Burnett v. Kansas City School Board

• Decision Date: 26 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. WD 68828.,WD 68828.
• Citation: 237 S.W.3d 237
• Parties: Barbara BURNETT, et al., Respondents, v. KANSAS CITY SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

237 S.W.3d 237

Barbara BURNETT, et al., Respondents, v. KANSAS CITY SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Appellants.

No. WD 68828.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

October 26, 2007.

Allan Hallquist, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Steven Mauer, Kansas City, and Bradley Alan Constance, Independence, MO, for Respondent.

RONALD R. HOLLIGER, Judge.

The Kansas City School Board ("KCMSD") appeals a mandamus order directing that it certify a boundary change question for submission to the voters of the Kansas City School District at the November 6, 2007, election. KCMSD contends that the boundary change law, RSMo section 162.431,¹ does not apply to districts like Kansas City's, which hold biennial, rather than annual, elections for its board members. The boundary change is proposed in a petition presented to KCMSD seeking to transfer a large section of the Kansas City School District to the Independence School District. We find that the boundary change statute is unambiguous in relevant part and applies to KCMSD. The board therefore has a ministerial duty to place the issue before its voters. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly granted the writ directing KCSMD to certify the petition to the Kansas City Election Board for placement on the November ballot.

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondents Barbara Burnett, Lois McDonald, Anthony Miller, and Patricia Rector (collectively "Relators") seek to place a school district boundary change question involving the Kansas City and Independence school districts before the voters pursuant to section 162.431. Pursuant to that statute, Relators obtained the signatures of voters from both of the affected districts. Relators then submitted the petition signatures to the Jackson County Board of Election Commissioners and the Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners in order to place the boundary change issue on the ballot for the November 6, 2007, election. Both election boards counted and verified the signatures, determining that they were sufficient to place the issue on the ballot. The Independence School Board certified the petition to the election board. KCMSD took no action on the petition for a boundary change. Relators then petitioned for a writ of mandamus, claiming KCMSD had a ministerial duty to call the election under subsection 162.431.1.

At oral argument before the trial court, KCMSD asserted that the boundary change statute does not apply to it because section 162.431 requires petition signatures from voters in the "last annual school election." As an urban school district created prior to 2000, KCMSD holds biennial elections. See section 162.481. In issuing the writ, the trial court relied upon section 162.461, which states that urban districts are "governed by the same general laws as other seven-director school districts, except as otherwise provided by law." The trial court held that the word "annual" in section 162.431 is not explicit enough to constitute an exception under the "otherwise provided by law" provision in section 162.461. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Mandamus is appropriate when seeking to require an official to perform a ministerial act. State ex rel. Mo. Growth Ass'n v. State Tax Comm'n, 998 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Mo. banc 1999). This court reviews the grant of a writ of mandamus under an abuse of discretion standard. Bergman v. Mills, 988 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Mo. App. W.D.1999). "Under [that] standard we will reverse the trial court's ruling only if it is `so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration.'" Id. (quoting Whitman's Candies, Inc. v. Pet Inc., 974 S.W.2d 519, 527 (Mo.App. W.D.1998)). We will not find an abuse of discretion "if reasonable people might differ about the propriety of the trial court's decision." Whitman's, 974 S.W.2d at 527-28. Matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. State ex rel. Wolfrum v. Wiesman, 225 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Mo. banc 2007).

Discussion

KCMSD's principal contention centers on the meaning and applicability of the school district boundary change statute, which states, in relevant part:

When it is necessary² to change the boundary lines between seven-director school districts, in each district affected, ten percent of the voters by number of those voting for school board members in the last annual school election in each district may petition the district boards of education in the districts affected, regardless of county lines, for a change in boundaries. The question shall be submitted at the next election, as the term "election" is defined in section 115.123, RSMo.

Section 162.431.1.³

KCMSD argues on appeal, as it did before the trial court, that the word "annual," as used in the first sentence of the statute, manifests the legislature's intent that the petition-initiated boundary change provisions not apply to a school district, like KCMSD, that does not hold annual elections for school board members. In considering this argument, the trial court examined the language at issue, finding it to be unambiguous, but also finding that the terms of the statute, "when given their ordinary meaning, produce an illogical or absurd result in light of the statute's purpose." Sisco v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Ret. Sys. of St. Louis, 31 S.W.3d 114, 119 (Mo. App. E.D.2000). Recognizing the general presumption that the legislature intends a logical result when enacting statutes, the trial court proceeded to apply rules of statutory construction in an effort to divine the legislature's intent. See id.

On appeal, however, we find no need to resort to rules of statutory construction, as the alleged ambiguity (or absurdity, as the case may be), is not relevant to the issue at hand: whether section 162.431 applies to the Kansas City Missouri School District.

There is no dispute that section 162.431 is a general law applicable to seven-director school districts. KCMSD's argument focuses on the fact that it is an urban district. See section 160.011.14. Since urban districts were created in 1963, they have "possess[ed] the same corporate powers and [have been] governed by the same general laws as other seven-director school districts, except as otherwise provided by law." Section 162.461. KCMSD argues that the word "annual" in section 162.431 creates an exception "otherwise provided by law" pursuant to section 162.461. We disagree.

The legislature has made explicit exceptions for urban districts in other statutes within Chapter 162. See sections 162.261, 162.301 ("seven-director school district, other than an urban district"); section 162.291 ("each seven-director district other than urban districts"). Other exceptions exist not within the language of the statute pertaining to seven-director districts, but by way of parallel provisions governing urban districts. Compare section 162.461 (urban district name), with sections 162.311, 162.321 (seven-director district name); Compare section 162.481 (establishment of urban districts), with sections 162.211, 162.221 (establishment of seven-director districts).⁴

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that the word "annual" in section 162.431 does not constitute an exception to the rule that urban districts are subject to the same general laws as seven-director districts. An examination of the history of the statutory language at issue is illustrative.⁵ Section 162.431 was enacted in 1963, as part of a general revision of the laws governing school districts. 1963 Mo. Laws p. 226 section 3-42. Just as in its current form, the original statute made reference to two different elections.

The first reference to an election is of particular relevance in the instant case. That reference is to a prior election (the signature determinative election), which is used to calculate the number of petition signatures required to place a boundary change question before the voters. In 1963, that signature determinative election was referred to as "the last preceding election of such [school board] members." Id. Obviously such an election could have been annual or biennial. In 1997, for no reason apparent on the face of the statute, this language was amended to its current form, referring to "the last annual school election." 1997 Mo. Laws p. 529-30 section 162.431.

The statute's second reference to an election is of less relevance in the instant appeal. That second reference is to a future election, at which the voters will adopt or reject the proposed boundary change. In 1963, that future election was referred to as "the next annual or biennial election." 1963 Mo. Laws p. 226 section 3-42. In 1978, as part of a general revision of the state's election laws, this language was amended so that the boundary change would be submitted to the voters at "the next municipal election." 1978 Mo. Laws p. 325 section 162.431. In 2007, the language was amended to its current form, directing that the boundary change be submitted to a vote at "the next election, as the term `election' is defined in section 115.123, RSMo." 2007 Mo. Laws p. 1092 section 162.431.

From this statutory history, KCMSD claims that the deletion of the phrase "next annual or biennial election," in 1978, and the insertion of the phrase "last annual school election," in 1997, evidences the legislature's intent to exclude school districts that hold biennial elections from the operation of the statute. In making this argument, KCMSD is forced to overlook a period of eleven years in which section 162.431 makes no mention of the periodicity of school board elections. That eleven-year gap is difficult to explain if the terms "annual" and "biennial" are to be accorded the import that KCMSD proposes. Of even greater significance is the fact that the 1963 phrase "next annual or biennial election" and the 1997 phrase "last annual election" are in different sentences and refer to two different elections. We conclude...