normally expected to be furnished by a mother, it must be recognized that "(t)he method of analysis used to define the federal standard of eligibility is no different from that used in solving any other problem of statutory construction." Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580, 95 S.Ct. 1180, 1184, 43 L.Ed.2d 469 (1975). As noted in Renz v. Penn Central Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 440, 435 A.2d 540 (1981), "statutory language should be given its ordinary meaning absent specific intent to the contrary." "Mother" has an ordinary, well-understood meaning. It is defined either as one who gives birth to a child, Gardner v. Hall, 132 N.J.Eq. 64, 72, 26 A.2d 799 (Chan.1942), or a female who adopts a child. Cf., N.J.S.A. 3B:1-1 ("Child") and 3B:1-2 ("Parent"). Thus, it is necessary to ascertain if Congress intended a different meaning to apply to AFDC.

Congress enacted AFDC to aid "needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life." 42 U.S.C.A. § 601. The statutory purpose is to assist certain, but not all, needy children. Stevens v. Califano, 448 F.Supp. 1313, 1319 (N.D.Ohio 1978). As a result, the definitions of the qualifying relatives have been strictly construed; for example, "parent" includes only those persons with a legal duty of support. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 327, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2138, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). In Cannon v. Illinois, Dep't of Public Aid, 76 Ill.App.3d 910, 32 Ill.Dec. 502, 395 N.E.2d 732, 734 (App.Ct.1979), it was held that a first cousin once removed is not a first cousin under the statutory provisions. Contra., Ottman v. Fisher, Me., 319 A.2d 56, 63 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1974). As stated in Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 582, 95 S.Ct....